Kierkegaard\u27s Theory of Boredom and the Development of Personality by Wadhams, Luke
University of Kentucky 
UKnowledge 
Theses and Dissertations--Philosophy Philosophy 
2020 
Kierkegaard's Theory of Boredom and the Development of 
Personality 
Luke Wadhams 
University of Kentucky, lwa237@g.uky.edu 
Digital Object Identifier: https://doi.org/10.13023/etd.2020.225 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Wadhams, Luke, "Kierkegaard's Theory of Boredom and the Development of Personality" (2020). Theses 
and Dissertations--Philosophy. 25. 
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/philosophy_etds/25 
This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at UKnowledge. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations--Philosophy by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For 
more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
STUDENT AGREEMENT: 
I represent that my thesis or dissertation and abstract are my original work. Proper attribution 
has been given to all outside sources. I understand that I am solely responsible for obtaining 
any needed copyright permissions. I have obtained needed written permission statement(s) 
from the owner(s) of each third-party copyrighted matter to be included in my work, allowing 
electronic distribution (if such use is not permitted by the fair use doctrine) which will be 
submitted to UKnowledge as Additional File. 
I hereby grant to The University of Kentucky and its agents the irrevocable, non-exclusive, and 
royalty-free license to archive and make accessible my work in whole or in part in all forms of 
media, now or hereafter known. I agree that the document mentioned above may be made 
available immediately for worldwide access unless an embargo applies. 
I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use in 
future works (such as articles or books) all or part of my work. I understand that I am free to 
register the copyright to my work. 
REVIEW, APPROVAL AND ACCEPTANCE 
The document mentioned above has been reviewed and accepted by the student’s advisor, on 
behalf of the advisory committee, and by the Director of Graduate Studies (DGS), on behalf of 
the program; we verify that this is the final, approved version of the student’s thesis including all 
changes required by the advisory committee. The undersigned agree to abide by the statements 
above. 
Luke Wadhams, Student 
Dr. Stefan Bird-Pollan, Major Professor 
Dr. Clare Batty, Director of Graduate Studies 





A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the 
College of Arts and Sciences 




Director: Dr. Stefan Bird-Pollan, Professor of Philosophy 
Lexington, Kentucky 
2020 
Copyright © Luke Wadhams 2020 
ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
KIERKEGAARD’S THEORY OF BOREDOM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
PERSONALITY 
This dissertation examines the conception of boredom presented in the work of 
Søren Kierkegaard.  Kierkegaard is known for deriving philosophical insights into human 
nature from phenomenological analyses of various moods.  However, while Kierkegaard 
provides explicit and complete accounts of anxiety, despair, and melancholy, his analyses 
of boredom are only ever fragmentary and dispersed.  Additionally, most scholars either 
neglect Kierkegaard’s descriptions of boredom or dismiss them as mere novelty, and, even 
though a few scholars analyze the concept, there is still no sustained and thorough account 
of the same.  This dissertation advances Kierkegaard scholarship by piecing together 
Kierkegaard’s theory of boredom from his fragmentary descriptions of the 
phenomenon.  Through a close reading of Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Irony and 
Either/Or, the dissertation demonstrates two main claims about Kierkegaard’s 
theory.  First, it shows that the experience of boredom can be understood in the work of 
Kierkegaard as expressive of the achievement of a reflective stance toward existence – a 
stance in which one begins questioning the meaning of one’s life and the ultimate 
justification for one’s actions.  Second, the dissertation shows that, based on how 
Kierkegaard situates the concept of boredom within his general theory of personal 
development, the concept of boredom is a crucial component of his philosophical project 
of explaining the stages of life through which an individual passes in the development of 
an adequate conception of itself.  Specifically, the dissertation argues that, within 
Kierkegaard’s theory of stages of life, boredom is a central concept of his account of the 
aesthetic and ethical stages. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
In his so-called “aesthetic writings” (i.e., his set of pseudonymously published 
works between 1843 and 1850), Søren Kierkegaard is known for pursuing philosophical 
investigations into human nature through analyses of particular moods.1  As part of his 
rejection of the systematic philosophy of Hegelianism, the impersonal method of which 
Kierkegaard considers to compromise insight into the existential aspects of human life, 
Kierkegaard seeks an articulation of what Vincent McCarthy calls “the wisdom of 
experience.” 2  Kierkegaard’s goal in this period of his authorship is to examine human 
existence as it is concretely oriented within its world.  It is within this context that 
Kierkegaard analyzes particular moods as constitutive and disclosive of human existence 
in its concreteness. 
The most well-known moods that Kierkegaard analyzes and upon which he founds 
his insights into human nature are depression, anxiety, and despair.  In Either/Or: Part II, 
Kierkegaard examines depression, which he understands to be a “hysteria of the spirit,” in 
the following sense: 
There comes a moment in a person’s life when immediacy is ripe, so to speak, and 
when spirit requires a higher form, when it wants to lay hold of itself as spirit. […] 
If this does not happen, if the movement is halted, if it is repressed, then depression 
sets in.3 
1 For a concise synopsis of the major divisions of Kierkegaard’s authorship, including an explanation of the 
pseudonymous period, cf. Mark C. Taylor, Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Authorship: A Study of Time and 
the Self (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 11-14.  For Kierkegaard’s own explanation of this 
period of his authorship, cf. Søren Kierkegaard, The Point of View, trans. and ed. Howard and Edna Hong 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 41-56. 
2 Vincent McCarthy, The Phenomenology of Moods in Kierkegaard (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), 
2. 
3 Kierkegaard, Either/Or: Part II, trans. and ed. Howard and Edna Hong (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1987), 189. 
2 
In The Concept of Anxiety, Kierkegaard presents the mood of anxiety as the basic 
experience of oneself as free: 
[A]nxiety is the dizziness of freedom, which emerges when the spirit wants to posit
the synthesis [of the human being as both mind and body] and freedom looks down
into its own possibility, laying hold of finiteness to support itself.  Freedom
succumbs in this dizziness.4
In The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard analyzes a variety of forms of despair, in each 
one of which there is a misrelation of the self with itself, due to an inadequacy in its 
conception of its own nature as a synthesis of possibility and facticity: “Despair is the 
misrelation in the relation of a synthesis that relates itself to itself.”5  Regarding this 
misrelation, despair involves a willing not to be oneself; the desperate individual wills “to 
rid himself of the self that he is in order to be the self that he has dreamed up.”6  In each of 
these cases, Kierkegaard views a particular mood as one of the fundamental experiences of 
human being, such that an analysis of mood elucidates human existence.  This 
consideration of mood puts Kierkegaard’s investigations into human nature somewhere 
between rationalistic and irrationalistic perspectives; as McCarthy explains: 
Kierkegaard takes moods and the emotional life with the utmost seriousness.  Thus 
he walks the line between the Romantics who unduly celebrate them and the 
intellectuals who shun them.  He sees a function of moods in the life of the whole 
person and sets out to describe, probe, explore, and analyze.7 
In each of the aforementioned texts, Kierkegaard examines a particular mood in an attempt 
to elucidate a specific way in which the nature of selfhood becomes manifest. 
4 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the Dogmatic 
Issue of Hereditary Sin, trans. Reider Thomte and Albert Anderson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1980), 61. 
5 Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, trans. and ed. Howard and Edna Hong (Princeton: Princeton  
University Press, 1980), 15. 
6 Ibid, 20. 
7 McCarthy, 2 
3 
As his analyses indicate, Kierkegaard understands moods as distinct from mere 
emotions.  Whereas emotions are briefly experienced and environmentally triggered, 
Kierkegaard views moods as being more sedimented and enduring experiences that stem 
from the very structure of selfhood.  McCarthy articulates this significance of mood in the 
following manner: 
The moods well up from subliminal structures of the psyche to confront the 
individual with the prospect of higher self-understanding to be effected by willingly 
passing through the mood and thus beyond it.8 
In Kierkegaard’s account, particular moods are grounded in the very structure of the self, 
such that, on the one hand, being in a mood is a result of the kind of self that one is and, on 
the other hand, one’s mood reveals what it means to be that kind of self; moods are taken 
by Kierkegaard to be both constitutive and disclosive of the essential structures of the self, 
and, accordingly, an understanding of moods entails an understanding of selfhood.   
While Kierkegaard views moods as revelations of selfhood, what is revealed 
through a mood, however, is not solipsistically oriented; moods do not reveal abstract 
structures of the self, but instead reveal the self in its determinate orientation within its 
world.  As Calvin Schrag says, moods “disclose aspects of the concrete life-world as it 
shows itself in its existential immediacy,” such that they express a “relatedness to the 
world.”9  He elaborates: 
Mood in its various modifications must thus properly be understood as an 
intentional disclosure.  The existential self is intentionally related to a world in 
which mood functions as a liaison.  But mood must also be thought of as a 
situational determinant.10 
8 McCarthy, 120. 
9 Calvin Schrag, Existence and Freedom (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1961), 21. 
10 Ibid. 
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Each mood in Kierkegaard’s philosophy of human nature makes manifest a particular way 
in which the self is attuned to its situation, such that a given mood determines how the self 
experiences itself and its environing world; moods characterize the manner in which one 
is oriented within one’s given situation.  Kierkegaard does not conceive mood in the 
ordinary empirical sense of an environmentally triggered psychical state or feeling that one 
contingently experiences.  Rather, Kierkegaard understands mood as a more basic feature 
of selfhood that conditions one’s worldly experiences.  McCarthy delineates this notion by 
exploring the etymological connotations of term.  He explains: 
The term mood in Danish, Stemning (German: Stimmung), suggests “attunement.”  
One is always “attuned,” and thus always in a mood.  One is always in a “frame of 
mind” which influences the entire emotional and psychological state of life, the 
extent of the influence depending upon the intensity of the particular mood.11 
McCarthy further stresses the ‘tonal’ connotations of Stemning: 
‘Tonality’ is suggestive in that it connotes a quality which pervades the personality, 
a quality not strictly localized.  It further suggests a coloring of perceptions, rather 
like a filter which intensifies, minimizes and maximizes, alters percepta so that the 
‘objective world’ is experienced through this filter and ‘less than objectively.’  But 
this filter is really a form of intensified subjectivity.12 
Moods for Kierkegaard, then, possess an apriority, to the extent that they shape how one 
originally experiences one’s own situatedness in the world; moods are not responsive to 
one’s environment, such that certain worldly phenomena could induce a particular mood, 
but rather mood is constitutive of selfhood, in such a way that one’s very experiences are 
determined by one’s mood.  An analysis of mood, then, does not so much reveal objective 
features of the world, as much as it reveals the more primitive experiences of being situated 
in a world in a determinate manner. 
11 McCarthy, 124. 
12 Ibid, 125. 
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One of the primary goals of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous authorship is to provide 
an account of the self as it finds itself in its situatedness, and Kierkegaard attempts to make 
this account concrete precisely by grounding it in analyses of particular moods.  
Specifically, Kierkegaard wants to explain how the self develops an understanding of itself 
as freely and responsibly situated in its world.  This Kierkegaardian project has both 
Kantian and Hegelian underpinnings.  On the one hand, Kierkegaard appropriates a 
Kantian understanding of personality as transcendentally free, in the sense that the person 
possesses “freedom and independence from the mechanism of the whole of nature,” as well 
as “a capacity of being subject to special laws – namely pure practical laws given by his 
own reason,” such that a person “belonging to the sensible world is subject to his own 
personality insofar as he also belongs to the intelligible world […].”13  Kierkegaard situates 
his own theory of personality in relation to the Kantian understanding of the person as free 
from natural mechanism and as thereby responsible for its own self-determination.14  
Differing from Kant, however, Kierkegaard is primarily interested in explaining the 
process through which one becomes aware of oneself as free and responsible.  
Kierkegaard’s philosophy operates within the understanding that, while the person is 
transcendentally free, this freedom cannot be deduced but can only be elucidated through 
a description of the way in which the person finds itself oriented in its world.  Mood 
becomes important for Kierkegaard’s philosophical project, since each mood corresponds 
to a particular way in which personal freedom becomes manifest. 
13 Immanuel Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason,” from: Practical Philosophy, trans. and ed. Mary Gregor 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 5:87. 
14 Regarding Kierkegaard’s situation of his conceptions of freedom and personality in relation to Kant, cf. 
Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates / Notes of Schelling’s Berlin 
Lectures, trans. and ed. Howard and Edna Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 242. 
6 
This is also where Kierkegaard’s project shares some commonality with that of 
G.W.F. Hegel, despite Kierkegaard’s explicit criticisms of the same.  As a whole, 
Kierkegaard’s pseudonymously published works present his so-called “theory of stages on 
life’s way.”  Mimicking the structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, Kierkegaard’s 
theory traces the development of the individual in a process toward self-knowledge and 
self-actualization.  Each of the particular stages in this theory represents a paradigmatic 
shape of self-awareness, corresponding to which there are specific and unique 
understandings of selfhood, freedom, and responsibility.  In his pseudonymous authorship, 
Kierkegaard seeks to explain the stages of self-development through which an individual 
must pass if it is to achieve an adequate conception of itself.  Kierkegaard’s theory, as 
Merold Westphal says, “embodies this double claim that the journey [through the stages] 
is grounded in human nature and that its goal is simultaneously the discovery and 
realization of one’s true self.”15  Analyses of moods become important for this theory, to 
the extent that moods express the nature of the self at a particular stage of development.  
Accordingly, McCarthy says that “moods represent a rite of passage from childish illusions 
about the self to mature understanding which is properly a life-view.”16  Moods are “crises 
in the growth of the personality,” such that moods correspond to particular stages in the 
development of personality.17 
It is in this general context that Kierkegaard analyzes boredom as a fundamental 
phenomenon through which the nature of selfhood becomes manifest.  Between The 
Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates and Either/Or: A Fragment of Life, 
15 Merold Westphal, Becoming a Self: A Reading of Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript (West 
Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1996), 21. 
16 McCarthy, 2. 
17 Ibid, 120. 
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which are the primary works in which Kierkegaard presents his conception of boredom, 
boredom is understood to be a mood corresponding to and expressive of a particular view 
of one's life, one’s freedom, and one’s situatedness in the world.  In each of these works, 
Kierkegaard presents two conflicting views of life.  There is one life-view, which 
Kierkegaard identifies as that of romantic irony or reflective aestheticism, wherein 
boredom is a defining feature.  In contrast, there is another life-view, which Kierkegaard 
identifies as that of mastered irony or as the ethical stage of life, in which boredom has 
been overcome through a reevaluation of how one understands oneself as situated in one’s 
world.  The form of life characterized by boredom is one in which the self achieves a 
nihilistic stance toward its own existence, such that this self finds life to be without any 
meaning, and this lack of meaning becomes manifest as boredom.  This form of life finds 
its characteristic boredom to be unbearable, and it seeks to overcome its boredom through 
distraction – by pursuing pleasures that can momentarily obscure the perceived 
meaninglessness of existence.  To this form of life, Kierkegaard presents an alternative – 
one in which boredom is overcome not through momentary distraction, but through a 
reevaluation of one’s nihilistic perspective altogether.  The experience of boredom, then, 
is situated by Kierkegaard between two conflicting views of life and in such a way that 
boredom evinces a particular understanding of one’s situatedness in the world. 
Despite Kierkegaard’s references to the experience of boredom in his project to 
elucidate different stages of life, scholars frequently fail to treat his conception of boredom 
as a philosophically interesting topic, instead tending to present Kierkegaard’s analysis of 
the mood as mere novelty.  Such scholarly neglect seems to result from the fact that, unlike 
despair and anxiety, each of which is the central topic of one of Kierkegaard’s treatises, 
8 
Kierkegaard’s account of boredom is far less sustained and explicit, and he only ever 
provides isolated fragments of an account.   From such fragments, however, an analysis of 
the concept can be developed.  A careful exposition of the way in which Kierkegaard 
describes the experience of boredom in The Concept of Irony and Either/Or indicates that 
boredom is not only a philosophically important phenomenon for Kierkegaard, but that 
boredom can also be seen as one of the central concepts of his theory of personal 
development, insofar as boredom relates directly to Kierkegaard’s conceptions of selfhood, 
freedom, and responsibility. 
1.2 Method 
In order to resolve this gap in Kierkegaard scholarship, the present dissertation 
seeks to explicate Kierkegaard’s conception of boredom with particular emphasis on the 
way in which this concept fits into his larger theory of stages on life’s way.  To this end, 
this dissertation primarily follows what Mark C. Taylor designates the “thematic approach” 
to Kierkegaard’s writings.  Distinguishing such an approach from the “biographical-
psychological” approach, which primarily interprets Kierkegaard’s work through the lens 
of his own personal development and in relation to major events in his own life, and the 
“historical-comparative” approach, which primarily tasks itself with explaining 
Kierkegaard’s various ideas by situating them within their historical context, often by 
comparing Kierkegaard with another philosopher or theologian, Taylor understands the 
thematic approach as one that works “to interpret Kierkegaard’s writings on their own 
terms, rather than by an examination of the influence of his life upon his works or by a 
9 
comparison of his arguments with other thinkers.”18  While this dissertation involves some 
brief historical contextualizing of ideas, it primarily follows the thematic approach, seeking 
“to define and to analyze a major theme with which Kierkegaard concerns himself.”19  The 
primary theme to be examined here is that of boredom, along with several peripheral 
themes that cannot be separated therefrom, such as those of negative and positive freedom, 
the situatedness of the self, and self-determination.  These themes will be traced between 
Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Irony and his first pseudonymously published work, 
Either/Or, since it is primarily in these two texts that Kierkegaard presents his theory of 
boredom. 
1.3 Overview of Chapters and Conclusions 
In order to present Kierkegaard’s theory of boredom, this dissertation begins with 
an analysis of Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Irony, wherein Kierkegaard situates his 
conception of boredom within an incomplete and unpolished theory of personal 
development that serves as a precursor to the theory of stages of life that is presented in 
subsequent pseudonymous publications.  In this text, Kierkegaard briefly presents his first 
description of boredom, connecting the experience of boredom with the concept of irony, 
which he understands idiosyncratically as the shape of consciousness in which the self 
originally begins questioning the meaning of its life.  Kierkegaard outlines two types of 
ironic consciousness, each of which represents a distinct stage of personal development.   
The first type is that of romantic irony, in which the person is unable to discover any 
meaning in life and adopts a nihilistic stance toward existence.  Boredom is presented in 
18 Taylor, 27, 30, 34. 
19 Ibid, 34. 
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this context as the mood that corresponds to this particular form of irony and as expressive 
of the self’s alienation from its world.  In this text, Kierkegaard understands boredom to be 
a manifestation of the nihilism of ironic consciousness; as bored, the person is disengaged 
from its world, finding all possible activities as pointless and uninteresting.  Kierkegaard 
contrasts this form of consciousness, of which boredom is a dominate expression, with a 
second form of ironic consciousness, which involves what Kierkegaard calls the mastery 
of irony.  Kierkegaard suggests that the nihilism and corresponding boredom of romantic 
irony can be overcome through a mastery of irony, whereby one achieves a more adequate 
conception of oneself in one’s relation to one’s world.  Here, Kierkegaard suggests that the 
boredom of romantic irony can be surmounted through a shift in self-conception, although 
the exact manner in which this is supposed to happen is not clearly explained by 
Kierkegaard.  Chapter I of the present dissertation examines Kierkegaard’s early 
conception of boredom within his theory of irony, since the former cannot be understood 
apart from his understanding of the two forms of irony.  Accordingly, this chapter focusses 
on explicating the two forms of irony, so as to elucidate the significance attributed to 
boredom by Kierkegaard within this account. 
Chapters II and III of this dissertation explore the more extensive and matured 
descriptions of boredom provided by Kierkegaard in his first pseudonymously published 
text, Either/Or.  While Kierkegaard’s initial account of irony and boredom is incomplete, 
Kierkegaard provides a more detailed account of boredom in Either/Or, wherein he 
presents his first formal articulation of his theory of stages of life.  Corresponding to the 
two forms of irony, in Either/Or, Kierkegaard presents the aesthetic and ethical stages of 
life, in relation to which boredom has differing significance.  Chapter II of the present 
11 
dissertation examines Kierkegaard’s aesthetic stage of life, which is one in which boredom 
is a dominant and defining characteristic.  The aesthetic stage of existence is one in which 
a person maintains a nihilistic perspective of life, devaluing all particular courses of action 
and lifestyles as pointless.  Boredom becomes predominant in this form of life, to the extent 
that the aesthete does not perceive the value of any activity, such that it becomes 
fundamentally disinterested in its world.  Because such boredom is unbearable, the aesthete 
is described as constantly striving to distract itself from its existential condition. 
Chapter III of this dissertation examines Kierkegaard’s conception of the ethical 
stage of life, precisely because therein the possibility of aesthetic boredom is supposed to 
be undermined, such that an analysis of this view of life helps elucidate the nature and 
conditions of boredom.  The ethical life is one in which the person views itself as being in 
a constant process of self-determination.  In the ethical stage, one cannot be disinterested 
in the world, since the latter is viewed as providing the necessary means for the ethical 
person’s project of self-determination.  In contrast to the boredom of aestheticism, the 
ethical personality maintains a mood of earnestness, wherewith the ethical person is 
committed to the particular situation in which it finds itself, thereby precluding the 
condition for the possibility of the boredom that characterizes the aesthetic life. 
This dissertation concludes with a summary explanation of how boredom is an 
important component in Kierkegaard’s theory of stages, given the way that Kierkegaard 
positions his descriptions of boredom in relation to particular stages in the development of 
personality.  Boredom is described as an essential and unique feature of the aesthetic stage 
of life and as expressive of the nihilism thereof.  In contrast, within the ethical stage of life, 
which transcends aestheticism by achieving a more adequate self-conception, the 
12 
possibility of boredom has been precluded.  Accordingly, the aesthetic and ethical stages 
can be viewed as different responses to the experience of boredom.  Aestheticism involves 
an inadequate response to boredom, to the extent that the aesthete does not address its 
nihilistic stance toward its own existence, but instead merely attempts to distract itself from 
its nihilism and escape boredom by pursuing the cultivation of amusing situations.  
Contrariwise, the boredom that characterizes aestheticism is surmounted with the 
achievement of the ethical stage of existence, insofar as this achievement requires a shift 
in one’s fundamental conception of oneself as situated within one’s world.  The ethical 
personality overcomes aesthetic nihilism and its corresponding expression of boredom by 
assuming a particular stance toward the world in which it finds itself situated – one in which 
the ethical person commits itself earnestly to its own particular situation as the only context 
within which it can enact its project of self-determination.  Because of the way that 
Kierkegaard situates the experience of boredom between these stages of personal 
development, such that boredom is essentially characteristic of aestheticism and 
surmounted in the achievement of ethical life, boredom is a decisive concept within 
Kierkegaard’s theory of stages on life’s way. 
13 
CHAPTER 2.  IRONY, LIVING POETICALLY, AND BOREDOM 
2.1 Overview of the Connection between Irony and Boredom 
Kierkegaard’s earliest account of boredom appears in his dissertation, The Concept 
of Irony, wherein he seeks to explain the concept of irony, referring frequently to the senses 
of irony that are characteristic of Socrates and the German Romantics.  In his dissertation, 
Kierkegaard explains irony as a particular stage in the development of personality.  
Modeling his understanding of irony off of the ways in which both Socrates and the 
German Romantics assumed ironic stances toward their respective cultures, Kierkegaard 
presents irony as a form of consciousness, whereby consciousness reflects on the validity 
of whatever dominant metaphysical and ethical understandings of life pertain to its given 
social milieu.  Consciousness becomes ironic when it achieves a reflective distance from 
its social situation, and it is with this distance that consciousness can raise questions about 
the meaning and purpose of its own existence, apart from whatever understandings of the 
same are dominant within its society. 
In Kierkegaard’s theory, there are two forms of irony, each of which represents a 
different response to the question concerning the meaning of life, and these different 
responses found two different ways of living.  It is in the context of these two forms of 
irony that Kierkegaard introduces his earliest account of boredom.  One of the forms of 
irony finds life to be ultimately meaningless, such that this ironist finds itself irrevocably 
alienated from its world.  This is a lifestyle that Kierkegaard presents as being permeated 
with boredom, due to its perception of all activity as pointless and vain.  The other form of 
irony, in contrast, is precisely one in which boredom is overcome, because, in this lifestyle, 
one surmounts one’s alienation by altering one’s understanding of the nature of irony itself.  
14 
In his dissertation, then, Kierkegaard understands the phenomenon of boredom in 
conjunction with the concept of irony, such that an investigation into the latter is necessary 
for an exposition of the former.  In order to delineate Kierkegaard’s account of boredom, 
then, it is necessary to consider his concept of irony, which constitutes an essential 
component of his general theory of personality. 
2.2 The General Theory of Irony 
While irony is usually understood as being a kind of aesthetic activity or as style of 
speech, Kierkegaard understands irony idiosyncratically as a form of consciousness itself.  
Contrary to ordinary understandings of the concept, irony for Kierkegaard is not primarily 
a form of discourse, wherewith, in a speech-act, there is a disparity between what one 
literally says and what one intends to communicate.  Instead, irony is identified as a mode 
of human existence, representing a particular manner in which one is conscious of both 
oneself and the world within which one finds oneself situated.  This understanding of irony 
is in part influenced by the theories provided by the German Romantics, as well as by 
Hegel’s corresponding criticisms of the same.  Kierkegaard’s unusual use of the term is 
also determined by Kierkegaard’s general use of aesthetic categories; Sylvia Walsh 
attributes this unorthodox understanding of irony to a more widespread practice in 
Kierkegaard's work to view "aesthetic categories...as existential determinations” and “not 
merely as intellectual categories for classifying material products of art according to the 
artistic genres to which they belong."20  As an existential determinant, irony is not a kind 
of discourse or a literary device but instead is a category intended to grasp a shape of 
20 Silvia Walsh, Living Poetically: Kierkegaard’s Existential Aesthetics (University Park: Penn State 
University Press, 1980), 6-7. 
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consciousness or a mode of existence.  Kierkegaard’s concept of irony does not belong 
strictly to aesthetics but instead is way of conceiving human existence. 
It is in this existential sense that, throughout his dissertation, Kierkegaard 
recurrently speaks of irony as a “position” and, often more specifically, as “the position of 
Socrates.”  According to Kierkegaard, Socrates is a paradigmatic ironist, but he is an ironist 
not by virtue of his manner of speech, despite whatever irony – in the ordinary sense – may 
inhere therein; instead, Kierkegaard understands Socrates to be an ironist due to the way 
that he lived.  Stressing this existential understanding of irony, Kierkegaard says of 
Socrates that “irony constituted the substance of his existence.”21  In Kierkegaard’s 
understanding, Socrates’ verbal irony is merely an expression of a more substantial 
existential irony.  While it is common in everyday discourse to describe speech-acts or 
artworks as ironic, it would be entirely nonsensical to do so within Kierkegaard’s 
conceptual framework, wherein only a person's existence is truly ironic: “Irony is a 
qualification of subjectivity.”22  Hence, Kierkegaard says: 
21 Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates / Notes of Schelling’s 
Berlin Lectures, trans. Howard and Edna Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 12. 
22 Ibid, 262.  Many commentators are careful to make this distinction between existential and verbal irony, 
both of which are analyzed by Kierkegaard, albeit with different emphasis.  Regarding this distinction, 
consider the following: Burgess, 144-145; Cross, 125-126; Hall, Word, 122; McCarthy, 7; Wilde, 3.  Cross 
provides perhaps the most detailed account of Kierkegaard’s analysis of verbal irony (Cross, 127-133).  
Kierkegaard’s own analysis appears only briefly in his dissertation (Kierkegaard, Irony, 246-253).  Cross 
distinguishes these types of irony by noting that verbal irony, as a particular speech-act, belongs to the set of 
interpersonal acts that constitute a general ironic way of life (Cross, 127, 133, et passim).  Cross’ 
interpretation is that irony is primarily a mode of existence and ironic speech is one manner through which 
this existential mode expresses itself.  The two senses of irony are analogous, though, in that each expresses 
a disparity between the inner and the outer (Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 12, 257, et passim).  In verbal 
irony, it is in an expression that one intends a meaning that is not explicitly stated.  In the case of existential 
irony, it is a person's very existence that is not fully expressed in the world – the intentions of the ironist are 
not expressed in the actions of the ironist: there is a "contradiction between the mode in which he exists in 
his inner being and his not expressing it in his outer appearance" (Kierkegaard, The Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript to ‘Philosophical Fragments’: Volume I, trans. Howard and Edna Hong (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1992), 504).  Cross’ interpretation seems concordant with Kierkegaard’s implicit account 
of the relation between verbal and existential irony.  As many commentators note, Kierkegaard is essentially 
interested only in analyzing existential irony; when he does discuss verbal irony, he does so with the implicit 
understanding either that verbal irony is the discourse of an existential ironist or that verbal irony is analogous 
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Irony is an existence-qualification, and thus nothing is more ludicrous than 
regarding it as a style of speaking or an author's counting himself lucky to express 
himself ironically once in a while. The person who has essential irony has it all day 
long and is not bound to any style, because it is the infinite within him.23 
The existential ironist does not simply engage in ironic discourse occasionally or for artistic 
purposes; rather, this ironist’s orientation in the world itself, which determines primarily 
all interactions within that world, is ironic.  For Kierkegaard, irony is more of an existential 
concept than it is an aesthetic one. 
With this crucial distinction between different senses of irony in mind, it can be 
properly considered what Kierkegaard understands by an existential irony.  Kierkegaard 
conceives irony as one of the essential shapes of consciousness that occurs in the 
development of subjectivity.  Kierkegaard identifies irony with the most primitive 
emergence of subjectivity, saying: “Irony is, namely, the first and most abstract 
qualification of subjectivity.”24  Moreover: “irony is the very incitement of subjectivity 
[…].”25  One becomes a person – in the sense of a self-aware being capable of consciously 
and, thereby, reflectively and responsibly enacting or neglecting various possibilities – 
through irony or as an ironic consciousness.26  Such self-awareness, however, is only 
to existential irony, such that an analysis of the former informs an analysis of the latter.  In either case, 
Kierkegaard is unconcerned with a purely aesthetic account of irony.  For instance, when, in the first part of 
his dissertation, Kierkegaard evaluates the style of Socrates’ speech, he does so entirely for the sake of 
expositing the nature of Socrates’ subjectivity that is tacitly expressed therein, rather than for the sake of 
producing a theory of verbal irony. 
23 Kierkegaard, Postscript I, 504. 
24 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 264. 
25 Ibid, 211. 
26 This is an attempt to provide a de facto definition of the conception of subjectivity or personality that is 
operative throughout The Concept of Irony.  Kierkegaard himself provides no explicit definition, but, at the 
very least, it can readily be seen that his conception is Kantian in nature, given that he situates his analysis 
of irony and subjectivity in relation to the theories of Kant and Fichte (cf. ibid, 242, 272-273).  Kierkegaard’s 
conception seems congruent with Kant’s definition of personality: “personality, that is, freedom and 
independence from the mechanism of the whole of nature…so that a person as belonging to the sensible 
world is subject to his own personality insofar as he also belongs to the intelligible world” (Kant, “Critique 
of Practical Reason,” 5:87).  Kierkegaard’s view of personality, however, places less emphasis on the 
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achieved by consciousness when it recognizes itself as distinct from its social situation.  
With reference to Socrates, who Kierkegaard identifies as the first ironist and, thereby, the 
first world-historical individual to achieve subjectivity, Kierkegaard states: 
Through irony Socrates was able to emancipate himself as an individual from the 
state, or established order, of his time.  The introduction of irony thus marked the 
beginning of subjectivity, or consciousness of oneself as an individual in distinction 
from family and state.27 
Subjectivity emerges through the awareness of one’s being distinct from the various 
determinations of substantial life.  Kierkegaard speaks of substantiality in various ways 
throughout his dissertation, and, while he does not explicitly define the concept, it is clear 
from his usage that he intends the concept in a Hegelian sense.  The substantial world is 
the unconsciously accepted “established order” of one’s lived situation.  In more 
contemporary terminology, substantiality correlates to a dominant logic – to whatever 
understanding of the world most prevalently and pervasively permeates one’s situation and 
that one is implicitly expected to perpetuate unreflectively in both theoretical and practical 
contexts.  The concept of substantiality is defined – albeit merely hyponymically – by 
Kierkegaard in a few passages in “The Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the Tragic in 
Modern Drama,” which is an essay found in Either/Or: Part I, wherein Kierkegaard 
analyzes the relation between subjectivity and substantiality as it pertains to tragedy.  In 
this essay, Kierkegaard refers to an individual’s “substantial determinants,” which are 
person’s recognized independence from nature and is more concerned with the person’s recognized 
independence from social norms.  The next quotation from Kierkegaard’s dissertation indicates this. 
27 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 49.  As this passage indicates, Kierkegaard is concerned with the 
emergence of subjectivity in two distinct ways in his dissertation.  On the one hand, he is concerned with the 
original emergence of subjectivity into human history – the emergence of what he calls “world-historical” 
irony.  This emergence he attributes uniquely to Socrates.  On the other hand, Kierkegaard is also concerned 
with the emergence of the ironic self-awareness in any particular person.  This latter kind of emergence is of 
primary interest to Kierkegaard in both his dissertation and subsequent works. 
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grounded “in the state, the family, in fate.”28  With minor variance, he also refers to the 
“substantial categories of family, state, and kindred.”29  He further delineates these 
substantialities in the following: “Every individual, however, original he is, is still a child 
of God, of his age, of his nation, of his family, of his friends, and only in them does he 
have his truth.”30  Accordingly, substantial determinations are, in Kierkegaard’s 
understanding, those features of one’s identity that are determined by nature and society, 
over which one has no control; one’s substantial existence is determined by the given 
context into which one is born.  The awareness of oneself as being distinct from these 
substantial determinants is what Kierkegaard calls irony; irony is the awareness that one’s 
personality is irreducible to the particular situation in which one finds oneself.  The truth 
of irony is precisely this awareness that personality is more than just a collection of 
substantial determinants and that there is something irreducible to these determinations: 
“Just as much in life now is not actuality and just as there is something in personality that 
at least momentarily is incommensurate with actuality, so also there is truth in irony.”31 
In explanation of this emergence of subjectivity through irony, Andrew Cross 
presents irony as involving the overcoming of the “life of immediacy,” which he 
understands as the form of life in which one unconsciously, unreflectively, and uncritically 
accepts some meaning of the world and of one’s position within the same.  Cross explains 
that “to live a life of immediacy is to take life as it comes, to take one’s life as a kind of 
28 Kierkegaard, Either/Or: Part I, trans. and ed. Howard and Edna Hong (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1987), 143. 
29 Ibid, 149. 
30 Ibid, 145. 
31 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 253. 
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happening in which one finds oneself.”32  If the salient feature of personality is the ironic 
consciousness of oneself as transcending the mere givenness of one’s self and world, then 
this life of immediacy is characteristic of purely latent personality; in the state of 
immediacy, the person does not yet recognize itself apart from substantial determinations 
(such as its position in the family, in the congregation, in the state, et cetera), nor does the 
person in this state of latency recognize for itself any understanding of life apart from the 
significance conventionally attributed to its role in its substantiality.  Pre-ironically, the 
individual defines itself entirely through its institutionalized roles in society; the 
individual’s identity and purpose in life are taken as already established objective 
certainties.  In this state of immediacy, the person is unconsciously absorbed in the situation 
in which it happens to find itself.  Such absorption involves the unconscious acceptance of 
the truth of one’s situation; the person views the occurrences of life simply as – borrowing 
Cross’ colloquialism – ‘the way things are.’  Cross characterizes this way of living in the 
following manner: 
One finds oneself in a given society, with certain dispositions and preferences, 
obligated to comply with various social norms; good things sometimes happen to 
one, and that’s good luck, bad things sometimes happen to one, and that’s bad 
luck.33 
Given this absorption, the immediately qualified personality is non-ironic, to the extent that 
it has not achieved the conscious distinction between self and world.  Such a person 
purports to know the world as it is and acts simply as one is self-evidently supposed to act.  
Irony precisely “constitutes the self’s break with ‘immediacy.’”34  Irony involves the 
32 Andrew Cross, “Neither Either Nor Or: The Perils of Reflexive Irony,” from The Cambridge Companion 




breakdown of the unconscious acceptance of ‘the way things are.’  As McCarthy 
summarizes: “The presence of irony in the personality indicates that there has been a rift 
in the everydayness in which men are usually caught up.”35   
Given that irony involves the negation of the life of immediacy, negativity is clearly 
essential to irony.  Kierkegaard explains the relation between negativity and irony in the 
following way: “Irony is an organ, a sense for the negative.”36  Moreover, through irony, 
one “perceives the nothingness of everything.”37  Such negativity has implications for both 
how one thinks about life and how one acts: 
We perceive here how irony continues to be totally negative in that in the realm of 
theory it establishes a misrelation between idea and actuality, between actuality and 
idea, and in the realm of practice between possibility and actuality, between 
actuality and possibility.38 
That which is negated in the irony of consciousness is the particular metaphysical and 
ethical view that belongs to substantial life.  The ironist has, as Jon Stewart says, “seen 
through the hollowness of traditional customs and values […].”39  Ironically, one no longer 
finds the theoretical and practical dimensions of substantial life to be credible – the 
supposed truth of substantial life has been negated, while subjectivity concurrently posits 
itself as independent precisely of this substantiality from which it absolves itself.  
Consequently, irony represents for Kierkegaard a heightened self-consciousness, which is 
achieved through a negation of a previous stage of consciousness.  The pre-ironic 
consciousness is the uncritical and non-thematic awareness of oneself merely as 
35 McCarthy, 18. 
36 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 309. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid, 285-286. 
39 Jon Stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), 173. 
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substantially determined.  The higher stage of ironic consciousness is achieved through the 
ironist’s awareness of itself as transcending the roles and identities ascribed to it by the 
institutions of its substantial situation; the ironist recognizes that there is a multitude of 
different ways of living, and this awareness makes the established order of the ironist’s 
given society appear purely contingent, insofar as there is no discernable reason for which 
the way of life that has been institutionalized within the ironist’s social milieu is to be 
maintained over other possible ways of life. 
Given its negativity, wherewith the ironic person conceives itself in distinction 
from its previously accepted understanding of the way of the world, the recognition of 
ironic self-consciousness has some similarity with the experience of doubt, as Kierkegaard 
notes.40  Ironically, one doubts both the validity of the established order of one’s society 
and the significance that has been ascribed to the various roles and identities that constitute 
one’s substantial existence, such as, for example, being a son, or a Lutheran congregant, or 
a Danish citizen.  Irony, as Cross notes, is the “radical disengagement from what one has 
hitherto regarded as one’s self.”41  In this ironic consciousness, the person ceases to identify 
itself completely with the substantial determinations that had once been conceived as 
exhaustively constituting its identity; such substantialities, which had been taken as 
necessary determinations of the self, are now perceived ironically as mere accidents that 
only belong to one by chance.  Irony is the awareness that one’s personality transcends 
simply being a son, a Lutheran, or a Dane.  Accordingly, the achievement of irony involves 
an alteration in self-conception; ironically, one begins to doubt one’s substantial identity. 
40 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 257. 
41 Cross, 137. 
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In this nascent intensification of consciousness, then, the conceptions of the world 
and of one’s place within the same lose whatever truth had been previous ascribed thereto: 
“actuality has lost its validity for the ironic subject.”42  Here and throughout his works, it 
is necessary to note that Kierkegaard uses the term actuality idiosyncratically as the 
designation for the concrete situation within which a person finds itself, with particular 
emphasis on the practical dimensions of that situation.  Kierkegaard clarifies the sense in 
which he understands actuality in the following: “The word ‘actuality,’ however, must here 
primarily be understood as historical actuality – that is, the given actuality at a certain time 
and in a certain situation.”43  The validity of the situation in which one finds oneself is what 
is negated in irony.  The ironist no longer identifies itself with the various features of the 
situation in which it happens to find itself, such that “the whole of existence has become 
alien to the ironic subject.”44  This alienation from one’s situation is an essential feature of 
irony and, thereby, of the emergence of personality.  Stressing the significance of alienation 
in Kierkegaard’s account of personality, Robert Hall states that the person for Kierkegaard 
is in the process of “dynamically and perpetually disengaging itself from the sensuous.”45  
The person is constantly aware that it is irreducible to its immediate existence – that it has 
a self that transcends what it means to be, for example, a son, a Lutheran, a Dane, or 
whatever other qualifications are inherent in one’s substantial life.  Kierkegaard 
accordingly presents irony as the self-alienating shape of consciousness: ironically, one is 
aware of oneself precisely as estranged from one’s concrete identity and situation.  The 
42 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 259. 
43 Ibid, 258. 
44 Ibid, 259. 
45 Ronald Hall, “The Irony of Irony,” from: International Kierkegaard Commentary: The Concept of Irony
(Macon: Mercer University Press, 2001), 118. 
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metaphysical and ethical explanations of existence, in which consciousness previously 
believed, no longer appear justified, such that the ironic consciousness finds itself as a 
metaphysical and ethical stranger in the world: “the whole of existence has become alien 
to the ironic subject and the ironic subject alien to existence.”46  The ironic consciousness 
no longer endorses conventional understandings of the meaning of the world or of the 
moral worth of actions, but instead doubts the truth of such understandings.  This 
estrangement is paradigmatically represented for Kierkegaard by Socrates, who, in various 
texts, challenges the justifications behind the beliefs and actions of Greek citizens and, 
thereby, becomes “alien to the actuality of the whole substantial world.”47 Accordingly, 
borrowing Hegelian jargon, Kierkegaard says that “irony is subjectivity’s being-for-itself,” 
in the sense that irony involves the concurrent negating of the truth of substantiality and 
the positing of the certainty of subjectivity, whereby the subject originally achieves 
recognition of itself. 48 
As previously noted, irony and doubt do exhibit some similarity, insofar as both 
challenge the validity of actuality and involve the estrangement of consciousness from its 
world.  Kierkegaard, however, maintains the distinction between irony and doubt.  While, 
ironically, consciousness can be said to doubt the truth of substantial life, irony is not 
identical to doubt, insofar as the latter is a purely theoretical concept, while Kierkegaard 
takes the former to be primarily a practical concept; Kierkegaard explains that “irony is 
essentially practical” and it is “theoretical only in order to become practical again.”49  The 
 
46 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 259. 
47 Ibid, 264. 
48 Ibid, 257. 
49 Ibid.  Later, in Either/Or, Kierkegaard maintains this conception of doubt, but does so by contrasting the 
theoretical nature of doubt with the practical nature of despair (Kierkegaard, Either/Or: Part II, 211-212).  In 
Either/Or, doubt is said to concern the intellect but not personality as a whole, insofar as doubt does not 
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ironic personality does not simply challenge the meaning or importance of the established 
order of substantial life as part of a purely scientific endeavor to achieve indubitable 
knowledge, but rather the ironist challenges substantiality in a way that undermines its 
participation in the norms that pertain to that life.  Irony is the awareness that the practices 
and customs that normatively constitute and belong to substantial life – that is, the practices 
pertinent to familial, congregational, and civic spheres of existence – do not have the 
unconditional value that had previously been ascribed to them, albeit in a wholly 
unreflective manner.   The ironist may be able to identify conditional reasons for which 
adherence to such norms is useful or beneficial – it may, for example, be useful to obey the 
laws that govern one’s state, so as to avoid the unpleasantness and inconvenience of various 
forms of punishment – but the ironist fails to identify an unconditional basis for these 
values, and the ironist is conscious of this failure.  The ironist sees no ultimate basis upon 
which the given way of the world is to be founded.  Irony, as George Stack notes, 
compromises the endorsement of any “objective certainty.”50  The ethical understanding 
into which one is ‘born’ – that is, whatever normative conceptions of the world are 
established for one through participation in one’s given family, congregation, or state – is 
suspended in irony, and it is suspended precisely through the awareness that such 
understanding has no clear justification and has only hitherto been endorsed dogmatically. 
It is along these lines that Merold Westphal notes both that “irony has the 
teleological suspension of the ethical built into it” and that Kierkegaard’s conception of 
directly relate to how one acts.  This is congruent with the analysis of doubt presented in The Concept of 
Irony. 
50 George Stack, Kierkegaard’s Existential Ethics (University: University of Alabama Press, 1977), 11. 
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irony is a way of expressing “the relativity of any culture, any state, any Sittlichkeit.”51  
Regarding this suspension of the ethical, it is crucial to note that it is not simply the case 
that the ironist rejects a particular value or set of values for the sake of another.  For 
example, one might convert from Catholicism to Lutheranism, finding the latter to be a 
more genuine way to express one’s devotion to the divine.  In this case, the basic values of 
one’s religious belief are maintained, and the conversion only concerns which particular 
sect better instantiates these core values that have not themselves been subjected to doubt.  
In such a case, the true irony of consciousness would not be achieved, insofar as one still 
retains both some affirmation of value and, thereby, some adherence to substantial life.  In 
the mere supplantation of one set of values by another, consciousness doubts the validity 
of particular values but does not doubt the validity of its practical situation as a whole, 
which is essential to irony.  Correspondingly, in such replacement of values, consciousness 
would be alienated from a particular facet of substantial life, but there would be no 
alienation from substantiality as such.  Rather than any mere substitution of values, all 
possible values are rejected by the ironist as being equally groundless. 
How irony accomplishes this total undermining of value is, according to Westphal, 
“through the juxtaposition of the ‘infinite’ and the ‘absolute’ requirement with the finitude 
 
51 Westphal, 167.  To be clear, Westphal employs the notion of a ‘teleological suspension of the ethical’ in 
a way that is broader than Kierkegaard’s own usage of the same expression.  For Kierkegaard, the ethical is 
suspended specifically by a religious calling that is irreducible to ethical concerns (cf. ‘Problem I’ of Fear 
and Trembling).  Westphal, however, does not limit teleological suspensions of the ethical to the religious 
life.  In the present context, Westphal understands there to be a teleological suspension of the ethical in the 
following sense: the ethicality that one unreflectively endorses in the life of immediacy is suspended for the 
sake of a reflectively endorsed ethics.  For Westphal, the ethical can be suspended for the sake of a ‘higher’ 
ethicality, which itself need not be religious; the telos that suspends the ethics of substantial life is simply a 
more reflective ethics.  For Kierkegaard, such suspension would not be a proper instance of a suspension of 
the ethical, insofar as, in this instance, the ethical is not suspended for the sake of an absolute duty to God 
that is inexplicable in ethical terms (cf. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 59).  As long as this difference in 
usage is understood, however, Westphal’s description is both useful and true to Kierkegaard’s account of 
irony. 
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of human existence.”52  Kierkegaard postulates that consciousness desires that there be 
some unconditional foundation for its world – something that explains transparently how 
the world is and why it is that way.  Reflecting upon its own situation, however, 
consciousness fails to identify any necessity underlying the constitution of that situation; 
the moral, customary, and legal constitution of its situation appears contingent and only 
arbitrarily established.  For the ironist, there is no apparent reason for why its situation is 
ultimately ordered in the way that it is, such that the ironic consciousness becomes 
disillusioned.  Kierkegaard describes the disillusionment of the ironic subject in the 
following: 
Here we meet the ironic subject.  For the ironic subject, the given actuality has lost 
its validity entirely; it has become for him an imperfect form that is a hindrance 
everywhere.  But on the other hand, he does not possess the new.  He is the one 
who must pass judgment.  In one sense the ironist is certainly prophetic, because 
he is continually pointing to something impending, but what it is he does not 
know.53 
By measuring one’s world by this absolute requirement – that it have an unconditional 
basis – consciousness becomes ironic, which entails that the subject becomes disillusioned 
by the merely presumed validity of the way of the world. 
Moreover, that the substantial world presents itself as meaningful appears 
presumptuous to the ironic consciousness, insofar as, with that presentation, the substantial 
world does not concurrently proffer any justification for that meaning; irony is the 
perception of the presumptuous nature of the established order of substantial life.  As 
McCarthy notes: “In the consciousness which irony represents, one sees through the 
illusions of the actual world which implies itself to be all-fulfilling.”54  That there is any 
52 Westphal, 167. 
53 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 261. 
54 McCarthy, 29. 
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presumed meaning to existence at all seems like vanity to the ironist, and Kierkegaard 
identifies irony precisely with the insight whereby “everything is shown to be vanity.”55  
This expression, which appears frequently throughout most of Kierkegaard’s aesthetic 
works, is borrowed directly from Ecclesiastes.56  As in Ecclesiates, Kierkegaard presents 
irony as the awareness that all human effort is “vanity and a striving after wind.”57  The 
pessimism characteristic of the verses of Ecclesiastes certainly aligns with Kierkegaard’s 
description of ironic alienation.  Unlike Ecclesiastes, however, Kierkegaard founds the 
perception of the vanity of existence not upon the historical repetition of all things, the 
equal susceptibility to death of all people (irrespective of caste or accomplishment), and 
the eventual oblivion of one’s reputation.58  Instead, Kierkegaard’s far more modern 
conception of vanity is grounded upon the insight that no unconditional foundation for the 
world is discernable to consciousness.  In the ironic perception of this lack, all 
understanding and action appear to consciousness as vain. 
In this perception of vanity, then, irony functions by relativizing that which is taken 
to be absolute.  Specifically, the assumption – either implicit or explicit – that the 
theoretical and practical features of one’s substantial life are absolute is rejected by the 
ironic consciousness, which cannot recognize any justification for which things are the way 
that they are.  McCarthy notes: 
In irony, one realizes that beforehand one had been immersed in the world and 
believed its implicit promise of fulfillment.  With the advent of irony one has 
55 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 258. 
56 Ecclesiastes seems to influence Kierkegaard’s philosophical thought perhaps more than any other book of 
the Bible; many of the themes therefrom can be seen throughout Kierkegaard’s work.  The two theses that 
are central to Ecclesiastes – that all effort is vanity, but that one should nonetheless be content with the simple 
gifts of God – noticeably parallel the central claims of Either/Or. 
57 Eccl. 1:14. 
58 Eccl. 1:9-11, 2:14-15, 2:16-17, et passim. 
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broken through illusion – in experience – and initially takes up an attitude of 
negativity, of passionate rejection, of the actuality which deceived.59 
Irony as consciousness represents the rupture of the illusions of the phenomenal 
world.  The illusions of finitude and temporality are shattered.  One realizes that 
that which one seeks and yearns for is not to be found in the finite and temporal.  
One has lived the finite and the temporal and found them incapable of making good 
on illusory promise.  Finally one perceives the obstacle posed by finitude and 
temporality as such and sees the need to move beyond them.60 
The substantial world presumes and pretends a meaning, which it cannot ultimately 
provide.  Pre-ironically, the person believes that the world is imbued with meaning.  Irony, 
however, “prevents all idol worshiping of the phenomenon.”61  Ironically, it becomes clear 
to consciousness that the world lacks fulfillment in that it cannot provide justification for 
the meaning of life that it espouses.  Irony is the awareness that undermines the tendency 
of substantial life to propose itself as absolute – as if the truth or rightness of its laws, 
customs, practices, and institutions were beyond question and not in need of any 
justification.  Irony makes manifest the vanity of such existence; it relativizes such 
presumed absoluteness. 
Once again stressing the practical significance of irony, Kierkegaard identifies the 
relativizing quality of irony with a freedom from social obligation, and he further 
quantitatively correlates being free with perceiving vanity: 
In irony, however, since everything is shown to be vanity, the subject becomes free.  
The more vain everything becomes, all the lighter, emptier, and volatized the 
subject becomes.62 
In ironic self-awareness, one perceives the vanity of the norms that belong to one’s 
situation.  Concurrent with this perception, one finds oneself no longer bound by those 
59 McCarthy, 7. 
60 Ibid, 127-128. 
61 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 329. 
62 Ibid, 258. 
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norms, insofar as, once a norm is identified as groundless, it no longer exercises any 
obliging power over a person.  The ironic consciousness knows that there is no ultimate 
reason to adhere to any particular norm, and, with this knowledge, the ironist achieves a 
kind of freedom: it finds itself liberated from the ethics characteristic of substantial life.  
Accordingly, the alienation of consciousness, wherewith the ethics of substantiality is 
suspended, can be more positively expressed as the emergence of what Kierkegaard calls 
“subjective freedom.”  This explains the quantitative correlation that Kierkegaard posits 
between perceiving vanity and being free; the more norms that are perceived as unjustified, 
the less the person feels bound to act in particular ways and the freer the person becomes.  
Irony undermines commitment to anything, resulting in the disillusionment with and 
disenfranchisement from participation in the normative structure of substantial life. 
The result of irony is that the person perceives itself as free from all ethical bonds; 
the person no longer feels itself beholden to the expectations and precepts of substantial 
life.  Kierkegaard says: “the salient feature of the irony is the subjective freedom that at all 
times has in its power the possibility of a beginning and is not handicapped by earlier 
situations.”63  In addition to the theoretical consequence that the ironic personality no 
longer believes in the presumed truth of its world, there is also the practical consequence 
that the same personality does not find itself compelled by the norms that belong to that 
world.  Insofar as the ironist is freed from the norms and values that had previously 
determined its practical existence, Kierkegaard accordingly describes the ironist’s 
liberation as an expression of a negative kind of freedom: 
In irony, the subject is negatively free, since the actuality that is supposed to give 
the subject content is not there.  He is free from the constraint in which the given 
63 Ibid, 253. 
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actuality holds the subject, but he is negatively free and as such is suspended, 
because there is nothing that holds him.64 
The ironic consciousness finds itself not bound to act in any particular manner, insofar as 
every activity appears equally trivial or meaningless: “actuality loses its validity for him; 
he is free and above it.”65  McCarthy describes the ironist in the following way: 
The world, world-view and society of men who constitute finitude’s kingdom of 
illusions are emphatically rejected, and one seeks to soar in freedom in search of a 
possible worthy object of desire.66 
Irony involves the emergence of the subject in its negative freedom from its social situation. 
This negative freedom that is salient to the ironist is totalizing.  Irony does not 
negate a particular demand or a particular set of demands; instead, this negation is infinite 
– the subject is absolved of all external demands upon it.67  Both borrowing an expression
from Hegel and stressing the negativity of irony, Kierkegaard identifies irony as “infinite 
absolute negativity.”68  Kierkegaard explains this expression with the following: 
It is negativity, because it only negates; it is infinite, because it does not negate this 
or that phenomenon; it is absolute, because that by virtue of which it negates is a 
higher something that still is not.69 
64 Ibid, 262. 
65 Ibid, 258, 253. 
66 McCarthy, 128. 
67 For this reason, Kierkegaard thinks that the irony of Socrates is not a complete expression of irony and, 
consequently, from the perspective of world-history, subjectivity emerges with Socrates, but it does not 
achieve its full expression until modernity.  According to Kierkegaard, Socrates only negates the truth of the 
Greek world and does so in anticipation of a new truth for that world (Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 
271, 264).  A fully explicit irony, in contrast, negates the truth of all situations, both actual and potential. 
68 Ibid, 254.  This expression is borrowed directly from Hegel, which Kierkegaard readily acknowledges: 
“To this extent we see the correctness of Hegel’s view of irony as infinite absolute negativity” (ibid).  Much 
of Kierkegaard’s understanding of irony and his corresponding critique of Romanticism is taken from Hegel’s 
own critical analysis of the same, which can be found in his exposition of morality in The Elements of the 
Philosophy of Right, in his presentation of German Romanticism in his lectures on aesthetics, and in his 
critique of K.W.F. Solger.  While endorsing Hegel’s analysis and criticism of Romantic irony, Kierkegaard 
challenges Hegel’s understanding of irony in general (ibid, 275, 278, 265, et passim).  Particularly, 
Kierkegaard thinks that Hegel problematically conflates all irony with Romanticism, which has the twofold 
consequence that Hegel fails to understand Socratic irony and that Hegel does not appreciate the value of 
non-Romantic forms of irony.  For a detailed but purely historical account of the influence of Hegel on 
Kierkegaard’s dissertation, consider Niels Thulstrup’s Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel (especially 224-242). 
69 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 261. 
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If we turn back to the foregoing general description of irony as infinite absolute 
negativity, it is adequately suggested therein that irony is no longer directed against 
this or that particular phenomenon, against a particular existing thing, but that the 
whole of existence has become alien to the ironic subject and the ironic subject 
alien to existence, that as actuality has lost its validity for the ironic subject, he 
himself has to a certain degree become unactual.70
Glossing the Hegelian jargon, Kierkegaard’s threefold point in using this expression is that 
irony undermines the conventional value attributed to actions without concurrently 
affirming any alternative value, the negation of irony applies indiscriminately and equally 
to all possible values, and this negation is not carried out for the sake of some already 
existing and known principle. 
This totalizing perception of the vanity of ethical life, whereby the ironist devalues 
all actions, however, cannot entail that the ironist ceases to act, since complete inaction is 
impossible – even the refusal to act is nonetheless an act, and such refusal is no more 
defensible for the ironist than its opposite, if consciousness has truly negated the value of 
action absolutely and infinitely.  In order to address this issue, Kierkegaard explains that it 
is not the case that the ironist becomes inactive with the awareness of the vanity of 
existence, but rather that the ironist feels indifferent to the various ways in which it does 
act; the ironist necessarily acts, but these actions no longer have a determinate meaning for 
the ironist.  Kierkegaard presents the tension between having to act and having no positive 
reason to act in the following: 
For irony, nothing is an established order; it plays helter-skelter ad libitum with 
everything; but when it wants to declare this, it says something positive, and to that 
extent its sovereignty is thereby at an end. […] The difficulty here is that, strictly 
speaking, irony actually is never able to advance a thesis, because irony is a 
qualification of the being-for-itself subject, who in incessant agility allows nothing 
70 Ibid, 259. 
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to remain established and on account of this agility cannot focus on the total point 
of view that it allows nothing to remain established.71 
To the extent that the ironic consciousness is purely negative, the issue is that it cannot act 
without positing value (since an agent at least tacitly posits value whenever it chooses to 
act in one way over another), and, thereby, compromising its own negativity.  
Kierkegaard’s resolution of this issue is not to claim that the ironist somehow ceases to act 
but is instead to claim that the ironist does not actually posit values in its actions.  
Kierkegaard explains this by attributing an essential vagary and insincerity to ironic 
consciousness.  Engaged in the activity of infinite absolute negativity, the ironist cannot 
value any particular course of action over others.  When the ironist acts, then, it does so 
without assuming that such action has any significance.  Accordingly, the ironist acts 
without earnestness: 
Ultimately the ironist always has to posit something, but what he posits in this way 
is nothing.  But then it is impossible to be earnest about nothing without either 
arriving at something (this happens if one becomes speculatively earnest about it) 
or despairing (if one takes it personally in earnest).  But the ironist does neither, 
and thus we can also say that he is not in earnest about it. […] Therefore we can 
say of irony that it is earnestness about nothing – insofar as it is not earnestness 
about something.  It continually conceives of nothing in contrast to something, and 
in order to free itself of earnestness about anything, it grasps the nothing.  But it 
does not become earnestness about nothing, either, except insofar as it is not 
earnestness about anything.72 
The enactment or neglect of any possible action appears arbitrary to the ironist.  Since the 
ironist is aware of the lack of justification for acting in any particular way, there is neither 
conviction nor commitment in its action; the ironist acts in an arbitrary manner, because 
the ironist conceives all action as unjustified.  Concerning the same, Cross notes that the 
ironist “is disengaged from his social world, in that he does not take the practices and norms 
71 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 269. 
72 Ibid, 270. 
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that constitute that world seriously and does not take other individuals in that world 
seriously.”73  Congruently, Kierkegaard characterizes ironic action as mere play: “Irony is 
the infinitely light playing with nothing.”74 
Additionally and for further clarification, the vagary that characterizes irony is not 
due to any ignorance regarding possible actions; it is not the case that there is a particular 
action or set of actions that is meaningful and that the ironist acts arbitrarily because it is 
simply ignorant of this action or set.  For Kierkegaard, irony is a recognition that concerns 
the nature of action itself and does not directly concern particular actions.  It is not the case 
that there is some proper course of action – one that the ironist has simply not uncovered 
yet but could potentially do so with either extended or intensified reflection; instead, from 
the perspective of irony, every possible action – presently conceived or not – has lost its 
significance.  What the ironic consciousness is lacking is not knowledge of a particular 
action but a principle in accordance with which any action could be deemed valuable; irony 
is founded upon ignorance of a principle, not ignorance of a particular act.  If irony were 
merely ignorance of some action that is otherwise justified, then a complete recognition of 
the self in its negative freedom would not be achieved.  In such a case, the self would 
recognize itself as still bound to a particular life-view, albeit one that it simply does not 
know yet.  As Kierkegaard understands it, however, irony is a more encompassing 
recognition – one that undermines faith in the value of any possible action. 
Given this understanding of irony, it is clear that consciousness does not achieve 
its ironic shape through a gradual and systematic procedure of negating the value of each 
possible course of action until consciousness has negated the totality of all possible action.  
73 Cross, 134. 
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For a finite being, it would be impossible to survey the totality of actions that are or may 
become available to it; finite consciousness never achieves a thoroughgoing and 
completely transparent awareness of its ethical situation.  If irony were understood in this 
manner, then its negativity would only ever be finite and relative; irony would only negate 
particular phenomena for the sake of some other phenomenon (known or otherwise).75  As 
Kierkegaard understands it, however, irony is achieved with the recognition that there is 
no explicable and principled basis upon which one could justify acting in a particular way.  
It is only on the basis of this recognition that the ironist finds nothing valuable in the survey 
of its ethical situation.  Only if irony is understood in this way can its negativity be infinite 
and absolute.  Kierkegaard says of this distinction: 
Irony sensu eminentiori is directed not against this or that particular existing entity 
but against the entire given actuality at a certain time and under certain conditions.  
Thus it has an intrinsic apriority, and it is not by successively destroying one portion 
of actuality after another that it arrives at its total view, but it is by virtue of this 
that it destroys in the particular instance.  It is not this or that phenomenon but the 
totality of existence that it contemplates sub specie ironiae.76 
The recognition that there is no foundation for the justification of any possible action is the 
condition under which particular acts appear to consciousness as vain.  One does not 
become conscious of the vanity of existence because particular acts appear valueless; 
rather, particular acts appear vain because the ironist is not aware of any foundation for 
75 This is not to say that questioning a particular way of life is unimportant or useless for the development of 
personality, but this kind of questioning is sub-ironic.  It also does not mean that one is being unreflective 
when one negates the value of a particular way of life or shifts from valuing one way of life to valuing 
another.  Rather, it just means that this reflection has not attained irony in the full sense of infinite, absolute 
negativity.  There is a difference between juxtaposing one way of life with another and juxtaposing having a 
way of life at all with the requirement that there be some unconditional basis for the same.  The former 
juxtaposition raises the question of the meaning of a particular way of life, while the latter raises the question 
of the meaning of life as such. 
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their value.  Lacking knowledge of this foundation is the reason for which the ironist cannot 
be confident in its acting and resigns itself to vagary. 
As Kierkegaard understands it, irony makes consciousness negatively free from the 
truth of substantial life as a whole and not merely in part or gradually.  Accordingly, most 
commentators identify Kierkegaard’s conception of irony with nihilism.   Irony is the shape 
of consciousness corresponding to the awareness that there is no discernable justification 
for the way of the world, that there is no ultimate basis for the value of actions, and that 
actions are unjustified.   Kierkegaard notes that, for the ironist, “nothing is an established 
order.”77  In this sense, irony involves annihilation: “For irony, everything becomes 
nothing.”78  Irony is the nihilistic perspective that nothing has value and that the totality of 
existence is meaningless. 
Developing this notion, Stack notes that irony is essentially a nihilistic awareness, 
which involves not so much a “discontinuity” in meaning but a “dissolution” of meaning.79  
It is not simply that the ironist is unable to discover a coherent meaning for actuality, but 
rather that an already established and accepted meaning becomes unbelievable.  This 
indicates the sense in which ironic consciousness is something that is developed or 
achieved; irony involves conscious movement, specifically the movement from an 
accepted understanding of the world to a rejection – without substitution – of that same 
understanding.  Irony is not a quality that could ever belong to the natural attitude of 
consciousness, which uncritically accepts the givenness of its world, precisely because 
irony is the negation of this attitude.  One becomes an ironist, and one does so by 
77 Ibid, 269. 
78 Ibid, 258. 
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transcending the view that life possesses a self-evident and unquestionable meaning.  
Further explicating this ironic dissolution of meaning, Stack notes that irony is not to be 
confused with some naïve irrationalism; the irony of consciousness is not some thoughtless 
rejection of meaning that is produced through a lack of reflection on the meaning of 
existence.  Rather, irony is precisely “the result of careful, critical, rational analysis.”80  The 
ironist has undergone the process of questioning the truth of the everyday metaphysical 
and ethical understandings that are constitutive of substantial life; the ironist asks why the 
world is the way that it is and why must one act in certain ways within that world.  Far 
from any kind of thoughtlessness, irony is that which first of all thematizes the question of 
the meaning of life.81  As such, irony expresses a reflective relation between consciousness 
and its world. 
Given that irony is the nascent awareness of the questionability of the meaning of 
existence, it thereby precisely serves as the basis for ethical development, which is why the 
concept is deemed important by Kierkegaard.  The alienating negativity of irony results in 
the consciousness of the uncertainty of the meaning of life.  The nihilism that emerges with 
irony need not be terminal but can be taken as the transition to a new consciousness of 
meaning.  It is with the loss of the apparent truth of substantial life that the possibility of 
reflectively and actively discovering or establishing a new meaning for one’s existence 
arises; with the ironic negation of substantial life, a space is opened up for a higher 
ethicality, where ethicality is understood not as unquestioning adherence to the established 
norms of one’s given social situation, but rather as conscientious and deliberate self-
determination within that situation.  The ironic insight into the vanity of everything marks 
80 Ibid, 26. 
81 Ibid, 43. 
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the initiation of ethical existence, insofar as it is with irony that one breaks free from social 
conformity and can – with this freedom – decide for itself how to act.  For this reason, Pia 
Søltoft describes Kierkegaard’s dissertation as “a summons to a particular kind of moral 
life.”82  Along these lines, Stack complementarily notes: 
[Irony is] a polemical attitude towards conventional ‘knowledge’ or opinion, the 
undermining of confidence in “objective” certainties and the correlative search for 
self-knowledge as well as a subjective basis for ethical self-being.83 
Irony is not simply the primitive expression of subjectivity; it is more determinately the 
inception of ethical subjectivity. 
The negativity of irony involves the call for a higher ethical existence; by depriving 
the subject of any conventional understanding of life, irony puts the subject in a position 
wherein it must determine what is true for itself, since there is no other source of meaning 
available to it.  Karsten Harries explains the situation of the ironist as follows: 
The immediate hold that family, country, society have on us first of all and most of 
the time, must be called into question if we are to genuinely commit ourselves to 
them, or to anything.  Only the person who is at some distance from what he is 
committing himself to, is able to make such a commitment.  It is thus important to 
detach oneself even and especially from those things that one takes to be most 
important, if one is to commit oneself to them in a meaningful manner.84 
This transition to a state of reflective engagement in one’s situation is made possible by 
irony precisely because irony involves the consciousness of the disparity between 
determinate actuality and indeterminate ideality.  Kierkegaard remarks: “irony is a demand, 
an enormous demand, because it rejects reality and demands ideality.”85  Stack adds to this: 
82 Pia Søltoft, “Ethics and Irony,” from: International Kierkegaard Commentary: The Concept of Irony, ed. 
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“Irony is the antithesis of conventional actuality; it is, by implication, a condemnation of 
actuality and is oriented in the direction of the ideal infinity of the possible.”86  This ironic 
recognition of possibility is the basis for ethical development, insofar as the ironic 
awareness entails the recognition of the person’s freedom from adherence to the way of 
life established by the substantial world.  Through irony, one first of all reflectively 
confronts the possibilities of one’s situation and one’s responsibility for enacting or 
neglecting these possibilities.  Consciousness becomes responsible in irony precisely 
because, having recognized that there is no unconditionally established way of the world, 
consciousness recognizes that it alone determines its activity. 
This confrontation between actuality and ideality signals the beginning of ethical 
personality, which is the reason for which Kierkegaard’s dissertation culminates in the 
following thesis: “Just as philosophy begins with doubt, so also a life that may be called 
human begins with irony.”87  Additionally, he says: 
In our age there has been much talk about the importance of doubt for science and 
scholarship, but what doubt is to science, irony is to personal life.  Just as scientists 
maintain that there is no true science without doubt, so it may be maintained with 
the same right that no genuinely human life is possible without irony.”88 
Implicitly, Kierkegaard understands the central feature of human life to be the twofold 
awareness of personal freedom and responsibility.  It is through irony that one attains 
consciousness of one’s various possibilities and one’s freedom in relation to the neglect or 
enactment of those possibilities.  Ironically, various courses of action are no longer 
perceived as the compulsory way of the world but as possibilities for and to which one is 
responsible. 
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2.3 The Two Types of Irony and Living Poetically 
Kierkegaard’s analysis of irony outlines two forms of the same, each of which has 
a unique ethical significance.  In general, irony involves the emergence of personality 
through the alienation of substantial or immediate existence.  There are two ways, though, 
in which the ironic consciousness can conceive of itself in the experience of this alienation 
and the correlative awareness of its negative freedom.  Kierkegaard’s account of two forms 
of irony fits well with the model provided by Alan Wilde, which distinguishes between 
irony and anirony.  Introducing this distinction, Wilde says: 
[All] irony, regarded as a perceptual encounter with the world, generates in 
response to its vision of disparity (or in some cases is generated by) a 
complementary, more conceptual vision of wholeness or singleness.89 
To every ironic position, which presents the world in its disjunction, disharmony, and 
incoherence, there is a counter-position, which Wilde designates as anironic, that presents 
the world in its junction, harmony, and coherence.  Kierkegaard’s account can be 
understood as operating within this model.  For him, both forms of irony recognize the 
meaninglessness of existence.  One form of irony, however, resigns itself to this 
meaninglessness and recommends acting in a purely arbitrary manner, since it perceives 
no non-arbitrary justification for acting in any particular way.  The other form of irony, in 
contrast, is inspired by the recognition of the meaninglessness of substantial life to discover 
a higher meaning for life, albeit one that does not belong to the pre-ironic consciousness 
of substantial life.  For Kierkegaard, one form of irony embraces the disharmony of 
existence and terminates in nihilism, while the other form seeks to overcome that 
disharmony.  These two types of irony, as Hall notes, found two distinct and incompatible 
89 Alan Wilde, Horizons of Assent: Modernism, Postmodernism, and the Ironic Imagination (Baltimore: John 
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“pictures” of existence: there is “a picture of the self/world relation in which the self is 
imagined as completely sundered from the world and a picture of the self/world relation in 
which the self is imagined as dialectically sundered from and bonded to the world.”90  As 
Hall’s description indicates, both forms of irony share the moment of sundering; only one 
form, however, transcends this sundering in a bonding moment.  Using the nihilistic 
descriptions that Stack employs: all forms of irony are nihilistic – one form, however, 
resigns itself to nihilism, while the other form seeks to overcome its nihilism. 
Kierkegaard primarily presents these two forms of irony as different ways of “living 
poetically,” an expression that Kierkegaard uses to characterize the existential task of the 
ironist.  Kierkegaard states: “irony’s great requirement was to live poetically.”91  
Irrespective of type, irony brings with it the demand for the person to live poetically.  That 
is, by ironically attaining the consciousness of one’s possibilities and one’s freedom in 
relation to the enactment or neglect of those possibilities, the ironist becomes tasked with 
the realization of itself.  This project of self-realization becomes a task for the ironic 
consciousness precisely because the ironist, having become aware of its own freedom and 
possibility, cannot appeal to any pre-established understanding of ‘the way things are,’ but 
instead can only view its life as determined by itself.  The pre-ironic person – still in its 
latency – is not truly responsible for its way of life, insofar as this person has not achieved 
conscious independence from its substantial existence.  Through irony, however, the 
person achieves this independence and becomes responsible for the way that it develops 
itself through the various possibilities that it enacts or neglects.  The ironic consciousness 
90 Ronald Hall, Word and Spirit: A Kierkegaardian Critique of the Modern Age, Bloomington: Indiana 
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reflects on how it freely acts, in consequence of which it can be said to be self-realizing.  
In such realization, the ironic consciousness freely and reflectively creates itself or “lives 
poetically,” which is precisely Kierkegaard’s expression for any project of self-
development. 
Despite being a kind of poiesis, this activity of living poetically is not limited to 
poets, aesthetes, or any other conceivable subset of persons.  Rather, what Kierkegaard 
calls “living poetically” is the activity of every person qua person.  As Andrew Burgess 
and Sylvia Walsh both note in explanation of this concept, poetic living is the task of all 
persons, insofar as the work that a person puts into self-development is akin to the work 
that the poet puts into poetry.92  The use of this expression, as Walsh notes, is part of that 
previously referenced tendency of Kierkegaard to explicate existential categories and 
existential issues using aesthetic terminology.  Accordingly, living poetically does not 
concern the creation of an artwork, except in the specific sense that one’s own life is 
considered a work of art.  Walsh clarifies the meaning of the term with the following: “For 
it is not the fashioning of a work of art as such but a particular way of orienting ourselves 
to life that constitutes the essential condition for living poetically.”93  Kierkegaard’s 
concept of living poetically concerns the manner in which one freely chooses to creatively 
shape one’s self and one’s world. 
Connecting the concept of living poetically with the two types of irony, 
Kierkegaard notes that living poetically can be understood in two different ways; to live 
poetically can mean either “to compose oneself poetically” or “to be composed 
92 Andrew Burgess, “The Upbuilding in the Irony of Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Irony,” from:  
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poetically.”94  These two senses of living poetically correspond to two different types of 
ironic existence: one characteristic of “romantic irony,” and another characteristic of what 
Kierkegaard terms “mastered irony.”  The first form of poetic living is a reaction to the 
experience of the alienation of the self that treats all actions as equally and incessantly 
meaningless, such that it does not matter which possible actions one enacts or neglects.  
The other form of poetic living responds to this experience of alienation by actively seeking 
some positive understanding of existence – one that is irreducible to the views constitutive 
of substantial life, since such views have become unbelievable for the ironic consciousness 
– by virtue of which one could justify the enactment or neglect of various possible actions.
2.4 The First Form of Living Poetically – Romanticism 
The first form of living poetically, which Kierkegaard thinks is paradigmatically 
represented by German Romanticism, is a complication of the awareness of the vanity of 
everything.95  Kierkegaard presents romanticism as an intensification of consciousness: 
while irony is the nascent expression of subjectivity, romanticism is “subjectivity in its 
second potency.”96  Of the romantic consciousness, Kierkegaard says the following: “It 
must be subjectivity raised to the second power, a subjectivity’s subjectivity, which 
94 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 280. 
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paradigmatically illustrative of one of the two forms of irony.  Regarding the connection between irony and 
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corresponds to reflection’s reflection.”97  In irony, there is the awareness of the vanity of 
existence.  In romanticism, this ironic awareness becomes self-affirming; as romanticism 
is “an intensified subjective consciousness, it quite naturally is clearly and definitely 
conscious of irony and declares irony as its position.”98  Romanticism, as self-affirming 
irony, involves a heightened consciousness of the self’s alienation from its substantial life. 
While the meaning of this intensification of consciousness remains fairly opaque in 
Kierkegaard’s descriptions, the point seems to be that, in romanticism, irony is intensified 
in the following sense: the ironist, having seen through the vanity of everything, becomes 
conscious of its freedom from all bounds and, subsequently, affirms itself in its liberation 
from actuality and its capacity to act without restriction.  Romanticism is the intensified 
consciousness of irony in the sense that, by actively assuming the recognition that the 
norms of substantial life are without foundation, the romantic consciousness recognizes 
itself as licensed to do anything, since it is not conscious of any prohibitions on action.  
Kierkegaard explains this as follows: 
But in order for the ironic formation to be perfectly developed, it is required that 
the subject also become conscious of his irony, feel negatively free as he passes 
judgment on the given actuality, and enjoy this negative freedom.99 
Romanticism is an irony that recognizes not only the independence of personality from 
actuality but also the power that consciousness has in relation to actuality; the romantic 
ironist perceives the vanity of actuality, but it thereby also perceives the power that it 
possesses over actuality, insofar as, on the one hand, it is precisely consciousness itself that 
passes this judgment concerning vanity and, on the other hand, this judgment liberates 
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consciousness from the bonds of actuality.  In recognizing that it itself is responsible for 
exposing the invalidity of substantial norms, the romantic consciousness affirms its own 
validity.  McCarthy and Stewart summarize this point well in the following: 
The individual, having risen from immersion in the actual and having broken with 
the age and his fellows, is “deprived” of inauthentic content and henceforth 
estranged, but because of this stands in sharp relief as an individual subject.100 
The self-positing “I” denies the truth and validity of everything in the external 
world and sets itself up as the ultimate judge and arbiter of truth, but this truth has 
no content in itself, and a given thing is true by virtue not of anything intrinsic to 
the matter itself but only of the fact that it is posited by the subject.101 
The romantic consciousness views itself as the sole source of truth; its negation of 
substantiality is concurrent with the affirmation of its position as that which passes 
judgment on substantial life. 
Romanticism is a self-affirming irony, and it affirms itself by maintaining the 
distance between itself and its world precisely by acting without concern for the normative 
structures of substantial life.  The romantic ironist affirms both the vanity of substantial 
life and the validity of itself as the arbiter of truth by acting in any manner that it sees fit.   
Kierkegaard describes the ethical situation of the romantic in the following: 
Irony now functioned as that for which nothing was established, as that which was 
finished with everything, and also as that which had the absolute power to do 
everything.  If it allowed something to remain established, it knew that it had the 
power to destroy it, knew it at the very same moment it let it continue.  If it posited 
something, it knew it had the authority to annul it, knew it at the very same moment 
it posited it.  It knew that in general it possessed the absolute power to bind and to 
unbind.102 
The romantic affirms the freedom of which it becomes conscious in irony precisely by 
employing that freedom in any way that it chooses, irrespective of the expectations or 
100 McCarthy, 30. 
101 Stewart, 171. 
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standards of substantial life.  Such an ironist may act perfectly in accordance with the norms 
of its social milieu, but such accord is purely accidental; if the romantic happens to adhere 
to any of the norms of its ethical situation, it is not because that norm has any binding force 
over the romantic but because the romantic coincidentally wants to act in that manner.  
Romanticism “gives the arbitrary I free reign in ironic self-satisfaction.”103 
Since the romantic does not recognize any objective standard for action, its activity 
is essentially capricious.  Personality, having attained an awareness of its negative freedom, 
finds itself not bound to act in any particular way, since there is no discernable justification 
for any action.  However, the same personality is also aware that the courses of action that 
belong to substantial life exhaustively define the realm of all possible actions.  While 
personality may recognize the vanity of its situation, it must nonetheless continue to act 
within this situation.  The ironist is in the contentious position wherein all actions are 
considered meaningless, but it must, in spite of such meaninglessness, nonetheless act.  The 
romantic responds to this tension by consciously acting in an arbitrary, playful, whimsical 
manner – in a manner liberated from adherence to social norms and expectations.  The 
romantic lives however it likes, and it feels neither conviction in its acting nor commitment 
to its acts, insofar as the romantic consciousness conceives itself as absolved from 
everything in its absolute freedom. 
This absolute freedom of self-development that consciousness attributes to itself in 
romanticism clarifies the first sense of Kierkegaard’s concept of living poetically.  In this 
first sense, living poetically means “creating oneself poetically,” which Kierkegaard 
understands in the following way: without reference to any objective norm (since such 
103 Ibid, 296. 
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norms are vain presumptions for the romantic consciousness and, thereby, lack authority), 
one arbitrarily develops oneself through equally arbitrary actions.  This arbitrary self-
development is twofold, as Kierkegaard notes; it is not simply that the romantic 
consciousness composes itself poetically, for, in this self-development, the romantic also 
composes its environing world, which serves as the context for self-development.  
Kierkegaard explains the poetic living of romanticism as involving a twofold activity of 
composition in the following way: 
But for the ironist, this context [i.e., the world], which he would call a demanding 
appendix, has no validity, and since it is not his concern to form himself in such a 
way that he fits into his environment, then the environment must be formed to fit 
him – in other words, he poetically composes his environment also.  The ironist 
stands proudly inclosed within himself, and just as Adam had the animals pass by, 
he lets people pass before him and finds no fellowship for himself.104 
Rather than being something to and for which consciousness is responsible in any 
determinate way, the world appears to the romantic consciousness merely as material that 
can be freely shaped in accordance with its vagary.  The romantic’s situation, which serves 
as the context for self-development, has validity only in relation to the whimsically pursued 
projects of the romantic.  As the romantic develops itself arbitrarily, it also arbitrarily 
determines the meaning and value of its situation. 
As Kierkegaard notes, this manner of arbitrary self-development produces a tension 
in the romantic view of life.  In order for the romantic to live poetically through arbitrary 
self-determination, it must have some conception of the meaning of itself and its world, to 
the extent that all self-development requires some representation of who one is, who one 
strives to be, and how the world is constituted so as to facilitate this developmental process; 
for a reflective consciousness, self-development cannot happen in a thoughtless manner.  
104 Ibid, 283. 
47 
As Kierkegaard’s description of romanticism indicates, however, the romantic 
consciousness does not recognize anything as valid; the romantic is precisely that nihilistic 
shape of consciousness that denies that any course of action or lifestyle is valuable or 
meaningful.  Accordingly, the romantic has the freedom to develop itself however it wills 
but has precisely denied the means through which it could develop itself.  Kierkegaard 
poignantly expresses the precarious position of the romantic ironist as follows: “It is a 
potentiation, an exaltation as strong as a god who can lift the whole world and yet has 
nothing to lift.”105  The romantic has the capacity to live any life that it sees fit but has 
already denied the value of any lifestyle. 
In order to overcome this tension between the need to attribute meaning to the world 
for the sake of self-development and the perception that the world is intrinsically 
meaningless, Kierkegaard claims that the romantic must freely and imaginatively create its 
own meaning for the world.  As already noted, the romantic perceives itself as valid in its 
judgment regarding the invalidity of the world.  This entails that the romantic conceives 
itself as its own source of truth and meaning.  Since actuality has no binding authority over 
the romantic consciousness, the latter feels free to create whatever meaning in accordance 
with which it wishes to live; given the perceived meaninglessness of substantial life, the 
romantic feels justified in creating its own subjective meaning for life, which it must do in 
order to act at all, since action is impossible without at least the appearance of meaning. 
Accordingly, romanticism – as the very name suggests – involves making existence 
novel, in the sense that the romantic freely creates a narrative for its own life that makes 
the latter appear meaningful.  The living poetically of romantic irony involves the 
105 Ibid, 274. 
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imaginative construction of a meaning that is superimposed upon a world that is otherwise 
perceived as meaningless.  In its novelization, the romantic does not passively accept an 
already established meaning from the substantial world; rather, the romantic maintains its 
alienation from substantiality by actively and freely creating its own meaning, with no 
regard for conventional understandings of life.  Kierkegaard explains the nature of this 
poetic creation of meaning in the following: 
If we ask what poetry is, we may say in general that it is victory over the world; it 
is through a negation of the imperfect actuality that poetry opens up a higher 
actuality, expands and transfigures the imperfect into the perfect […].106 
 
The romantic, liberated from conventional understandings of life, imaginatively 
reconstructs its world in what is taken to be a more perfect form.  This poetic expansion 
and transfiguration of actuality, whereby the latter is novelized, is made possible by irony.  
Due to the twofold ironic insight into the freedom of consciousness from its situation and 
into ideality, the romantic is able to idealize its actual situation; the romantic ironist is able 
to imaginatively construct its own version of actuality – one in which its own life appears 
meaningful.  Ironically, consciousness possesses an “infinite poetic freedom” with which 
it can romanticize its world in any way that it can imagine.107 
Although it is not congruent with the terminology of Kierkegaard’s dissertation, 
Hall provides a useful framework through which to interpret the poetic freedom that 
Kierkegaard attributes to the romantic consciousness.  Hall frames the issue of meaning 
and novelization in romantic irony in terms of the death of God.108  He describes the 
situation of the romantic in the following manner: 
 
106 Ibid, 297. 
107 Ibid, 281. 
108 This expression is obviously not employed by Kierkegaard.  However, so long as one understands this to 
be the death of the ‘God’ of substantial life, then Hall’s conception is perfectly congruent with Kierkegaard’s 
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The romantic ironist finds herself thrust into a radically contingent but godless 
universe in which she has no place to stand.  She lacks this place because she no 
longer is able to be called to it by God, having lost faith in him, and no longer able 
to return to the serene immediacy of a Greek (psychically qualified) “place” in the 
substantial order of the cosmos, having been irreversibly awakened […] to her own 
transcendence.109 
The primitive experience of irony is the inability to recognize an unconditional foundation 
that grants validity to the way of the world, and, consequently, the way of the world 
becomes unbelievable for the ironist.  In the wake of the death of the God of substantial 
life, the romantic individual sees only its own personality as having any validity.  
Consequently, as Hall says, the romantic deifies itself, in the sense that it takes itself to be 
the center of its world and the source of all truth and value: 
The romantic ironist then is a self without a world, but in need of one to be a self.  
She therefore sets out to poeticize her own private ‘world’ over which she can 
exercise absolute god-like power.110 
The romantic consciousness poeticizes its world, operating under the understanding that it 
itself is the criterion of truth and justice within this world, which is the position that the 
romantic consciousness originally assumes when it passes judgment on the invalidity of 
substantial existence; in romanticism, consciousness becomes uncertain of the truth of 
substantial life, while concurrently become certain of itself as the judge of such truth.  
Romantically, it is the individual person who decides that a particular poetically 
constructed narrative adequately explains existence and that that person should live in 
account.  Kierkegaard would agree that irony is the awareness of the death of the God of “Christendom” or 
conventional Christianity. 
109 Hall, Word, 127.  Interestingly, this conflation of subjectivity with divinity is what Jacobi believes and 
fears is the ultimate consequence of the Fichtean conception of selfhood.  Cf. Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich, 
“Jacobi to Fichte”, from The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel Allwill, trans. George di Giovanni 
(Montreal & Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994), 524.  In Kierkegaard’s account, which 
recognizes the influence of Fichte upon Romanticism, the Romantics seem to realize Jacobi’s fear concerning 
Fichte’s philosophy. 
110 Hall, Word, 128. 
50 
accordance with the prescriptions entailed by that narrative.  Given the absolute authority 
assumed by the romantic, Kierkegaard identifies romanticism with a “divine freedom that 
knows no bonds, no chains, but plays with abandon and unrestraint, gambols like a 
leviathan in the sea.”111  Whereas, in the life of immediacy, actuality has authority over the 
person, in that the former determines how the person is to live, in romanticism, 
consciousness assumes authority over itself, viewing itself as the sole author of its life.  
Having invalidated actuality, the romantic does not perceive itself as beholden to it, such 
that the romantic narrative for life need not correspond to actuality in any particular way. 
From the romantic perspective, which posits the subject in absolute validity, 
actuality is reduced to the mere material from which a narrative can be freely constructed 
by the subject, and the romantic consciousness views actuality as having no truth except in 
relation to the constructions of its romanticism.  Kierkegaard explains: “Everything 
established in the given actuality has nothing but poetic validity for the ironist, for he, after 
all, is living poetically.”112  The romantic consciousness perceives itself as free in such a 
way that it can ascribe whatever truth it wants to its actual situation.  This truth is 
determined ultimately by the particular narrative that is under construction; something is 
true as it fits into the romantic’s novelization of actuality.  The standard of truth applied in 
such construction is: “whether it is poetically appropriate, whether it could do as a line in 
the mouth of a poetic character.”113  Something has value for the romantic, only if it 
contributes to the particular story that the romantic is creating of its own life.  Accordingly, 
an essential feature of romanticism is substitution: in the poiesis of romanticism, an 
111 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 279. 
112 Ibid, 283. 
113 Ibid, 284. 
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imaginative construction is substituted for actuality.  Kierkegaard states that “irony’s 
special endeavor” is “to cancel all actuality and substitute for it an actuality that is no 
actuality.”114  As it replaces its lived-situation with a novelization of the same, romanticism 
posits the distinction between “the poetic actuality and the given actuality” or between “an 
imaginary world” and “the real world,” and the romantic exploits this distinction by 
supplanting actuality with poetry.115 
This project of novelization involved in the living poetically of romanticism is 
further connected by Kierkegaard to pleasure and enjoyment, although this connection is 
not developed in much detail, despite its significance for the account.  Kierkegaard says 
that the romantic novelizes existence in whatever way it “pleases.”116  Moreover, the 
standard in accordance with which the romantic creates is “enjoyment, and to enjoy, after 
all, is to live poetically.”117  In his description of romanticism, Kierkegaard identifies 
romanticism with an affirmation of desire or an appeal to sensuousness, in that the romantic 
creates the meaning that it wants to be true, or that satisfies its desires, or that feels true.  
Despite its emphasis on personal freedom, then, romanticism involves what McCarthy calls 
a “devolution” to sensuousness.118 
Here, there is an apparent inconsistency in Kierkegaard’s description of 
romanticism, although this may be an inconsistency within the romantic way of life, rather 
than within the description of the same.  The inconsistency is this: the romantic does not 
perceive the validity of anything but nonetheless validates both its own desires and its own 
114 Ibid, 290. 
115 Ibid, 298, 300. 
116 Ibid, 277. 
117 Ibid, 295. 
118 McCarthy, 26. 
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decision to shape the world in accordance with those desires.    To the extent that everything 
in the actual world lacks validity, it is unclear why the romantic affirms the validity of 
desire, so as to let desire determine the novelization of existence.  Moreover, letting one’s 
life be shaped by desire seems characteristic of immediate personality, which the ironist 
has precisely transcended.  The tension in Kierkegaard’s description of the romantic is as 
follows: the romantic affirms the irony of consciousness, such that it no longer recognizes 
any source of value or truth, but, at the same time, it affirms what it finds to be pleasant, as 
if pleasantness were a source of value and truth. 
Unfortunately, Kierkegaard does not explicitly address this tension in his account 
of romanticism.  Some indication of how this tension is resolved can, however, be found 
in some of his comments on Friedrich Schlegel, who is one of the three paradigmatic 
Romantics, whose work Kierkegaard analyzes in exposition of his theory and critique of 
romantic irony.  In his commentary on Schlegel’s novel, Lucinde, Kierkegaard says the 
following: 
The oddity about Lucinde and the whole trend associated with it is that, by starting 
from the freedom and the constitutive authority of the I, one does not arrive at a 
still higher spirituality but comes only to sensuousness and consequently to its 
opposite.  In ethics, the relation to spirit is implied, but because the I wants a higher 
freedom, it negates the ethical spirit and thereby falls under the laws of the flesh 
and of drives.119 
While ethicality is conventionally understood as a liberation of the agent from natural 
inclination, in that the ethical person lives life in accordance with the concepts of good and 
evil, rather than pleasure and pain, the romantic ironist considers the viewing of life under 
moral categories as unwarrantedly restricting its freedom, such that, in an effort to maintain 
its absolute freedom, the romantic ironist rejects the assumption of an ethical existence.  
119 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 301. 
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What Kierkegaard suggests here is that the romantic resorts to sensuality in an attempt to 
maintain its liberation from the binding force of ethics; in the attempt to free itself from 
unjustified and vain convention, the romantic affirms its sensuousness.  Here, Kierkegaard 
is presupposing a dichotomy between sensuality and ethicality; if the romantic has negated 
the ethics of substantial life, while concurrently withholding the affirmation of any higher 
ethicality (since any ethical attitude appears vain to the romantic), then, in this twofold 
negation of ethics, the romantic has recourse to nothing but desire in deliberating on how 
to live its life.  Ultimately, then, the romantic novelizes its existence in accordance with its 
arbitrary desires, so as to maintain its subjective freedom from the restrictions of ethical 
life. 
To the extent that the romantic creates a meaning for the world in accordance with 
enjoyment, the romantic is not bound to a single or even consistent meaning.  That which 
is enjoyable is not only unique to each subject, but it is also as multiple for a single subject 
as that subject’s desires.  Given the diversity of what one may enjoy, there is “a multitude 
of destinies” through which the romantic can poetically live its life, and this has several 
consequences, according to Kierkegaard.120 
First, what determines the particular meaning that the romantic endorses at any 
given moment is whatever passing mood characterizes the romantic’s current emotional 
state.  In any given moment, the romantic endorses whatever meaning feels valid, not 
because it actually is true, but because, by appealing to some disposition of the romantic, 
that meaning is momentarily believable.  Kierkegaard thinks that this is illustrated well by 
Schlegel’s Lucinde, wherein the erotic mood of the first and infatuous moment of love is 
120 Ibid, 282. 
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emphasized to the point that the erotic is perceived to be the sole content of life, such that 
the pursuit of the erotic is taken to be that toward which one should exhaustively live. 
Second, since there is a diversity of moods that one may experience, the 
novelization of romanticism has diverse and often inconsistent influences; the romantic’s 
narrative for its existence is itself as variated as its moods, which makes its life dissolve 
into a series of disparate episodes.  Moreover, since no singular meaning has more validity 
than others, to the extent that each is arbitrarily endorsed, the romantic can freely cycle 
through completely inconsistent and heterogeneous narratives for life: “But since for him 
all such destinies have only the validity of possibility, he can run through the whole scale 
almost as fast as children do.”121  The romantic shifts from one narrative to another based 
on its present mood; as the mood shifts, so too does the narrative.  In one moment, the 
romantic may be content in the pursuit of the erotic, and, in the next, it may feel utmost 
devotion to a religious ideal.  Kierkegaard characterizes this diversity well in the following 
description of the romantic person: 
At times he walks around with the proud air of a Roman patrician wrapped in a 
bordered toga, or he sits in the sella curulis with imposing Roman earnestness; at 
times he conceals himself in the humble costume of a penitent pilgrim; then again 
he sits with his legs crossed like a Turkish pasha in his harem; at time he flutters 
about as light and free as a bird in the role of an amorous zither player.  This is what 
the ironist means when he says that one should live poetically; this is what he 
achieves by poetically composing himself.122 
Since pleasure is what motivates the poetic self-composition of the romantic, the romantic 
not only has access to a multitude of ways of living, since what is pleasing to any given 
person is multiple, but is also committed only in a fleeting way to each lifestyle that it 
adopts, since pleasure itself, through either frustration, satisfaction, or supersession, is only 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid, 282-283. 
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ever transient.  There is nothing enduring in the life of the romantic; any truth that is posited 
one moment can be negated in the next: 
Now all existence becomes just a game for the poeticizing arbitrariness that rejects 
nothing, not even the most insignificant thing, but for which nothing endures, 
either, not even the most significant.123 
The romantic’s life, then, consists of an episodic series of radically distinct lifestyles, 
though which the romantic arbitrarily and non-committally cycles. 
Third, insofar as there are innumerable understandings of the world that the 
romantic is free to adopt, it is difficult for the romantic to decide upon which narrative to 
follow.  Correspondingly, Kierkegaard identifies in the romantic personality a tendency to 
let external forces to decide: 
For the ironist, everything is possible.  Our God is in heaven and does whatever he 
desires; the ironist is on earth and does whatever he desires.  But we cannot blame 
the ironist for finding it so difficult to become something, because when one has 
such a prodigious multitude of possibilities it is not easy to choose.  For a change, 
the ironist finds it proper to let fate and chance decide.124 
That the romantic develops itself in accordance with its supposed lot in life does not, 
however, undermine its negative freedom; it is still the romantic consciousness itself that 
decides to accept whatever it designates as fate or chance.  This appeal to fatalism remains 
just one of several ways that the romantic arbitrarily creates itself and its world.  The 
romantic lets the manifold of its passing moods determine how it variously develops itself, 
and, even when it identifies an external source for meaning, this source is nonetheless valid 
only due to the romantic’s free endorsement of it. 
123 Ibid, 302. 
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Insofar as the romantic engages in a free creation of meaning that is not necessarily 
tied to its actuality, Kierkegaard identifies romanticism with a “letting fantasy prevail.”125  
The romantic consciousness substitutes actuality with a fantastic rendering of the same.  
This substitution is carried out with the intent to superimpose a meaning on an otherwise 
meaningless world, but this superimposed meaning exists only within the imagination of 
the romantic consciousness and is not grounded the lived-situation of the same.  Such 
fantasizing, then, reinforces the alienation of consciousness from its world.  The romantic 
loses itself in fantasies that precisely perpetuate its alienation.  The romantic is fantastically 
distracted from its world; romanticism “lulls the deeper I into a somnambulate state.”126  In 
this state, consciousness does not find itself concerned with the world in any way: “When 
fantasy alone gains the upper hand in this way, it exhausts and anesthetizes the soul, robs 
it of all moral tension, makes life a dream.”127  This somnambulance is essential to 
romanticism; for the romantic, it is not the case that “living is something different from 
dreaming.”128 
Both the salient feature and ultimate consequence of romantic irony is the active 
perpetuation of the discontinuity between personality and its world.  The romantic 
consciousness is a self-conscious and self-affirming irony; it knows and wills itself as 
ironic, as disconnected from its world.  For the romantic, irony is a terminal position: 
consciousness achieves a recognized disparity between itself and its world, and, rather than 
seeking to reconcile itself to its world, consciousness acts so as to maintain itself in a state 
of discontinuity.  It does this by letting fantasy prevail, such that the meaning that is 
125 Ibid, 292. 
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fabricated by the romantic is always at odds with actuality, either because it does not 
correspond with the romantic’s actual situation or because it does so only accidentally.  
This fantasy is determined not by the supposed truth of its situation, but by what the 
romantic finds enjoyable.  Accordingly, this fabrication reinforces the disparity between 
consciousness and its world, since the latter has been substituted with a fantastic projection 
of the same.  Kierkegaard concludes: “Therefore, the poetic is a kind of victory over 
actuality, but the infinitizing [of imagination] is more of an emigration from actuality than 
a continuance in it.”129  Existence loses its reality for the romantic: 
As the ironist poetically composes himself and his environment with the greatest 
possible poetic license, as he lives in this totally hypothetical and subjunctive way, 
his life loses all continuity.130 
Accordingly, romantic irony may be described, following Hall, as a kind of 
“worldlessness.”131  The romantic consciousness finds itself alienated from a world that 
lacks justification for the meaning that it pretends and presumes, and the arbitrary acting 
and the flight into imaginative constructions that characterize romanticism only perpetuate 
this alienation.  This self-perpetuated disparity between the self and its world is the essence 
of romantic irony. 
As Kierkegaard emphasizes, this discontinuity between person and world is 
primarily ethical, insofar as the crisis of irony ultimately concerns action.  The romantic 
ironist, in perpetuating the negation of its situation, maintains the invalidity of the 
normative structures of this situation; the romantic suspends “what is constitutive in 
actuality, that which orders and supports it: that is, morality and ethics.”132  The romantic 
129 Ibid, 297. 
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rejects the truth and normativity of the world, but provides nothing substantial in its place.  
Kierkegaard advances this point further: 
It cannot really be said that the ironist places himself outside and above morality 
and ethics, but he lives far too abstractly, far too metaphysically and esthetically to 
reach the concretion of the moral and the ethical.133 
Consciousness ironically embraces the disparity between itself and the world, and it 
romantically intensifies this disparity through the substitution of actuality with a 
novelization of the same, such that consciousness is doubly removed from its situation and 
is no longer susceptible to any demands that actuality might place upon it.  Living out its 
life in fantasy, the romantic existence is too abstract for the demands of ethics and morality.  
Removed from the concerns of ethics, the romantic only concerns itself with its novel 
conception of life; Kierkegaard explains the romantic in the following: 
For him, life is a drama, and what absorbs him is the ingenious complication of this 
drama. He himself is a spectator, even when he himself is the one acting.  Thus he 
infinitizes his I, volatilizes it metaphysically and esthetically, and while his I 
sometimes contracts as egotistically and narrowly as possible, at other times it flaps 
about so loosely and disintegratedly that the whole world can be encompassed by 
it.134 
Life for the romantic loses unity, because the only thing holding such a life together is a 
poetically fabricated narrative of the same, over which the romantic has complete control 
and the details of which are determined by nothing beyond the inconsistency, vagary, and 
insouciance of romanticism. 
133 Ibid. 
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2.5  The Critique of Romanticism and the Issue of Boredom 
It is precisely due to its discontinuity that Kierkegaard critiques the romantic form 
of living poetically.  Kierkegaard’s critique is that romanticism presupposes an inadequate 
conception of self and world, which problematically results in the indefinite alienation of 
consciousness.135  Kierkegaard says that, in its self-perpetuated alienation, romanticism 
lacks a proper “reconciliation” with actuality, and it lacks this due to a misunderstanding 
of selfhood and the situatedness of the same.  Kierkegaard understands reconciliation in 
the following way: consciousness, having recognized itself in its negative freedom, 
achieves the further recognition that, despite such negativity, the self is nonetheless 
inseparably bound to its particular situation and is thereby responsible to that situation.  
This recognition is specifically reconciliatory to the extent that it views the self in 
continuity with its situation.  In this recognition, there is a twofold movement.  There is the 
first movement of irony, whereby consciousness finds itself estranged from its situation.  It 
is in this movement that consciousness recognizes itself as liberated from the apparent 
necessity that is operative within its substantial life and originally achieves subjectivity.  
There is a second movement, however, wherewith consciousness recognizes both that, 
despite its freedom, it is bound to a particular situation and that it has no control over this 
bond.  Borrowing Hall’s earlier expressions, consciousness is reconciled to its situation 
through a twofold movement of sundering and bonding.  This twofold movement is 
reconciliatory, to the extent that consciousness moves out of the world and back into the 
135 For an interesting defense of Romanticism against the Hegelian and Kierkegaardian critique, consider 
Gary Handwerk’s Irony and Ethics in Narrative: From Schlegel to Lacan. 
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same world.136  Insofar as romanticism only maintains the alienation of consciousness from 
its world through its fantasizing, it does not achieve this kind of reconciliation. 
In Kierkegaard’s account, the limitation of romanticism is precisely that this 
twofold movement is only inadequately carried out.  Romanticism attempts to create 
meaning for its life, but it fails to establish continuity between its self and its actuality 
through this meaning, insofar as the romantic substitutes actuality with a poeticized version 
of the same.  As a consequence of its novelization, the romantic self can be said to achieve 
reconciliation with its fabricated world, in the sense that the romantic consciousness can 
find itself meaningfully oriented within its poetically constructed representation of the 
world, but this artificial reconciliation only intensifies the disparity between the self and 
its actual world.  In his theory of irony, there are two ways in which Kierkegaard speaks of 
reconciliation.  First, there is a real reconciliation, wherewith the self recognizes itself as 
necessarily bound to its actual situation, and, second, there is a merely ideal reconciliation, 
wherewith the self recognizes itself only as belonging to a poetically imagined version of 
its actual situation.  Accordingly, Kierkegaard notes: 
To that extent, poetry is a kind of reconciliation, but it is not the true reconciliation, 
for it does not reconcile me with the actuality in which I am living; no 
transubstantiation of the given actuality takes place by virtue of this reconciliation, 
but it reconciles me with the given actuality by giving me another, a higher and 
more perfect actuality.  The greater the contrast, the less perfect the actual 
reconciliation, so that when all is said and done there is often no reconciliation but 
rather an enmity.137 
136 This language of a ‘dual movement’ of ‘moving out of the world’ and ‘moving into the world’ appears 
frequently in Kierkegaard’s aesthetic works, most thematically in Either/Or: Part II, Fear and Trembling, 
and Repetition.  Such terminology is used variously to express both ethical and religious processes of self-
development. 
137 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 297. 
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In an attempt to overcome the apparent vanity of its world, the romantic ironist seeks to 
imbue its world with meaning by substituting its lived-situation with an imaginatively 
constructed one – a poetically composed understanding of actuality with no principle of 
construction beyond personal whim.  Within this construction, the romantic self may feel 
at home and live according to the arbitrarily established dictates and norms of its world.  
For Kierkegaard, however, the standard of truth for reconciliation concerns the status of 
the situation to which one finds oneself connected; true reconciliation occurs when one 
holds oneself accountable in some way to one’s lived-situation, for only thereby does one 
accept one’s necessary connection to that situation, while only an illusory reconciliation is 
achieved in connection with an imagined-situation.  The romantic can give life the 
appearance of meaning through imaginary constructions, but this meaning is only apparent; 
the romantic consciousness can be reconciled with an imagined actuality, but it is thereby 
not reconciled with the situation in which it actually lives.  Søltoft explains this well in the 
following: 
This […] criticism of romantic irony is thus actually a criticism of its acosmism 
and escapism from actuality.  Romantic irony is not capable of bringing about a 
reconciliation between the subject who has differentiated himself from himself and 
his circumstances and the subject who despite this differentiation would make 
actual the connection between himself and his circumstance.138 
To the extent that the imaginary construction is the lens through which the romantic’s 
lived-situation is exhaustively viewed, the novelization of romanticism not only 
presupposes but actively perpetuates the ironic discontinuity between self and world.  The 
romantic perceives the vanity of the world, but the romantic’s vagariously created meaning 
only “reinforces vanity in its vanity and makes what is lunatic even more lunatic.”139  The 
138 Søltoft, 283. 
139 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 257. 
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issue is that the romantics do not attempt to make sense of their lived-situation, focusing 
instead only on the “unheard-of and highly improbable things that take place in their poet-
world.”140  Hence, romanticism is critiqued for its characteristic acosmism (i.e., 
romanticism’s perpetuation of the disparity between self and world) and escapism (i.e., 
romanticism’s letting fantasy prevail over actuality). 
Even though Kierkegaard critiques romantic irony for its discontinuity and its 
tendency to arbitrarily adopt particular views of life based on nothing more than enjoyment, 
Kierkegaard does identify a kind of unity to the romantic way of life, and it is with this 
identification that Kierkegaard introduces the concept of boredom into his analysis of 
irony.  Viewing itself as unbeholden to any conventional view of life and as free to 
arbitrarily adopt any lifestyle that it can imagine, the romantic ironist lives a disjointed life: 
“At times he has a clear grasp of everything, at times he is seeking; at times he is a 
dogmatician, at times a doubter, at times Jacob Böhme, at times the Greeks, etc. […].”141  
Despite this variety and inconsistency, Kierkegaard claims that there is still a unity in the 
romantic life.  He explains: 
But since there always must be a bond that ties these contrasts together, a unity in 
which the enormous dissonances of these moods resolve themselves, upon closer 
inspection one will reveal this unity in the ironist.  Boredom is the only continuity 
the ironist has.  Boredom, this eternity devoid of content, this salvation devoid of 
joy, this superficial profundity, this hungry glut.  But boredom is precisely the 
negative unity admitted into a personal consciousness, wherein the opposites 
vanish.142 
140 Ibid, 303.  In order to illustrate this point, Kierkegaard cites various examples from Tieck’s plays: 
“Animals talk like human beings, human beings talk like asses, chairs and tables become conscious of their 
meaning in existence, human beings find existence meaningless.  Nothing becomes everything, and 
everything becomes nothing; everything is possible, even the impossible; everything is probable, even the 
improbable” (ibid). 




Implicitly in this account, Kierkegaard posits a connection between boredom and the 
enjoyment that shapes the romantic’s poetic self-composition.  As previously noted, what 
motivates the romantic ironist to adopt a particular view of its life is enjoyment; the 
romantic adopts that view of life that it finds pleasing in some way.  On this model, what 
would explain a shift from one view of life to another is that a given view is no longer 
pleasing or that one’s passion for that view has subsided, and it is in this sense that 
Kierkegaard introduces boredom as a kind of vital unity.  Boredom, in this context, is 
precisely the experience of the disinterest in a particular way of life that emerges when the 
pleasure and passion for that particular way of life subside.  When these subside, however, 
the romantic life loses its content and joy, and the romantic becomes bored with its 
existence.  In such a state, the romantic is compelled to overcome its boredom by 
fantasizing its life anew.  In one sense, the life of the romantic lacks unity; by letting 
whatever fantasy that it finds to be momentarily pleasing prevail, the romantic lets its life 
devolve into a series of disjointed narratives and projects of poetic self-composition 
without any consistent and overarching view of life or ultimate goal of the same.  In another 
sense, however, the unifying feature of this life is boredom, in the sense that what motivates 
the romantic to adopt a life-view and to shift from one life-view to another is the experience 
of life as stagnant, uninteresting, and in need of reinvigoration through fantasy; boredom 
is what motivates the romantic to compose its life poetically.  To the extent that the 
experience of boredom recurs whenever a particular view of life becomes unengaging and 
is that which motivates the romantic ironist to construct a new view of its life, the avoidance 
of boredom is the only consistent and unifying element in the romantic life. 
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Kierkegaard thinks that no life can be wholly without unity, but there are 
nonetheless different kinds of vital unity.  Regarding these kinds, Kierkegaard posits a 
distinction between positive and negative unities for life, suggesting that romanticism lacks 
the former and possesses the latter.  The romantic life is negatively unified, in the sense 
that its unity is determined by a repeated negation – namely, the negation of boredom – 
rather than by the pursuit of a lifestyle that has been posited as valuable; the romantic view 
of life is characterized by an avoidance of boredom, such that the self-development of the 
romantic ironist is motivated by negation.  In this sense, boredom is the negative unity of 
the romantic life.  In contrast, a positively unified life – which is supposed to be represented 
in the second form of irony – is one in which one views one’s life as oriented around some 
goal that one takes to be worthwhile by virtue of itself and not merely as a means to avoid 
boredom. 
In this context, Kierkegaard connects boredom essentially with the dissolution of 
meaning and the alienation characteristic of irony.  What the romantic ironist seeks from 
its poetically composed narrative of life is the appearance of a meaning in accordance with 
which it can live.  The experience of boredom shatters this appearance and evinces the 
meaninglessness of life that the romantic seeks to avoid in its imaginative constructions.  
William McDonald explains: 
Boredom arises when consciousness has no serious concern for mapping 
representations truthfully onto actuality.  Boredom, then, presupposes, reflection.  
It is a mood that infects the space of consciousness between the ideal and the 
actual.143 
143 William McDonald, “Kierkegaard’s Demonic Boredom,” from Essays on Modernity and Boredom, ed. 
Barbara Dalle Pezze and Carlo Salzani (New York: Rodopi, 2009), 67-68. 
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Boredom is the mood that corresponds to the ironic shape of personality and expresses the 
worldlessness characteristic thereof.  The experience of boredom evinces the ironist’s loss 
of being meaningfully embedded and oriented within its lived-situation.  With irony, 
personality surpasses the life of immediacy and achieves the recognition of itself in its 
freedom and possibility, but, with this achievement, personality finds itself as having lost 
all meaningful connection with its actual world, and this loss becomes manifest as 
boredom.  The romantic ironist finds itself liberated from the institutionalized but 
unfounded understandings of the meaning and purpose of life that had dominated its pre-
ironic existence, but, through the infinite, absolute negativity of its irony, the romantic has 
deprived itself of any meaningful relation to its lived-situation, such that its life alternates 
between moments of boredom, wherein the romantic is totally disinterested in its existence, 
experiencing the latter as devoid of content and without joy, and moments of fantasy, 
wherein the romantic loses itself in imaginings wherethrough life briefly appears 
meaningful.  McCarthy characterizes the bored state of the romantic ironist in the following 
way: 
He is free from the deception of the present actuality, but he is left empty.  And 
albeit he has reached a higher stage of consciousness, it provides him no support to 
bear the terrible realization of the absence of content and meaning in his 
existence.144 
The vanity of existence and of all activity is experienced by the ironist as boredom.  The 
romantic is bored because it finds itself as essentially alienated from its world, as being 
free from all bonds and as having possibilities to enact without having any reason to enact 
any of them.  This is the sense in which, as previously noted, Kierkegaard describes the 
144 McCarthy, 19. 
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romantic as being “as strong as a god who can lift the whole world and yet has nothing to 
lift.”145  As McDonald says: 
[Romantic irony] does not negate the actual in a way that clears a space for a new 
positivity, or that serves truth and reason.  Instead, Romantic irony negates actuality 
in a way that leaves room only for bored attunement to its own vacuity.  Romantic 
irony, reduced to boredom, has only negative motivating power through 
repulsion.146 
Boredom expresses the contentlessness of the ironic life, as it is perceived as being devoid 
of any meaning, and this experience of emptiness motivates the romantic’s perpetual 
project of escapism, wherewith it supplements its own situation with fantasy. 
It is important to note that, given the way that Kierkegaard situates his account of 
boredom within his larger account of subjectivity and irony, Kierkegaard is not describing 
the ordinary experience of boredom.  While Kierkegaard himself does not explicitly present 
any such distinction, most scholars who analyze the concept of boredom distinguish a 
multitude of varied expressions and experiences of the same.147  Often, boredom is 
conceptually divided into two general categories: ordinary boredom (sometimes referred 
to as “situational” or “circumstantial” boredom) and existential boredom (sometimes 
referred to as “profound” boredom or “ennui”).148  The former type is ordinary, in that it is 
a common and frequent experience, the occurrence of which is determined by a particular 
situation or set of circumstances.  Brian O’Connor explains that such boredom occurs in 
145 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 274. 
146 McDonald, “Demonic,” 72. 
147 Lars Svendsen provides a concise summary of various typologies of boredom (Lars Svendsen, A 
Philosophy of Boredom, trans. John Irons (London: Reaktion Books, 2005), 41-45).  For an analysis of 
various ordinary experiences of boredom, consider Peter Toohey’s Boredom: A Lively History (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2011).  For an analysis of existential boredom with emphasis on the historical 
development of articulations of the phenomenon, consider Elizabeth Goodstein’s Experience without 
Qualities: Boredom and Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). 
148 Svendsen, 41-42; Brian O’Connor, Idleness: A Philosophical Essay (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2018), 105. 
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situations in which “we are deprived of the opportunity to do what would interest us and 
are forced at the very same time to do something that does not satisfy us at all.”149  In 
certain circumstances, one finds oneself confined for some duration of time to a situation 
in which one is prevented from interesting activity, which causes both time to drag and 
tedium to become manifest.  In such cases, the cause of boredom is readily identifiable, 
and the bored individual can alleviate this boredom by simply finding more interesting 
circumstances; such boredom is readily and easily cured through a change in circumstance.  
This ordinary experience contrasts with existential boredom, which, as O’Connor says, 
cannot be “explained in terms of contingent situations or circumstances” but is determined 
by one’s perception of existence itself.150  This type of boredom is not conditioned by 
particular circumstances and the availability of interesting activity in relation to the same, 
but rather it is “existential” in the sense that it is conditioned by the human condition itself.  
O’Connor explains the experience of this type of boredom in the following: 
At certain times, we may have our judgement affected by a mood that leads us to 
believe that life has nothing of interest to offer us.  At the same time, we do not 
really know what would interest us.  We feel no motivation or capacity to find 
pleasing activities, none of which are, in any case, conceivable from within the 
perspective we fall into during this type of boredom.151 
Existential boredom relates not to a particular activity, situation, or way of life, but instead 
concerns life as such: “the very value of life itself can seem doubtful when we are bored in 
this way.”152  Elizabeth Goodstein connects existential boredom with the modern problem 
concerning the meaning of life: “Boredom (ennui, Langeweile) names a crisis of meaning 
lived by the modern subject whose most fundamental relation to the world has become 
149 O’Connor, 106. 




problematic.”153  She adds: “Boredom […] should be seen not only as a symptom of the 
breakdown of older ways of being in the world but also as a locus of new possibilities.”154 
As O’Connor notes, both general types of boredom are similar in their “shared 
feeling of oppression connected with a frustrated wish to act.”155  However, whereas 
ordinary boredom can be alleviated through a simple change in circumstances, existential 
boredom involves a weariness of all actual and possible circumstances, such that a change 
in circumstance does not affect the boredom.  When one is existentially bored, one does 
not perceive any activities, situations, and ways of life as having any value, appeal, or 
justification.  The existentially bored individual cannot flee this boredom, since all 
circumstances appear equally worthless, and feels resigned to “a kind of depressing 
lethargy.”156  As Svendsen adds, these two types of boredom “have different symbolic 
modes of expression.”157  He explains that while ordinary boredom “is expressed via 
yawning, wriggling in one’s chair, stretching out one’s arms and legs, etc., profound 
existential boredom is more or less devoid of expression.”158  Hence, Goodstein aptly 
describes existential boredom precisely as “an experience without qualities.”159 
While Kierkegaard himself does not explicate his own theory of boredom through 
any typology of the various experiences thereof, his account nonetheless focuses on an 
existential type of boredom.  The boredom that permeates the life of the romantic ironist 
and that provides negative unity thereto is by no means an ordinary phenomenon that one 
153 Goodstein, 414. 
154 Ibid. 
155 O’Connor, 108. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Svendsen, 42. 
158 Ibid; passage amended to correct a typographical error. 
159 Ibid. 
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experiences in response to a particular situation or set of circumstances, wherein one is 
temporarily prevented from interesting activity.  Rather, the kind of boredom described by 
Kierkegaard in this account is grounded in the more fundamental structure of the romantic 
self.   The romantic ironist experiences boredom not in response to circumstances, but as 
expressive of its alienation from its lived-situation as such.  Boredom is a phenomenon 
wherewith the person feels itself disconnected from its situation, such that life itself appears 
vain and empty.  Additionally, unlike the ordinary type of boredom, the boredom of 
romanticism is not the kind that pre-ironic personality could experience, to the extent that 
the former is conditioned by the assumption of an ironic stance toward existence.  As 
Svendsen notes: “Boredom presupposes an element of self-reflection, or contemplation 
regarding one’s own placement in the world […].”160  This boredom is not accidental but 
grounded in the romantic view of life itself and expressive of the alienation thereof.  The 
mood of boredom shapes how the romantic basically encounters its world; the world 
appears to the romantic as devoid of meaning, such that no particular course of action 
arouses interest. 
The discontinuous life of the romantic that is permeated by boredom is, according 
to Kierkegaard, founded upon an inadequate conception of the self and of the freedom and 
possibility essential to the same.  More specifically, Kierkegaard – following Hegel’s 
critique of the Romantics – claims that the inadequate self-conception of the romantic 
ironist is based on a confused understanding of the meaning of selfhood in Fichte’s 
philosophy, whereby the transcendental and empirical selves are conflated.  Kierkegaard 
explains: 
160 Svendsen, 57. 
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This Fichtean principle that subjectivity, the I, has constitutive validity, is the sole 
omnipotence, was grasped by Schlegel and Tieck, and on that basis they operated 
in the world.  In this there was a twofold difficulty.  In the first place, the empirical 
and finite I was confused with the eternal I; in the second place, metaphysical 
actuality was confused with historical actuality.161 
Fichte’s concept of a transcendental imagination of an absolute subject, whose imagery is 
supposed to constitute the various forms of experience, is misunderstood by the Romantics 
to entail that the empirical imagination of a finite subject is responsible for constituting the 
actual world.  Kierkegaard’s basic critical point is that there is a confused conception of 
selfhood underlying the romantic form of irony; the romantic ascribes to itself a conception 
of freedom that it does not actually possess, and this conception of freedom both obscures 
the sense in which consciousness is bound to its lived-situation and grounds the boredom 
that permeates the romantic life.  In order to correct this inadequate self-conception and 
overcome boredom, Kierkegaard suggests that the romantic needs to master its irony. 
2.6 The Second Form of Living Poetically – Mastered Irony 
According to Kierkegaard, the romantic conception of the self involves a threefold 
inadequacy: the romantic self-conception fails to properly understand what it means to be 
a self, what it means for the self to be situated in its world, and what it means for a self to 
be free.  Kierkegaard thinks that romanticism expresses an inadequate understanding of 
self, world, and freedom, and it is in these terms that he criticizes romanticism.  This 
161 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 275.  In his dissertation, Kierkegaard’s critique of Romanticism 
focuses on Friedrich Schlegel, Ludwig Tieck, and K.W.F. Solger.  Solger is notably exempted from the 
preceding quote, because Kierkegaard ultimately argues that, while otherwise misguided, Solger presents a 
less radical form of irony – one that is primarily contemplative (that is, its implications are primarily of 
scientific importance, rather than practical importance) and avoids any deification of the self, since it subjects 
subjectivity to the same scrutiny as actuality, thereby perceiving the vanity of both.  Cf. ibid, 283, 309, 311 
(fn).  Accordingly, Solger “does not come into collision with actuality in the sense that the other ironists do, 
since his irony did not in any way take the shape of opposition to actuality” (ibid, 309). 
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inadequate understanding is specifically the result of a misconception of irony: 
romanticism has “overlooked the truth of irony.”162  Accordingly, the achievement of a 
proper conception of self, world, and freedom requires that consciousness overcome its 
romanticism through a re-evaluation of its irony.163 
So long as the romantic misconception of the self is maintained, irony is not 
“controlled,” as Kierkegaard says, but is treated inappropriately as an end-in-itself, such 
that the discontinuity between self and world is assumed as irreconcilable; to the extent 
that irony is uncontrolled, consciousness mistakenly believes that romanticism is a terminal 
162 Ibid, 265. 
163 Some scholars present Kierkegaard’s critique of romanticism differently.  Cross and Walsh, for example, 
claim that Kierkegaard’s critique is that romanticism involves an intrinsic inconsistency and is, thereby, a 
self-defeating position (Cross, 139; Walsh, 211).  The inconsistency is supposed to lie in this: it is unclear 
why the ironist should take itself as the criterion of truth, rather than assume an ironic stance toward its own 
ironic existence.  The romantic consciousness, on the one hand, affirms the invalidity of everything, while, 
on the other hand, it affirms the validity of the experience in which it first became aware of the invalidity of 
everything.  The inconsistency is that the ironic self is ironic toward everything except irony, despite having 
no reason not to view itself and its irony sub specie ironiae.  This argument, however, is not one that is 
presented by Kierkegaard in his dissertation.  In his opening analysis of irony, which seeks to distinguish 
irony from similar activities of consciousness, Kierkegaard does distinguish irony from religious devotion 
by noting that, unlike irony, the religiously devout person thinks that both the substantial world and its self 
are vain: “if the devout mind finds everything to be vanity, it makes no exception of its own person, makes 
no commotion about it; on the contrary, it also must be set aside so that the divine will not be thrust back by 
its opposition but will pour itself into the mind opened by devotion” (Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 
258).  While religious devotion is self-critical, at no point does Kierkegaard explicitly critique irony for not 
being so.  Instead, Kierkegaard merely presents religious devotion as one of several activities of 
consciousness that are similar to but ultimately distinct from irony.  Elsewhere in his dissertation, in a 
discussion regarding how the romantic views its own action, Kierkegaard also does note that, due to its 
negativity, irony cannot affirm any value, for that would be an inconsistency for the ironist.  However, rather 
than use this point to critique romantic irony, Kierkegaard only uses it to explain that, while the ironic person 
does posit values, it does so without earnestness – this, he thinks, resolves the inconsistency (cf. ibid, 269-
270).  While the critique of romanticism that Cross and Walsh attribute to Kierkegaard does not appear in his 
dissertation, a similar argument does, however, appear in Either/Or: Part II, where Kierkegaard uses it to 
critique the mystical life-view.  In that context, Kierkegaard presents the mystic as similar to the ironist; in 
pursuit the divine, the mystic is one who has seen through the vanity of everything and denies that the material 
world has any value.  Critically, Kierkegaard says of such mysticism: “There is always an inconsistency in 
this.  If on the whole the mystic does not esteem actuality, it is not clear why he does not regard with the 
same mistrust that moment in actuality when he was stirred by something higher” (Kierkegaard, Either/Or 
II, 247).  Given similarities in their expressions, it seems that the critique of romanticism that Cross and 
Walsh attribute to Kierkegaard in his dissertation is actually informed by Kierkegaard’s critique in Either/Or: 
Part II of the mystical life-view and that Cross and Walsh are reading this argument against mysticism into 
The Concept of Irony.  In any case, however, Kierkegaard does not critique romanticism as being inconsistent 
regarding the validity of irony; instead, his explicit critique is that romanticism involves an inadequate 
conception of agency. 
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position – that it is the highest achievement of consciousness.   In order to overcome this 
view, Kierkegaard recommends another way of living poetically: to let oneself be 
composed poetically, rather than to compose oneself poetically.164  This requires what 
Kierkegaard calls the “mastery of irony.” Only when irony is mastered is authentic 
personality possible; the proper conception of personality is expressed by the 
consciousness that has overcome the pure negativity of irony.  In mastered irony, the 
alienation of consciousness is overcome, such that the person identifies itself in continuity 
with its world, albeit not in the unreflective and pre-positional manner of the pre-ironic 
acceptance of the truth of substantial life.  Mastered irony develops out of romantic irony; 
the master of irony is further along in what Kierkegaard calls the “dialectic of life” than 
the romantic.165  Romanticism, then, is presented by Kierkegaard as in an intermediate 
stage between pre-reflective personality and authentic personality.  Kierkegaard’s point 
about the mastery of irony advancing one along the dialectic of life is not that such 
advancement is necessary.  It is not necessary that one transcend the romantic view of life, 
nor for that matter is it necessary that consciousness become romantic or even ironic at all; 
in Kierkegaard’s theory of life, one could occupy any stage of consciousness for an entire 
lifetime.  Kierkegaard presents these forms of consciousness as stages through which 
consciousness must pass, if it is to achieve an adequate self-conception, but there is nothing 
that necessitates this achievement.  Regarding the place of romanticism within 
164 The grammatical voice of this distinction between composing oneself poetically and being composed 
poetically is misleading.  As Kierkegaard presents this distinction, it would be oversimplified to say that one 
form of living poetically is passive, while the other is active.  If the forms were to be described in terms of 
activity and passivity, the following would more accurately represent Kierkegaard’s understanding: romantic 
irony is active, since it recognizes its radical freedom for self-creation, while mastered irony is both active 
and passive, since it recognizes that its radical freedom must be limited by the givenness of its situation. 
165 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 327. 
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Kierkegaard’s dialectic of life, Goodstein explains that “the path of freedom” requires the 
“embrace of purposelessness as the means of subjective equilibrium.” 166  The vanity of 
existence must be experienced as a condition for authentic selfhood, but this requires that 
one “rehabilitate the romantic project of rendering human life meaningful by stabilizing 
the anarchy of subjective desire.”167  This stabilization occurs only when the romanticism 
of consciousness is transcended, and this transcendence is achieved through a threefold 
reevaluation of the function of irony, the significance of actuality, and the nature of 
freedom, by which irony becomes mastered. 
For Kierkegaard, irony becomes mastered when it is viewed not as in end-in-itself 
but as an instrument.  Distinguishing the romantic and the instrumental views of irony, 
Kierkegaard expresses the latter in the following way: “Irony as the negative is the way; it 
is not the truth but the way.”168  The master of irony conceives of irony not as a terminal 
position to be maintained but instrumentally as the means to an end; irony is not viewed 
by the master as a way of living but as that through which one discovers how to live.  
Regarding this instrumentality, Kierkegaard explains: “Irony as a controlled element 
manifests itself in its truth precisely by teaching how to actualize actuality, by placing the 
appropriate emphasis on actuality.”169  Viewed as an instrument, irony exposes the 
presumptuousness of substantial life, and it does this by bringing to consciousness the 
awareness of what is possible for personality.  The ironic recognition both of one’s freedom 
from the apparent necessity of substantial life and of one’s capacity to freely enact one’s 
own possibilities is what teaches consciousness the “appropriate emphasis on actuality.”  
 
166 Goodstein, 160. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 327. 
169 Ibid, 328. 
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In this way, irony is a “baptism of purification that rescues the soul from having its life in 
finitude even though it is living energetically and robustly in it.”170  In its first and 
uncontrolled moment, irony is pure negativity; it is an infinitizing movement, wherewith 
consciousness distinguishes itself from its actual situation by reflecting on its possibility 
and its freedom to enact these possibilities.  If left uncontrolled, ironic consciousness would 
maintain itself in its infinity and would view itself as perpetually estranged from actuality.  
Such is the case of romanticism.  If, however, irony is viewed as an instrument, its 
infinitizing becomes controlled, and this allows for the overcoming of alienation.  
Kierkegaard explains the consequence of mastering irony in the following: 
As soon as irony is controlled, it makes a movement opposite to that in which 
uncontrolled irony declares its life.  Irony limits, finitizes, and circumscribes and 
thereby yields truth, actuality, content; it disciplines and punishes and thereby 
yields balance and consistency.171 
Controlled irony finitizes consciousness by disclosing the possibilities that belong to a 
definite person, not the possibilities that one could imagine irrespective of one’s concrete 
identity; when irony is controlled, such that consciousness does not lose itself in the infinity 
of possibility, it can be used as a tool to bring to consciousness the determinate possibilities 
that specifically belong to a given person’s actual situation.  As a controlled element, irony 
reveals the various ways that a person can actually live its life.  It is in this sense that irony 
teaches the person how “to actualize actuality.”  The complete dialectic of irony has two 
movements: one of infinitude, and one of finitude.  In romanticism, the first movement is 
made; in the mastery of irony, the second is made.  Romanticism involves the negation of 
the actual world, while the mastery of irony involves the negation of this negation.  In the 
170 Ibid, 326. 
171 Ibid. 
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complete movement of irony, the “negative has, namely, a double function – it infinitizes 
the finite and it finitizes the infinite.”172 
The purpose of irony, then, is understood differently by the romantic and by the 
master of irony.  The latter recognizes irony as a tool for self-development – a tool that 
shows what possibilities belong to one’s lived-situation and can, thereby, be actualized.  
For the romantic, in contrast, irony has no purpose other than the aggrandizement of the 
self in its absolute freedom.  The romantic only views irony in the following way: 
Irony, however, has no purpose; its purpose is immanent in itself and is a 
metaphysical purpose.  The purpose is nothing other than the irony itself. […] [The 
ironist’s] actual purpose still is to feel free, but this he is precisely by means of 
irony – consequently irony has no other purpose but is self-motivated.173 
The master uses irony to dispel the illusory meaning that substantial life presumes so that 
a higher meaning for existence may be found.  The romantic, however, ironically dispels 
substantial life not for the sake of personal development, but merely to celebrate its own 
liberation from the substantial world.  The romantic thinks that, “when the understanding 
has reached its apex, its order should give way to fantasy, which now alone is to prevail 
and not be an interlude in the task of life.”174  The romantic uses the negativity of irony for 
the sake of negativity; the master uses the negativity of irony for the sake of a higher 
positivity, which is achieved through the negation of irony. 
Kierkegaard illustrates the way in which the romantic fails to appreciate the 
instrumentality of irony in his critical analysis of Schlegel’s Lucinde, which infamously 
challenges conventional understandings of marriage, which Kierkegaard takes to be an 
essential component of substantial life.  According to Kierkegaard, in the novel’s 
172 Ibid, 310. 
173 Ibid, 256. 
174 Ibid, 292. 
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presentation of amorous relationships, irony could function as a tool by inspiring a 
reevaluation and reconstitution of the convention of marriage.  In fact, that Lucinde 
presents marriage in a way that calls for the revision of that institution is precisely the value 
that Kierkegaard attributes to the novel.  However, despite challenging this particular facet 
of substantial life, Kierkegaard thinks that Schlegel fails to provide an alternative 
conception of the marital relation that could be viably instantiated in the world, and, with 
this failure, his use of irony as a tool for ethical development is inadequate.  Regarding 
Schlegel’s use of irony, Kierkegaard explains: 
Lest an injustice be done to Schlegel, one must bear in mind the many degradations 
that have crept into a multitude of life’s relationships and have been especially 
indefatigable in making love as tame, as housebroken, as sluggish, as dull, as useful 
and usable as any other domestic animal – in short, as unerotic as possible.  To that 
extent, we would be very obligated to Schlegel if he should succeed in finding a 
way out, but unfortunately the climate he discovered, the only climate in which love 
can really thrive, is not a more southern climate compared with ours in the north 
but is an ideal climate nowhere to be found.175 
 
Schlegel uses irony as a tool to present the paltriness into which the institution of marriage 
has devolved, and he attempts to overcome this paltriness by emphasizing the erotic aspects 
of interpersonal relationships.  Kierkegaard thinks that this attempt fails, however, because 
the alternative proposed by Schlegel is too fantastic to be viably realized, in which case he 
has not used irony to actualize actuality – his solution is too abstracted from the lived-
situation of persons to be realized.  Kierkegaard’s reasoning here is that Schlegel presents 
a conception of interpersonal relationships that fails to account for the everyday situation 
of lovers, wherein one cannot simply dedicate one’s life solely to the infatuous moment of 
love but must instead balance one’s amorous commitments with other existential concerns.  
Schlegel myopically presents a fantasy wherein the passion of love itself – simply and 
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purely – ought to subvert all concerns that arise in one’s life and that one should let oneself 
be swept up in erotic passion and live a wholly erotic existence.  Regarding this overly 
romantic depiction of love, Kierkegaard says: 
Those days are over and gone – those day when human beings lived so happily 
without sorrows and cares, so innocently, when everything was so human, when 
the gods themselves set the tone and sometimes laid down their heavenly dignity in 
order fraudulently to gain the love of a mortal woman, when someone who softly 
and secretly stole away to a tryst could fear or be flattered to see a god among his 
rivals – the times when the heavens high and beautiful arched overhead as a friendly 
witness to happy love or quiet and grave hid it in the solemn peacefulness of night, 
when everything lived for love alone and for the happy lovers everything in turn 
was but a myth about love.176 
The issue is that Schlegel wants to imbue passion with a validity that is not adequate to the 
lived-situation of persons.  He is trying to “reconstruct a vanished age,” but actuality lacks 
the material to do so.177  Schlegel isolates the first moment of the amorous relation, wherein 
the lovers are wholly absorbed in their passion for one another, and makes that the whole 
content of life, such that the pursuit and maintenance of this passion is supposed to 
supersede all other concerns.  Schlegel wants to rehabilitate marriage but presents an 
alternative that is too indefinite and fantastic to be realized.  His conception of amorous 
relationships involves “a love without any real content” and, moreover, this love “can 
acquire no content, in the deeper sense can have no history.”178  Schlegel’s ironic 
exposition of the vanity of marriage does not teach one to actualize actuality, “since this 
love does not belong in the real world at all but in an imaginary world where the lovers 
themselves are lords of the storms and hurricanes.”179  Properly used as a tool, irony does 
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not merely expose the vanity of substantial life but also founds projects that can viably 
reconstitute the substantial world in a reflective and deliberate manner. 
As this illustration shows, irony can be considered either as a danger, when left 
uncontrolled, or as a saving power, when mastered through the proper conception of it as 
an instrument: “Even though one must warn against irony as against a seducer, so must one 
also commend it as a guide.”180  That irony requires mastery does not entail that irony is 
some evil to be avoided or that irony is unimportant for living.  Instead, Kierkegaard notes: 
To be controlled in this way, to be halted in the wild infinity into which it rushes 
ravenously, by no means indicates that irony should now lose its meaning or be 
totally discarded.  On the contrary, when the individual is properly situated – and 
this he is through the curtailment of irony – only then does irony has its proper 
meaning, its true validity.181 
The value of irony is that it breaks consciousness out of the unreflective acceptance of its 
situation and grants consciousness the capacity to freely and deliberately determine its self 
and its world.  Accordingly, irony is an important stage of consciousness in the 
development of a reflective and free personality, since irony marks the transition from the 
pre-reflective existing characteristic of substantial life to the deliberate self-determination 
of personality; for this development of one’s personality, it is “necessary to dispel the 
bestial miasma in which one breathed up to this point,” and this is precisely what irony 
achieves.182  Despite his criticism of Romanticism, Kierkegaard does praise the attempts 
by Schlegel and Tieck to inspire a revaluation of substantial life, even if these attempts fail; 
he says that, at the time of Romanticism, “The world was in its dotage and had to be 
rejuvenated.  In that respect, romanticism was beneficial.”183  He further stresses the 
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importance of Romanticism by describing the historical context that Romanticism sought 
to rejuvenate: 
But it must be born in mind that Tieck and the whole romantic school stepped into 
or thought they were stepping into an age in which people seemed to be totally 
fossilized in finite social forms. […] The glorious principles and maxims of habit 
and custom were the objects of a pious idolatry; everything was absolute, even the 
absolute.  One abstained from polygamy; one wore a stovepipe hat.  Everything had 
its importance.  In accordance with his station, everyone felt with nuanced dignity 
how much he was accomplishing, how great was the importance of his indefatigable 
efforts to himself and to the whole. […] Everything proceeded calmly with 
measured step, even the person on his way to propose marriage, because he knew, 
of course, that he was on a licit mission and was taking a very earnest step.  
Everything occurred according to the stroke of the hour.  One reveled in nature on 
St. John’s Eve, one was contrite on the fourth Friday after Easter; one fell in love 
when one turned twenty, went to bed at ten o’clock.  One married, one lived for 
domesticity and one’s position in society; one acquired children, acquired family 
worries. […] One knew something about the world and brought up children in the 
same understanding; one was inspired one evening a week by the poet’s praises of 
the beauty of existence; one was also everything to one’s own family, year in and 
year out with an on-the-dot certainty and precision.184 
The value of romanticism is that it calls consciousness to reflect on the life that, for the 
most part, it thoughtlessly affirms.  Irony, however, only has this value if its negative 
movement is curtailed, such that the idealizing activity of consciousness is directed toward 
its lived-situation, whereby irony functions as a tool to help one develop oneself within 
one’s situation. 
When consciousness conceives irony instrumentally, there is a shift in its 
understanding of the significance of actuality.  For the romantic, actuality is perceived as 
mere vanity – it lacks any meaning or truth, and, as such, it is precisely that which is to be 
negated through the romanticism that makes actuality novel.  The romantic consciousness 
does not find itself accountable to its lived-situation but, instead, due to its negative 
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freedom, feels licensed to act in accordance with any imaginatively constructed meaning 
that it imposes on the world.  Mastered irony, in contrast, expresses a different 
consciousness of the world and of one’s position in the same.  The consciousness that has 
mastered its irony understands that “actuality (historical actuality) stands in a twofold 
relation to the subject: partly as a gift that refuses to be rejected, partly as a task that wants 
to be fulfilled.”185  Personality is bound to a particular situation, and it has no control over 
the fact of this bond; its situation is something that is simply given to it, and it is impossible 
to deny or reject this gift.  The master of irony precisely recognizes this givenness of 
actuality. This recognition, however, does not entail some kind of quietism or resignation, 
wherewith the master of irony simply accepts the established way of the world.  The master 
of irony affirms its situation as that which founds the manifold of all of its possible actions, 
but this affirmation does not entail that the ironist must passively accept the morals, laws, 
and customs that conventionally pertain to substantial life.  Irrespective of any acceptance 
or denial of the prescriptions of substantial life, the person is necessitated to act within the 
situation in which it finds itself.  While actuality is gift that the person must necessarily 
accept, it is nonetheless given as a task – as something that the person must freely shape 
through its actions.  The person has no control over the fact that it finds itself in a particular 
situation, but it does have control over how it acts within that situation.  The master of 
irony recognizes that actuality is to be negated – not, however, through the substitution of 
actuality with a novelization but through the realization of a self-posited ideal.  Mastered 
irony recognizes that its freedom is conditioned by its situation.  The situation, however, 
does not undermine freedom, but provides precisely the means through which the person 
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can realize the self that it decides to be.  Kierkegaard explains how the master of irony 
conceives actuality in the following: 
Actuality hereby acquires its validity, not as a purgatory – for the soul is not to be 
purified in such a way that stark naked, so to speak, it runs blank and bare out of 
life – but as history in which consciousness successively matures, yet in such a way 
that salvation consists not in the forgetting all this but in becoming present in it.186 
Actuality for the master of irony consists of the set of ways in which the person can choose 
to give itself a definite meaning. 
Mastered irony thereby acquires for personality a continuity with actuality, and it 
is in this way that it undermines the source of boredom in romanticism.  Kierkegaard 
explains: “for thought, subjectivity, to acquire fullness and truth, it must let itself be born; 
it must immense itself in the deeps of substantial life.”187  The master of irony validates 
actuality by recognizing that actuality is essential for the project of self-determination.  
Unlike the romantic self, which tries to maintain itself in the first moment of irony, wherein 
the self is purely indefinite, the master of irony seeks to freely define itself through the 
situation in which it finds itself.  Whereas the romantic self rejects its historicity, the master 
of irony seeks to give itself a history by freely letting itself be determined by its lived-
situation.  Actuality allows for the maturation of consciousness by providing the material 
through which consciousness can actually and determinately develop itself.  In mastered 
irony, consciousness has seen through the vanity of substantial life, but it also grants a new 
validity to actuality – actuality is valid as the sole sphere within which the person can freely 
define itself. 
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Kierkegaard further develops this conception of actuality through an explanation of 
the nature of ideality.  In its most nascent expression within consciousness, irony is the 
awareness of ideality.  Ironically, the person achieves the awareness of the possibilities that 
could be instantiated, despite the established way of the world; irony is the awareness of 
the disparity between how the world is and how the world could be.  The romantic and 
mastered forms of irony, however, clearly understand the nature of ideality differently.  
Kierkegaard postulates that, in general, there is “a longing in every human being for 
something higher and more perfect.”188  However, Kierkegaard thinks that the object of 
this longing should not be something wholly divorced from one’s lived-situation, such that 
its realization is impossible, undesirable, or insincere.  This, of course, is the nature of 
romantic longing; the romantic ideal, as something produced through the whimsy of the 
romantic, is not bound to a lived-situation but to an imagined-situation.  The romantic 
posits an “exaggerated and impotent ideal, which floats about like a cloud in the sky or like 
the cloud’s shadow fleetingly flies across the ground.”189  The misrelation between the 
romantic ideal and reality is such that this ideal cannot be realized.  Critically, then, 
Kierkegaard says that the person ought to long for an ideal, but “this longing must not 
hollow out actuality; on the contrary, life’s content must become a genuine and meaningful 
element in the higher actuality whose fullness the soul craves.”190  Again stressing the 
instrumental function of irony, the ironic awareness of possibility should be employed to 
determine an ideal that is grounded in one’s lived-situation, such that one could truly strive 
toward its realization.  The master of irony recognizes that only those possibilities that are 
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bound to its situation can be realized: “Possibility is not so prudish as to be unwilling to 
enter into actuality, but actuality is possibility.”191  For the romantic, idealization is for the 
sake of novelization; for the master of irony, idealization is for the sake of realization.  The 
longing for a more perfect world that characterizes the mastery of irony is responsive to its 
given situation.  For such consciousness, Kierkegaard says: 
Actuality, therefore, will not be rejected, and longing will be a sound and healthy 
love, not a weak and sentimental sneaking out of the world.  The romantic longing 
for something higher may well be genuine, but just as man must not separate what 
God has joined together, so man also must not join what God has separated, but a 
sickly longing such as this is simply a way of wanting to have the perfect 
prematurely.192 
 
The master of irony ideates an ideal of a more perfect world – not so as to be lost in some 
imaginary world but to be able to realize this perfection through its action.  The value that 
an ideal has for the master of irony is determined through its ability to be enacted.  Actuality 
acquires a meaning for the master of irony through the enacting of an ideal.  In this sense, 
Kierkegaard says that “actuality acquires its validity through action.”193  The ideal world, 
toward the realization of which the master of irony strives, is not a fantastic and free-
floating possibility; it is precisely bound to the ironist’s lived-situation, in such a way that 
the ironist can sincerely strive toward its realization and, correlatively, define itself through 
this striving.  The master of irony must “make his poet-life congruous with his actuality.”194  
Such an ironist recognizes that, while it possesses freedom from constraint, its actions are 
necessarily conditioned by its lived-situation; the ironist may strive to change its situation, 
but such changes are themselves limited by the unique constitution of that situation. 
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The relation to actuality, then, is more complicated in mastered irony than it is in 
romantic irony.  Unlike romantic irony, which begins and ends in a single movement of 
alienation from the actual world, mastered irony involves a twofold movement of sundering 
and bonding, but, as Hall notes, this “sundering effect is always in the service of bringing 
us down to earth.”195  The master of irony elevates itself above the world through its 
awareness of possibility, but it does this only to change its situation through the enactment 
of a possibility. 
Due to its validation of actuality, mastered irony reconciles consciousness to its 
world, and this reconciliation has consequences for how consciousness conceives its 
historical existence.  Since the romantic negates the validity of actuality, romanticism is 
essentially anachronistic; the romantic finds itself not accountable to any particular epoch, 
which is what allows the Romantics to idealize Greek life and the Middle Ages, critique 
contemporary life for failing to live up to these ideals, and to recommend projects to restore 
these golden ages.196  For the romantic, “there really never was a past,” precisely because 
it “confused the eternal I with the temporal I.”197  The master of irony, in contrast, in the 
affirmation of its particular situation, assumes a past: 
But when I said earlier that actuality offers itself partly as a gift, the individual’s 
relation to a past is thereby implied.  This past will now claim validity for the 
individual and will not be overlooked or ignored.198 
The master of irony finds itself bound to its particular age, and its ideals must be responsive 
to the reality of this age. 
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Between the romantic and the mastered forms of irony, there is a clear difference 
in the conceptions of actuality and of the relation between actuality and ideality.  Related 
to this is a difference in how the two types of irony conceive freedom.  Kierkegaard 
presents this difference in terms of the distinction between negative and positive freedom: 
unlike the negative freedom that characterizes romanticism, mastered irony is an 
expression of positive freedom.  In the romantic manifestation of irony, consciousness 
achieves the recognition of its own freedom, but only in the sense that consciousness finds 
itself freed from its ethical situation – that it is not necessitated to act in accordance with 
any pre-established values that characterize its substantial situation.  Mastered irony, in 
contrast, in its twofold movement, transcends the purely negative conception of freedom.  
The master of irony, having worked through the romantic consciousness, conceives itself 
as free from the prescriptions of its substantial life, such that it has “the absolute power to 
do everything.”199  However, to the extent that the master of irony views actuality as a gift 
to be received and as a task to be fulfilled, it recognizes that its freedom is not merely 
negative, but also positive.  For mastered irony, freedom does not so much liberate 
personality from its situation but instead orients the person within its situation, such that 
the person becomes free to act within that situation; it is only in “actual history” that “the 
authentic individual has his positive freedom.”200  The master of irony views itself as 
inseparably tied to a particular situation, so whatever freedom belongs to the master must 
be the freedom to act within that situation; the master is free to enact or neglect its 
possibilities, but it is not free to decide what is possible for it.  The freedom of personality 
is always conditioned: “I am also bound with respect to myself and cannot free myself any 
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time I wish.”201  The positive freedom of mastered irony is the freedom to cultivate what 
is necessarily given to the ironist. 
This clarifies the sense in which the master of irony lets itself be composed 
poetically – in its own form of living, the master of irony lets itself be determined by the 
particularity of its situation.  Kierkegaard says: 
In other words, the poet does not live poetically by creating a poetic work…but he 
lives poetically only when he himself is oriented and thus integrated in the age in 
which he lives, is positively free in the actuality to which he belongs.202 
Where the romantic understands the task of living poetically as exploiting a purely negative 
freedom in order to lose itself in imaginary constructions and insouciant behavior, the 
master of irony lives poetically by freely developing itself within the limited situation that 
has been given to it.  The master of irony reflects upon its unique situation so as to 
understand the particular ways in which it can actually create itself: “Therefore it is very 
urgent for him to become conscious of what is original in him, and this originality is the 
boundary within which he poetically composes, within which he is poetically free.”203  The 
poetic living of the master is bound, and this boundary is determined by what is possible 
for the master given the particular determinations of its lived-situation. 
That the romantic and mastered forms of ironic consciousness understand freedom 
differently entails that they understand responsibility differently, as well.  Freedom is 
understood by the master of irony as the capacity to cultivate the possibilities that constitute 
its lived-situation; it is not viewed as the capacity to flee from this situation through 
imaginary constructions, which is the romantic understanding.  To the extent that the 
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master of irony recognizes both that its freedom is tied to its particular situation and that it 
freely determines itself through the various ways in which it cultivates possibilities within 
that situation, the master of irony conceives of itself as responsible.  Moreover, this 
responsibility is twofold: the master of irony is responsible to its situation, and it is 
responsible for its situation.  The master of irony is, first, responsible to its situation, to the 
extent that it recognizes that it can only act freely within its situation and, thereby, must be 
responsive to the unique constitution of that situation.  The master accepts its situation as 
that which circumscribes the sphere of realizable possibilities.  Second, since the master of 
irony determines its situation through free activity and inactivity, the master is responsible 
for its situation.  The master recognizes that it is responsible for the way of the world; the 
master cannot defer responsibility to any pre-ironic understanding of the way of the world, 
since it has seen through the vanity thereof, but instead, recognizing that it is free, it also 
recognizes that it is responsible for how it develops itself.  Responsibility is essential for 
the mastered view of actuality; Kierkegaard says: 
But for the individual actuality is also a task that wants to be fulfilled. […] In order 
for the acting individual to be able to accomplish his task by fulfilling actuality, he 
must feel himself integrated in a larger context, must feel the earnestness of 
responsibility, must feel and respect every reasonable consequence.204 
Positively conceived freedom is what allows the master of irony to overcome its alienation 
and achieve continuity with its situation.  If personality merely views itself as negatively 
free from its situation, it would not perceive itself as responsible to or for its situation – it 
would not feel necessitated either to assume any position within its given situation or to 
take responsibility for what it does within that situation.  The absence of responsibility is 
precisely what licenses the novelization of romanticism.  For the romantic, there is no sense 
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of responsibility, insofar as the pure negativity of romanticism entails that the romantic 
conceives itself just as much liberated from its own actions as from the prescriptions of 
substantial life.  The romantic perceives the vanity of everything, and this perception 
extends to the entirety of actuality, including the romantic’s own contributions to the same.  
Accordingly, how one acts is not a concern for the romantic, and, thereby, the romantic 
experiences neither the earnestness of responsibility nor the respect for the consequences 
of choices.  Actuality is not a task for the romantic, insofar as the romantic does not feel 
any responsibility to it or respect for it. 
This account of mastered irony further sets into relief the various limitations of 
romantic irony, which can be summarized in the following manner: romanticism does not 
pursue the irony of consciousness to its ultimate expression, wherewith irony itself is 
overcome and the reconciliation of self and world is achieved.  In romanticism, irony is 
treated terminally, whereby consciousness, as an expression of infinite and absolute 
negativity, takes such negativity to be the final expression of self-knowledge.  
Romanticism is an extreme expression of subjectivity, whereby any substantiality is 
denied.  Kierkegaard explains the misconception of the romantic as being the following: 
“he stands above his whole environment, but in order really to live poetically, really and 
thoroughly to be able to create himself poetically, the ironist must have no an sich.”205  This 
utter negation of the an sich of the romantic personality is what constitutes the 
discontinuity, emptiness, and corresponding boredom in the life of the same.  Mastered 
irony overcomes the boredom of irony precisely by seeking a continuity with substantial 
life.  The nature of mastered irony is twofold, embracing both freedom from and continuity 
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with actuality, such that mastered irony expresses the in-and-for-itself of personality.  
Whereas romanticism is the negation of substantial life, mastered irony is the negation of 
that negation.  Kierkegaard says of mastered irony: “its activity is to become für sich what 
it is an sich.”206  The master of irony sets as its task the free and reflective cultivation of its 
substance.  For its master, irony is a tool employed to achieve a positively unified existence, 
such that the boredom of romanticism is undermined; when mastered, irony is viewed not 
as a way to perpetually obscure the perception of meaninglessness through fantasies, but 
as a way to live within one’s concrete situation. 
Mastered irony, then, does involve commitment to actuality and, thereby, bears 
some similarity to the pre-ironic absorption in the world.  However, the difference between 
these two levels of consciousness lies in mediation.  The pre-ironic personality, which 
passively accepts its situation, is, as previously noted, an immediately qualified 
consciousness; since it lacks the qualification of subjectivity in the strict sense, it cannot 
be said to posit its relation to actuality.  The personality of mastered irony, however, 
actively accepts its situation, and it does so having already passed though the romantic 
shape of consciousness.  In contrast to the immediacy of the latent personality, the mastered 
ironist has a mediated relation to its situation.  Having lived through an ironic awareness 
of the contingency of substantial life, the person who has mastered irony affirms actuality 
without being unreflectively absorbed in the truth of the same, precisely because the ironic 
awareness prevents it from conceiving of itself as completely reducible to its substance.  
McCarthy explains this difference in the following way: 
In order to gain equilibrium, without sacrificing the insight and higher 




what is termed “mastered irony,” and thus re-enter into a relation with reality, 
henceforth to be regarded with circumspection.207 
 
Even though the mastered ironist and the unreflective person may express a similar 
confidence in actuality, the mediative quality of the former distinguishes it from the latter; 
the master of irony affirms its concrete situation, but with circumspection. 
Particularly elucidative of this point is Hall’s description of mastered irony as a 
liberation from two forms of bondage.  As Hall notes, Kierkegaard’s conception of self-
actualization entails that one remains partially withdrawn in one’s engagement with the 
world, such that one never feels bound to the world in any way that would undermine one’s 
freedom.  This withdrawal is absent in pre-ironic consciousness, absolute in romanticism, 
and relative in mastered irony.  The essential feature of mastered irony is that one freely 
and consciously affirms one’s position in the world.  The emphasis, here, though, is on 
freedom.  The mastered ironist recognizes its freedom from constraint, so that, in the 
affirmation of any position in the world, it cannot deny its freedom in relation to this 
affirmation.  The mastered ironist, in awareness of its own freedom, cannot mistakenly 
treat any subjectively affirmed position as the objective way of the world.  Irony, as Hall 
notes, is a “power of withdrawal” that ensures that one is never exhaustively identified with 
the way that one engages in the world, such that one’s freedom would thereby be denied.  
Irony is precisely that “power that keeps our worldly bonds from being transformed into 
bondage.”208  Irony resists “the ever-present danger of turning bonds into bondage, of 
absolutizing the relative.”209  As Hall notes in his interpretation, then, irony is not simply 
the awareness that first of all liberates the subject from its absorption in substantial life; 
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irony is also that which continually prevents the subject from being absorbed into the bonds 
to actuality that are freely chosen.  That is: “Mastered irony reminds us of our 
transcendence by reminding us that our worldly bonds are our own.”210   Not only is the 
person irreducible to the situation in which it first of all finds itself; the person is also 
irreducible entirely to the commitments that the person freely chooses.  The sense in which 
irony liberates the person from “an absolute relation to the relative” involves the 
recognition of the relativity of all worldly bonds, irrespective of whether those bonds are 
unreflectively assumed or reflectively posited.  Irony is the power that in all contexts 
“keeps our worldly bond from disintegrating into our bondage.”211  Søltoft notes that the 
instrumental function of irony is “to keep the space of subjectivity open.”212 
2.7 The Limitations of the Account of Irony and Boredom 
Kierkegaard’s account of these two forms of poetic living is fairly undeveloped in 
his dissertation.  On the one hand, apart from rare references to the literary characters of 
the Romantics, he presents both forms of living poetically abstractly, leaving it ambiguous 
how these particular life-views are concretely instantiated by individuals.  On the other 
hand, Kierkegaard’s explanation of the mastery of irony is largely unfinished.213  In 
particular, he says little about the nature of the higher ethicality that is supposed to emerge 
through the mastery of irony.  While Kierkegaard’s uses the second part of his dissertation 
as an opportunity to articulate the basic structure and features of his theory of life-views, 
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this nascent presentation leaves most aspects of that theory undeveloped, including the 
conception of boredom.  In order to develop a full understanding of the two senses of living 
poetically and to more fully explicate Kierkegaard’s theory of boredom, attention must be 
given to Kierkegaard’s first pseudo- and polynymously published work, Either/Or, which 
involves the same central issues of Kierkegaard’s dissertation, albeit in a far more detailed 
manner. 
CHAPTER 3. AESTHETICISM AS THE LIFE-VIEW OF BOREDOM 
3.1 Introduction to and Overview of Either/Or 
Kierkegaard’s theory of boredom receives its earliest – and also briefest – 
presentation in his dissertation, wherein boredom is identified as a preeminent 
characteristic of romantic irony.  Romantic irony nihilates any meaning in life, such that 
all activity is perceived as pointless and unfulfilling, which the ironist acutely experiences 
as boredom.  In an attempt to avoid its boredom, the romantic consciousness resigns itself 
to a project of composing itself poetically, whereby it adopts and lives in accordance with 
one fantastically constructed view of life after another in an attempt to perpetually negate 
the boredom that expresses the emptiness of such views of life.  This continual effort to 
avoid boredom constitutes the only unity of the romantic life; rather than living for the sake 
of some positive goal, the romantic only lives to negate its boredom.  As indicated briefly 
at the end of his dissertation, Kierkegaard suggests that this lifestyle and its concurrent 
boredom can be overcome through a mastery of irony, whereby irony is supposed to teach 
one how to properly relate to one’s concrete situation.  In his dissertation, however, 
Kierkegaard does not develop this theory of mastered irony in much detail, which renders 
his initial theory of boredom incomplete, to the extent that it is unclear how a change in 
one’s view of life is to overcome boredom. 
This nascent and unfinished theory of boredom is, however, developed in far more 
detail in Kierkegaard first pseudonymously published work, Either/Or: A Fragment of Life, 
wherein boredom appears one of the primary themes.  Although this text has few explicit 
references to Romanticism and to living poetically, Kierkegaard writes Either/Or as a 
matured expression of his critical analysis of romantic irony, while at the same time 
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presenting a clearer account of how such irony is to be mastered through an advanced stage 
of self-awareness.  In this text, Kierkegaard presents two distinct “life-views,” each with 
competing understandings of selfhood, freedom, morality, and beauty.  These two life-
views correspond to the two senses of living poetically and represent – as Walsh says – 
“alternative patterns for ‘living poetically.’”214  While the theory of living poetically in The 
Concept of Irony is fairly abstract and undeveloped, with little illustration of how either 
way of life is concretely instantiated (especially that of mastered irony, which is only 
briefly explained in a few pages), the theory of life-views presented in Either/Or works to 
show more determinately how one can live poetically in both senses.215  Accordingly, 
consideration of the disparate lifestyles presented in Either/Or can further an understanding 
of Kierkegaard’s theory of irony and, thereby, his understanding of boredom. 
Whereas Kierkegaard’s dissertation provides a direct analysis of living poetically, 
in Either/Or, he attempts an indirect analysis by writing the text from the perspective of 
personae who instantiate the different senses of living poetically.  Each of the two volumes 
of Either/Or is written through a pseudonym, but Kierkegaard does not use pseudonyms 
merely to mask his name; instead, corresponding to each false name is an entire character 
created by Kierkegaard, and each of these characters expresses their own unique view of 
life.  By writing the two volumes from the perspective of persons who live poetically in 
214 Walsh, 64. 
215 Kierkegaard does not explicitly discuss irony and its types in Either/Or.  That this connection between 
these texts is intended, however, is obvious given the similar and parallel themes that appear in the texts. 
Many Kierkegaard scholars have explored this connection between the two texts (cf. Burgess, 157-8; 
Ferguson, 54; Kosch, 147; McCarthy, 10; Stack, 33; Walsh, 64; Westphal, 31; Malantschuk, 217; Taylor, 
175; Jothen, 182; Shmuëli, 14).  Walsh explains this connection by noting that The Concept of Irony and 
Either/Or address the same issue of Kierkegaard’s earliest work, From the Papers of One Still Living.  
According to Walsh, these three early works are different but complementary projects of outlining 
Kierkegaard’s conception of a positively unified life-view. 
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different senses, Kierkegaard provides a more concrete expression of the notion of living 
poetically and resolves many of the ambiguities of his dissertation. 
In Either/Or, Kierkegaard develops his understanding of living poetically not only 
through his perspectival form of pseudonymous writing, which provides concrete 
instantiations of the two forms of living poetically, but also by situating the concept within 
his larger theory of “stages on life’s way,” in which he typologizes the ideal personality 
types through which one passes in the development of one’s personality.216  The two 
volumes of Either/Or expound Kierkegaard’s conceptions of the aesthetic and the ethical 
stages of life.  The first volume is written from the perspective of an aesthete – usually 
addressed simply as “A” – and is a collage of essays and aphorisms that blend philosophical 
and literary observations on various subjects, such as love, sorrow, boredom, happiness, 
and freedom.217  This first volume expresses Kierkegaard’s aesthetic life-view, which takes 
the achievement of enjoyment to be the ultimate purpose of life.  In its highest expression, 
this life-view mixes selfishness, hedonism, and moral nihilism, such that the aesthetic 
person simply acts however it pleases, refusing to be held accountable to anyone or for 
anything.  Serving as a foil to this life-view, the second volume of Either/Or is written 
from the perspective of an ethicist – identified in the text as “B” or “[Judge] William” – 
and gives voice to a view of life wherein agency, duty, and personal responsibility are 
stressed.  This volume consists primarily of two letters that have been written to A, both of 
216 Scholars generally refer to Kierkegaard’s theory of personality and its development as the “theory of 
stages (on life’s way).”  This designation is borrowed from the title of his 1845 work, Stages on Life’s Way, 
although Kierkegaard rarely uses the titular term stages therewithin. 
217 Kierkegaard, Either/Or I, 9.  Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous editor of Either/Or, Victor Eremita, designates 
the authors of the two volumes simply as “A” and “B.”  The author of the second volume (B), is also explicitly 
named “William.”  Since William is further identified as a judge, most Kierkegaard scholars refer to him as 
“Judge William.” 
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which work explicitly to distinguish the aesthetic and ethical life-views and to show how 
the latter life-view can be achieved.218 
3.2 The General Theory of Stages on Life’s Way 
In order to understand the two life-views that structure Either/Or, it is necessary to 
consider Kierkegaard’s general concept of a life-view.  Kierkegaard first introduces this 
concept in one of his earliest publications – his 1837 critique of Hans Christian Andersen, 
“From the Papers of One Still Living.”  In this essay, Kierkegaard summarily critiques 
Andersen’s novel, Only a Fiddler, by claiming that the quality of the novel suffers because 
“Andersen totally lacks a life-view” and Andersen’s lack of a life-view entails that the 
novel itself also lacks a life-view.219  Kierkegaard posits that the integrity of the novel is 
conditioned by the integrity of the author, such that a coherent view of life cannot be 
presented within a novel unless the author’s own life is organized around a consistent and 
consciously defined view of life: “a life-view is, for the novelist of the class to which 
Andersen belongs, conditio sine qua non.”220  As Gregor Malantschuk explains: 
Drawing from many examples from the epic poetry of his day, Kierkegaard claims 
that the primary qualification of the epic poet is a solidly constructed philosophy of 
life as the background for his epic productions.221 
In effect, Kierkegaard critiques Andersen for lacking the maturity and reflectiveness 
requisite for writing a novel.  As a genre, the novel involves a representation of epic 
218 Apart from the two letters of the text written by Judge William, there is a brief sermon written by a 
“Jutland Pastor” that Judge William appends to his letters.  This sermon works to anticipate Kierkegaard’s 
religious stage of existence, the conception of which is left ambiguous and undeveloped in Either/Or.  
219 Kierkegaard, “From the Papers of One Still Living,” from Early Polemic Writings, ed. and trans. Julia 
Watkins (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 76. 
220 Ibid, 77. 
221 Gregor Malantshuck, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Existence, trans. and ed. Howard and Edna Hong 
(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2003), 183. 
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development, or, as Walsh prefers, “life development,” which “consists in forming a 
positive relation to actuality through striving toward a single goal in life […].”222  The 
successful presentation of a character’s life development within a novel requires that the 
author be thoroughly familiar with the life-view of that character – that the author be 
familiar with the single goal of that character’s life and the way in which that goal animates 
the character’s behavior.  In Kierkegaard’s view, however, this familiarity is achieved only 
by an author who possesses a thorough understanding of life itself.  When this possession 
is lacking, the author is incapable of discerning which features are essential to a particular 
way of life, and this compromises the author’s ability to present characters within the novel.  
Kierkegaard critiques Andersen’s novel for failing to achieve this unity of a life-view, the 
result of which is that the novel consists of a series of diverse and incoherent observations 
that are held together merely by the book’s binding, rather than an overarching and 
integrating view of life. 
Even though his critique of Andersen revolves around the concept of a life-view, 
Kierkegaard only provides a few brief comments in his review regarding the meaning, 
acquisition, and constitution of the same.  By way of definition, he says: 
For a life-view is more than a quintessence or a sum of propositions maintained in 
its abstract neutrality; it is more than experience, which as such is always 
fragmentary.  It is, namely, the transubstantiation of experience; it is an unshakable 
certainty in oneself won from all experience […].223 
Here, Kierkegaard identifies several essential features of a life-view.  First, a life-view is 
not merely an abstract theory of life.  This does not entail that a life-view is not theoretical, 
but, as Kierkegaard clarifies, a life-view is not theoretical in such a way that it could be 
222 Walsh, 35. 
223 Kierkegaard, “From the Papers of One Still Living,” 76. 
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maintained in “abstract neutrality,” as if having a life-view were unnecessary or 
unimportant for one’s concrete manner of living; instead, a life-view is something of 
interest to the individual, something in which the individual is invested.  A life-view is not 
incidental for an individual, for the individual’s own manner of living is determined by its 
view of life.  Richard Summers summarizes this point well: “A life-view of this kind is not 
a merely theoretical notion, but a coherent, unifying view of reality as a whole, which gives 
consistency to personal life.”224  Second, Kierkegaard understands a life-view to be 
something that transcends particular experiences and ultimately unifies experiences in 
some totalizing view.  In absence of a particular life-view, one’s life would be thoroughly 
disorganized, and one’s experiences would all appear to be merely incidental and unrelated.  
A life-view involves a “transubstantiation of experience” to the extent that it traces all 
experiences, which, as Kierkegaard understands them, are heterogeneous and lacking 
intrinsic unity, back to a central point – oneself.  That experiences are transubstantiated 
means that they do not in themselves change, but they are given a new meaning according 
to their place in the total view of life; one’s experiences are not random happenings but, 
instead, are part of an overarching conception of one’s own life.  In the following, 
Kierkegaard explains this synthesizing function of a life-view, while at the same time 
explaining how a life-view is acquired: 
If we now ask how such a life-view is brought about, then we answer that for the 
one who does not allow his life to fizzle out too much but seeks as far as possible 
to lead its single expressions back to himself again, there must necessarily come a 
moment in which a strange light spreads over life without one’s therefore even 
remotely needing to have understood all possible particulars, to the progressive 
understanding of which, however, one now has the key.225 
224 Richard Summers, “‘Controlled Irony’ and the Emergence of the Self in Kierkegaard’s Dissertation,” 
from: International Kierkegaard Commentary: The Concept of Irony, ed. Robert Perkins (Macon: Mercer 
University Press, 2001), 49. 




A life-view imbues one’s life with some overarching meaning, in accordance with which 
one both lives and makes sense of one’s living.  One acquires a life-view when one works 
to trace individual experiences back to a single source and views one’s life as a coherent 
totality of such experiences; a life-view is “the consolidating total survey” of one’s 
experiences.226  In this way, a life-view grounds and orients one in one’s world; a life-view 
explains the occurrences in one’s life, the importance or unimportance of these 
occurrences, and how these occurrences contribute to one’s personal development. 
This transubstantiation of experiences has two other noteworthy features.  First, as 
Summers puts it, there is “an element of personal appropriation” to any life-view.227  A 
life-view is produced precisely when one consciously traces the various expressions of life 
back to oneself, thereby making the meaning and acquisition of a life-view personal; a life-
view is the product of a particular individual trying to make sense of its own life.  As 
McCarthy notes, this appropriative element distinguishes a life-view from a worldview, to 
the extent that the former is a personal view of life, and the latter is an objective view of 
how the world is generally constituted.228  A life-view is not supposed to be an objective 
or impersonal view of the world, whose truth could be measured scientifically.  Instead, a 
life-view is simply one’s personal understanding of the world and of one’s place within the 
same.  It may be the case that an individual’s view of life is common or even held by most 
people, but what makes it a life-view is not that it is unique but that an individual has taken 
possession of it personally – that it has become a truth in accordance with which an 
individual lives.  Second, this tracing-back of experience is an ongoing activity – one that 
 
226 Ibid, 83. 
227 Summers, “Controlled Irony,” 48. 
228 McCarthy, 136 
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brings about a life-view – and this indicates that a life-view develops over time.  
Kierkegaard confirms this, but he adds the qualification that the developmental feature of 
a life-view does not mean that, at any given time, a life-view does not have certain 
sedimented and discernable qualities.229  Additionally, a consequence of these 
appropriative and developmental qualities of a life-view is that there is not a singular, 
universal life-view, but, rather, there is a plurality of diverse life-views.  Kierkegaard 
distinguishes, for example, Stoic and Christian life-views, as well as comments on the 
possibility of arguing for one life-view over another, although he provides no such 
argument himself.230 
As a representation of one’s life, in accordance with which one lives, a life-view 
also has a practical dimension.  Kierkegaard indicates this quality by explaining the role of 
a life-view within the novel.  He says: 
A life-view is really providence in the novel; it is its deeper unity, which makes the 
novel have the center of gravity in itself.  A life-view frees it from being arbitrary 
or purposeless, since the purpose is immanently present everywhere in the work of 
art.231 
A life-view unifies experience and does so by viewing one’s experiences in relation to 
some central purpose, such that various particular experiences no longer appear incidental 
or meaningless.  A life-view is not a set of incidental, abstract, or neutral principles; instead, 
a life-view is that in accordance with which one makes sense of the events and actions that 
constitute one’s practical existence.  A life-view is teleological in nature; what unifies the 
fragmentary experiences of life is a purpose around which one’s life is oriented; a life-view 
is how one makes sense of the underlying purpose of one’s various experiences.  Walsh 
229 Kierkegaard, “From the Papers of One Still Living,” 77. 
230 Ibid, 76, 80 (fn). 
231 Ibid, 81. 
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says: “A life-view thus provides a comprehensive center of orientation that enables one to 
take a firm, positive stance toward life […].”232 
Summarily, a life-view expresses how one makes sense of one’s place in the world.  
Life does not consist of a series of disjointed experiences; rather, each person processes 
and interprets individual experiences as belonging to some overarching understanding of 
the meaning and purpose of life, and this understanding constitutes one’s life-view.  In this 
way, a life-view is more than mere experience – it is the “transubstantiation of experience,” 
to the extent that the meaning of an experience is determined by the significance that an 
experience has within the context of a total view of the meaning and purpose of life.  
Even though Kierkegaard originally introduces the notion of a life-view as a means 
to critique Andersen’s novel, the concept serves as the cornerstone of own philosophical 
project and is operative in both his dissertation and in Either/Or.  In “From the Papers of 
One Still Living,” Kierkegaard criticizes Andersen simply for having not acquired a life-
view, but he does not analyze any particular life-views, instead focusing only on an 
explanation of the function and importance of a life-view for literary projects.233  In The 
Concept of Irony, Kierkegaard does not explicitly discuss the concept of a life-view as 
such, but he does present a specific life-view – that of romanticism – and critically 
deconstructs this life-view through juxtaposition with another life-view – that of mastered 
irony.  In Either/Or, Kierkegaard provides some brief comments on the meaning of a life-
232 Walsh, 37 
233 Kierkegaard makes this approach clear in his critique: “I do not seek to make one life-view valid, and
Andersen another, but, uninterested in advancing any particular life-view, I seek only to combat this negative 
standpoint and its right to try to pass itself off as a life-view” (Kierkegaard, “From the Papers of One Still 
Living,” 80 (fn). 
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view but focusses more directly on the presentation of two competing life-views, which he 
presents as constituting particular stages of personal development. 
In Either/Or, Kierkegaard continues to develop his theory of life-views.  In this 
text, he provides the following provisional definition of a life-view, which builds upon his 
earlier account: 
Every human being, no matter how slightly gifted he is, however subordinate his 
position in life may be, has a natural need to formulate a life-view, a conception of 
the meaning of life and of its purpose.234 
On the one hand, this definition affirms the features of the earlier account used to critique 
Andersen – that a life view is developed and consists of a personal explanation of life with 
emphasis on the practical dimensions.  On the other hand, though, this definition adds a 
new feature – that the development of a life-view corresponds to a natural need that all 
human beings possess.  This indicates that a life-view is not merely for the novelist or the 
philosopher, but for anyone who lives and acts; a life-view is the way that a particular 
human being understands what life is and how it ought to live.  The inclination to have a 
life-view is universal, even if the determinate features of life-views make them diverse and 
inconsistent with each other.  To the extent that a life-view is a “a conception of the 
meaning of life and of its purpose,” each of the views of life presented by Kierkegaard 
designates a general orientation toward the world, tacitly belonging to which are unique 
metaphysical and ethical understandings and commitments.  Westphal provides a useful 
summary of Kierkegaard’s theory by identifying each life-view as a “worldview” and 
explaining this concept in the following manner: 
234Kierkegaard, Either/Or II, 179; emphasis added. 
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[A] worldview is less a theory, in the sense of a set of propositions, than a
perception, a habit of seeing the world in a way that gives to my beliefs and
practices whatever coherence they may have.235
Westphal further develops this conception by stating that life-views “are not in the first 
instance assertions about the world but modes of being in the world.”236 
Another way in which Kierkegaard further develops his conception of a live-view in 
Either/Or is by presenting particular life-views as stages of personal development.  As 
Mark C. Taylor notes, Kierkegaard understands each stage of life in a twofold manner: the 
“most adequate view of Kierkegaard’s theory of the stages of existence” views the stages 
“as ideal personality types (or as ideal representations of various life-views) and as the 
stages of the development of the individual self.”237  In the first case, Kierkegaard’s theory 
of stages is intended to typologize the views of life that persons generally instantiate.  Each 
stage represents a paradigmatic view of oneself as oriented within one’s world, 
corresponding to which there are unique understandings of selfhood, freedom, and 
responsibility.  In the second case, Kierkegaard also presents his theory of stages “as 
descriptive of the phases of the self’s development.”238  Taylor explains: “But it is 
recognized that these live-views are arranged so that there is a successive movement from 
the pleasure-seeking life of the aesthete to the devout life of the Christian.”239  These ideal 
personality types are presented as constituting the graduated series of stages through which 
the person passes in the maturation of selfhood.  In this development, which is formally 
modeled after Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, each stage represents a particular shape 
235 Westphal, 22.  While McCarthy is previously cited as distinguishing life-views from worldviews, the two 
interpreters understand the latter concept differently, such that they are not actually in disagreement. 
236 Ibid. 
237 Taylor, 74. 
238 Ibid, 70. 
239 Ibid. 
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of self-consciousness, and one ascends to higher stages through an intensification of self-
consciousness, wherewith one achieves a more adequate conception of what it means to be 
a self.  In Kierkegaard’s theory, this graduated ascension toward more complete self-
knowledge involves a shift from a life absorbed in the satisfaction of natural desires to life-
views that are more ethically and religiously oriented. 
3.3 The Aesthetic Stage of Life and Its Types 
The first life-view that Kierkegaard presents in Either/Or is that of the aesthetic, 
which is named for the centrality and primacy of sensuous experience to the lifestyle of 
this stage.240  In Kierkegaard’s theory, aestheticism is an empirically-oriented 
understanding of one’s self and one’s place in the world, which thereby involves the 
prioritization of the physical, material, and natural dimensions of personal existence.  
Walsh summarizes the nature of this stage in the following definition: 
In the writings of Kierkegaard “the aesthetic” is a major term signifying that 
condition and stage in human life where every human being begins and in which 
some remain, living in an immediate or reflective manner on the basis of natural 
inclinations and capacities in an effort to gain satisfaction and enjoyment through 
the senses.241 
The aesthetic life-view is a conception of the meaning and purpose of life that culminates 
in the maxim: “One must enjoy life.” 242  One lives aesthetically when one views the 
ultimate meaning and purpose of life to be the pursuit of some kind of pleasure.  At higher 
240  For a brief historical explanation of this term, cf. McDonald, “Aesthetic/Aesthetics,” from 
Kierkegaard’s Concepts: Tome I: Absolute to Church, ed. Steven Emmanuel, William McDonald, and Jon 
Stewart (Burlington: Ashgate, 2013), 23-29.  It is also useful to note that “aesthetic” is a polyvalent term in 
Kierkegaard’s work, describing either (1) a theory of art, (2) a literary style (for example, Kierkegaard refers 
to his pseudonymously published texts as constituting his “aesthetic” authorship, which refers to the form of 
the texts, not the content), (3) the sensuous or empirical features of human existence, (4) a particular life-
view, stage of existence, or existence-sphere, as Kierkegaard variously identifies it. 
241 Walsh, 19. 
242 Kierkegaard, Either/Or II, 179. 
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levels of development, the aesthetic life-view, with its commitment to the pursuit of 
pleasure, is characterized by the romantic priority of imagination and poetic creation over 
actuality, an ironic and ultimately nihilistic stance toward social order, convention, and 
relations, which involves the subordination of ethical concerns to personal enjoyment and 
amusement, an emphasis on individuality to the point of egotism, and an aversion to 
boredom so severe that it is the primary determinant of aesthetic praxis. 
Presentations of Kierkegaard’s general theory of stages of life often outline three 
stages – the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious – as being mutually exclusive in such a 
way that it appears as through an aesthete cannot have ethical commitments or religious 
beliefs.  This, however, is a misleading simplification.  The aesthete can be an upstanding 
citizen and congregant; an aesthetic life is not necessarily devoid of ethical and religious 
dimensions, but it is a life in which such aspects are subordinated to the pursuit of 
enjoyment.  What distinguishes these stages from each other is what is taken to be of 
primary importance, around which beliefs, values, and activities are oriented.  As Westphal 
explains: 
The identity and integrity of each stage – its essence, if you like – is the criterion it 
offers for successful living.  Each stage is an answer to the question, What is the 
good life? In the classical sense in which it is equivalent to the question, Where is 
true happiness to be found?243 
Despite being a life that prioritizes pleasure, the aesthetic need not be a life of depravity, 
immorality, or atheism.  An aesthete, for example, could live perfectly in accordance with 
the customs of its society or could affirm a set of religious convictions, but, since 
enjoyment is central to this life-style, such social or religious commitments would be 
affirmed either because they are pleasing to the aesthete or in such a way that their value 
243 Westphal, 22. 
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is subordinated to what the aesthete otherwise finds pleasing.  When Kierkegaard 
distinguishes life-views in accordance with a singular quality (e.g., the pursuit of pleasure), 
it is not the case that Kierkegaard thinks that particular forms of life are myopically focused 
on a single goal and lacking any intrinsic complexity; rather, it is just a matter of identifying 
the primary concern that around which others revolve or to which others are subordinated. 
To the extent that aestheticism prioritizes the pursuit of enjoyment, aesthetic views 
of life have an empirical orientation, such that what is identified as the meaning of life and 
the condition for happiness is purely mundane.  The aesthete “considers personality in 
relation to the surrounding world, and the expression for this in its recurrence in the 
personality is enjoyment.”244  Kierkegaard further explains this empirical orientation in 
terms of external and internal conditions for satisfaction: 
But the person who says that he wants to enjoy life always posits a condition that 
either lies outside the individual or is within the individual in such a way that it is 
not there by virtue of the individual himself.245 
Any life that revolves around desire has its condition outside of itself, insofar as desire is 
empirically determined; the aesthetic life is lived in pursuit of some goal that is accidental 
to the individual or is not posited by the individual itself, to the extent that the goal is 
dictated by nature or circumstance.  For example, one might be born with a talent for music 
and might view the purpose of life as the development of this talent.  In such a life-view, 
the goal of life – the development of the musical talent – is determined by one’s innate 
capacity.  An aesthete views its own life as meaningful only in relation to an external 
condition, such that it finds fulfillment solely in the possession of this condition. 
244 Kierkegaard, Either/Or II, 229. 
245 Ibid, 180. 
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Due to its empirical orientation, Kierkegaard considers aestheticism to be a life of 
immediacy.  Kierkegaard states of aesthetic life-views: “all stages still have the essential 
similarity that spirit is not qualified as spirit but is immediately qualified.”246  Kierkegaard 
understands spirit to be qualified immediately when a person inadequately conceives itself 
or when personality has not become transparently manifest to itself.  The aesthetic life-
views each represent an incomplete self-awareness, such that none of these views is able 
to “penetrate personality itself, which remains in its accidental immediacy.”247  The 
condition for this adequate and transparent self-apprehension, which is presented in 
Kierkegaard’s analysis of the structure of ethical personality, is that the self is understood 
as something freely and responsibly created through its own deliberate actions.  Self-
determination is the unique characteristic of the ethical life and of the qualification of the 
spirit as spirit, but this is precisely that which is absent in the aesthetic life.  Self-
determination involves a mediation of the self, in the sense that, as self-determined, one’s 
identity is mediated through one’s actions.  The aesthetic view of selfhood is not that one’s 
identity is created through action, however, but that the self is static and determined by 
nature, such that one simply is what one is; the aesthete “spontaneously and immediately 
is what he is” – the aesthete “immediately is the person he is.”248  Taylor explains this 
immediacy in the following: 
What a person is “immediately” (i.e., unmediatedly) is a function of that which does 
not result from his own decisions.  One’s body, mental ability, physical talents, 
family, etc. would be examples of such aspects of the self.  The aesthete, therefore, 
is what he is by virtue of circumstances that lie outside the realm of his self-
determination.249 
246 Ibid. 
247 Ibid, 190. 
248 Ibid, 178, 225. 
249 Taylor, 129 
108 
This immediacy does not entail that the aesthete does not develop over the course of life; 
rather the aesthetic personality simply develops in accordance with what is taken to be its 
innate or intrinsic nature: “From this you see what esthetic development signifies; it is a 
development just like that of a plant, and although the individual becomes, he becomes that 
which he immediately is.”250  Related to its empirical orientation, the aesthete views 
selfhood as something that is merely produced and determined by nature, such that “the 
spirit is still not qualified as spirit but as gift.”251  Moreover: “All the [aesthetic] stages 
have this in common, that the reason for living is that whereby one immediately is what 
one is, because reflection never reaches so high that it reaches beyond this.”252  Each 
aesthetic life-view represents an inability to achieve a proper conception of personality as 
self-determining; in this inability, consciousness does not yet recognize itself apart from 
purely empirical determinations – it does not recognize itself as free and, thereby, 
responsible for its manner of existence. 
Accordingly, Kierkegaard thinks that the aesthete is primarily committed to the 
pursuit of enjoyment as a result of a limited awareness of what it means to be a self – one 
that perceives the self merely as a determined product of nature.  This limited self-
awareness does not entail that aesthetes are otherwise ignorant or unreflective.  To the 
contrary, certain forms of aestheticism require remarkable degrees of reflectiveness to 
satisfy their projects of enjoyment.  Kierkegaard says that aesthetes are reflective, “yet this 
reflection is always only a finite reflection, and the person remains in his immediacy.”253  
Aesthetic personalities do not reflect beyond their physical, material, and sensuous 
250 Kierkegaard, Either/Or II, 255. 
251 Ibid, 181. 
252 Ibid, 191. 
253 Ibid, 183-184. 
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existence, insofar as their primary goal in life is the pursuit of a purely worldly satisfaction.  
In the aesthetic stage, one’s reflective capacities are oriented around the pursuit of an object 
of pleasure. 
While the first volume of Either/Or is written consistently from the perspective of 
a highly developed and reflective aesthetic personality, such that a single form of 
aestheticism is expressed therein, the second volume of the text provides what Kierkegaard 
calls a “vivisection” of the aesthetic life-view, delineating this stage of life into a graduated 
series of sub-stages.254  This variety of aestheticism is explained by the fact that there are 
various ways in which the aesthetic maxim regarding enjoying life could be interpreted, 
due to the diversity of enjoyable things and to subjective preferences regarding the same.  
Given this variety, Kierkegaard typologizes the aesthetic life-view into seven paradigmatic 
types, distinguishing each in accordance with what is taken to be the primary object of 
enjoyment in that life-view, such that each type possesses a unique understanding of how 
to enjoy life, and each of these understandings correlates to different degrees of 
reflectiveness and self-awareness.  The stages of aestheticism are presented in a graduated 
series, advancing from a “total absence of sprit to the highest level of brilliance, but, even 
in the stage where brilliance manifests itself, the spirit is still not qualified as spirit but as 
gift.”255  The series of aesthetic life-views represent different degrees of self-awareness, 
advancing from largely unreflective forms of life to the highly reflective stage of romantic 
self-consciousness.  For this reason, the lower stages are presented by Kierkegaard as more 
innocent and simpler than the higher stages.256 
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In each of the first three stages of aestheticism, the pursuit of pleasure is directed 
toward a particular object of desire, such that the attainment or maintenance of this object 
is viewed as the highest purpose in life.  The first and lowest stage of aestheticism perceives 
health or beauty as the highest good, such that one is to enjoy life through the appreciation 
of one’s health or beauty.257  At this stage, personality “is immediately qualified, not 
mentally-spiritually but physically.”258  In other words, this type of aesthete possesses self-
consciousness, but only to the extent that it recognizes itself in its purely physical existence, 
such that the body “is the most precious good, is that around which everything revolves.”259  
Happiness in this life-view is determined entirely by the condition of one’s body, which in 
turn is determined by nature and circumstance.  The second stage of aestheticism consists 
of those life-views in which “wealth, honors, noble birth, etc. are made life’s task and its 
content.”260  Such life-views are materially oriented, similar to the first stage, but the 
material whose possession is supposed to constitute the highest in life is more abstract and 
intangible than the body, as it corresponds to one’s station in life.  The maxim to enjoy life 
at this stage is determined by the maintenance of what one has by virtue of the social 
position or class into which one is born.  The third stage revolves around talent – for 
example, “a talent for practical affairs, a talent for business, a talent for mathematics, a 
talent for writing, a talent for art, a talent for philosophy.”261  Similar to the foregoing 
stages, talent refers to innate or naturally determined capacities, such that the satisfaction 
of this life is conditioned by something “not posited by the individual himself.”262  
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Kierkegaard explains the purpose of life in this view as follows: “Satisfaction in life, 
enjoyment, is sought in the unfolding of this talent.”263 
Kierkegaard distinguishes these first three forms of aestheticism from the 
remaining ones by virtue of the former’s simplicity.  Each of these first stages revolves 
around a single object, like health or honor, and a life at one of these stages is satisfied so 
long as this object is maintained.  This simplicity makes the first set of life-views more 
internally unified and consistent: 
Just as all of these life-views have their esthetic nature in common, so they also 
resemble one another in having a certain unity, a certain coherence, the one 
particular thing around which everything revolves.  What they build their lives upon 
is something simple, and therefore this life-view is not fragmented as is the life-
view of those who build upon something intrinsically multiple.264 
In contrast to this simple orientation, each of the four remaining stages of aestheticism 
becomes more complex, as well as more multifaceted and fragmented, insofar as each one 
revolves around a more abstract and thereby more nuanced understanding of enjoyment – 
one that requires a higher development of self-awareness. 
Rather than perceiving the meaning of life to be the maintenance of some particular 
quality or status, the fourth life-view “teaches ‘Enjoy life’ and interprets it as ‘Live for your 
desire.’”265  Whereas the foregoing forms of aestheticism all revolve around a singular 
object – health, beauty, wealth, honor, nobility, talent – the remaining forms of life are 
conditioned by something “intrinsically multiple.”    In the case of the fourth aesthetic life-
view, this multiplicity stems from the nature of desire: “desire per se is a multiplicity, and 
thus it is easy to see that this life splits up into a boundless multiplicity […].”266  At any 





given moment, one always has numerous desires that one could work to satisfy, and this 
multiplicity itself constantly changes over time.  Kierkegaard notes that it is at this stage 
that the aesthete is significantly “within the sphere of reflection” and is so precisely due to 
the multiplicity of desire.  To live a life for the satisfaction of desire, one must be able to 
reflect on oneself, so as both to be able to recognize the various objects of one’s desire and 
to be able to choose which desires are worth pursuing.  This pursuit of enjoyment requires 
a degree of reflection that is unnecessary for the simpler pursuits of the lower stages.  At 
this stage, one must be able to represent to oneself the manifold of one’s desires and be 
able to evaluate these desires, so as to prioritize them.  This reflection, however, is “always 
only a finite reflection, and the person remains in his immediacy,” to the extent that this 
type of aesthete reflects only on its naturally conditioned desires. 
The fifth stage develops from the recognition that a life dedicated simply to 
satisfying desire “cannot be carried out, and for that reason it is not worth the trouble to 
embark on it,” insofar as one’s desires are endless and no enduring satisfaction could be 
achieved by this lifestyle.267  Kierkegaard identifies this fifth life-view as that of 
epicureanism, since there is a reflective shift from enjoying life to the maxim: “‘Enjoy 
yourself; in enjoyment you are to enjoy yourself.’”268  This shift represents “a higher 
reflection,” to the extent that one no longer simply pursues whatever is pleasurable, but is 
instead concerned with achieving self-contentment by regulating this pursuit of pleasure 
by also striving to avoid pain and distress, which requires a more nuanced understanding 
of different types of pleasures (such as bodily and mental pleasures, as well as immediate 
and mediated pleasures) and their consequences. 
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The sixth stage is a slight variant of the former, to the extent that both involve a 
more reflective form of self-enjoyment.  Kierkegaard identifies the sixth stage as that of 
cynicism, which teaches “‘Enjoy yourself by continually discarding the conditions.’”269  
The cynic pursues enjoyment through the ascetic denials of all that is superfluous to 
existing, which allows the cynic “to rejoice in his lightness […]” – to enjoy life in a state 
of liberation from distress.270  Similar to the preceding stage, cynicism requires a 
heightened reflective capacity, since self-knowledge is the condition for the ascetic’s task 
of “hollowing himself out,” but this reflection is still finite, in that it concerns the purely 
empirical features of the self.271 
The seventh stage of aestheticism – “the finest and the most distinguished of them 
all” – is that of reflective aestheticism, and it is from the perspective of an aesthete at this 
stage of development that the essays of the first volume of Either/Or are written.272  It is at 
this stage that the aesthete becomes conscious of its aestheticism as a way of life.  Whereas 
lower stages of aestheticism involve – in different degrees – an awareness of one’s desired 
goal in life and how to satisfy this desire, reflective aestheticism possesses a thematic 
consciousness of its life-view, which entails that this type of aesthete is not only capable 
of representing to itself its own desires, but it is also aware of its life-view as such and can 
raise evaluative questions concerning the same. 
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3.4 Reflective Aestheticism – Despair, Nihilism, Boredom, and 
Amusement 
Reflective aestheticism differs from the lower stages of the same to the extent that 
the reflective aesthete possesses a thematic awareness of its own life-view as aesthetic.  
Due to this more complete self-knowledge, however, Kierkegaard designates this stage of 
aestheticism as that of despair, to the extent that it is at this stage of self-awareness that the 
commitments of aestheticism begin to founder and the aesthete becomes weary of its own 
way of life, albeit without possessing knowledge of any alternative way of living.  
Kierkegaard says: 
This last life-view is despair itself.   It is an esthetic life-view, because the 
personality remains in its immediacy; it is the final esthetic life-view, for up to a 
point it has absorbed the consciousness of the nothingness of such a life-view.273 
In this highest stage of aestheticism, the aesthete is capable of reflecting on its own life-
view, whereby the aesthete begins to doubt the validity of a life dedicated to the pursuit of 
enjoyment.  At lower stages of aestheticism, individuals simply live their lives absorbed in 
the pursuit of some form of enjoyment, and, to the extent that they reflect on life, their 
reflections are at the service of their pursuit of enjoyment: they reflect on what they find 
enjoyable and on how to achieve their enjoyment.  At these stages, aesthetes do not 
question the worthwhileness of their lifestyles as such, but instead focus only on how best 
to realize their maxim of enjoying life.  At the higher stage of reflective aestheticism, 
however, the aesthete not only reflects on how to live aesthetically, but it also reflects on 
the significance of the aesthetic life-view itself, questioning the meaning and justification 
of the same.  Through this questioning, the aesthete realizes that it has lived for the sake of 
enjoyment by default and becomes aware of the “nothingness” of its own life-view.  With 
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this awareness, the aesthete becomes desperate, because, on the one hand, the aesthete finds 
no justification for living for the sake of enjoyment and thereby loses conviction in its way 
of life, but, on the other hand, the aesthete knows of no other way of living except to pursue 
enjoyment.  The aesthete feels inescapably immersed in a way of life that has become 
unfulfilling, and, in this despair, the reflective aesthete already lies “somewhat beyond the 
esthetic realm,” precisely because it is no longer satisfied with this life-view.274 
While Kierkegaard presents a full analysis and typology of despair later in The 
Sickness unto Death, his 1849 treatise dedicated solely to that goal, such analysis is only 
nascently present in Either/Or when Kierkegaard critiques aestheticism as a life of despair.  
This nascent account only presents two forms of despair, both of which are characteristic 
of different forms of aestheticism, such that this account is comparatively simple and 
limited in scope.  Similar to the mature account of despair in The Sickness unto Death, the 
earlier account in Either/Or presents despair as stemming from an inadequate conception 
of selfhood, but this inadequacy is explained directly in terms of the aesthetic life, such 
that only aesthetes are in despair.  Kierkegaard characterizes despair in the following 
manner: “But every life-view that has a condition outside itself is despair.”275  He 
elaborates: “it is always despair to have one’s life in something whose nature is that it can 
pass away.”276  Since it is the essential quality of aestheticism to have an empirically 
oriented life-view, one that places its highest goal in something determined by nature or 
circumstance, which is thereby something transient, Kierkegaard concludes that “every 
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esthetic view of life is despair, and that everyone who lives esthetically is in despair, 
whether he knows it or not.”277 
Kierkegaard identifies two basic types of despair.  First, there is a worldly despair, 
which can be suffered by any form of aestheticism.  This despair is occasioned by some 
worldly object, such that one despairs in the unattainment or loss of this object.  
Kierkegaard illustrates: 
If I imagine an artist, for example a painter who goes blind, he perhaps – unless 
there is something more profound in him – will despair.  He despairs over this 
particular matter, and if his sight is restored again, the despair would terminate.278 
In this case, the despair is conditioned entirely by a particular object whose attainment or 
maintenance has been deemed to be essential for living a fulfilling life.  In contrast to this 
worldly-oriented despair, there is a personal despair, which is conditioned by one’s self-
perception, rather than by some mundane object.  To the extent that this despair requires 
intensive self-knowledge, it is suffered uniquely by the reflective aesthete.  Such despair 
emerges not from an inability to acquire the means for aesthetic enjoyment, but from a 
discontent with the aesthetic life-view itself.  In the following passage, Kierkegaard 
describes the reflective aesthete in a state of personal despair: 
You still have in your power all the elements for an esthetic life-view.  You have 
financial means, independence; your health is undiminished; your mind is still 
vigorous; and you have never been unhappy because a young girl would not love 
you.  And yet you are in despair.  It is not a despair involving something actual but 
a despair in thought.  Your thought has rushed ahead; you have seen through the 
vanity of everything, but you have not gone further.  Occasionally you dive into it, 
and when for a single moment you abandon yourself to enjoyment, you are also 
aware that it is vanity.  Thus you are continually beyond yourself – that is, in 
despair.  Therefore, your life lies between two enormous contradictions: at times 
you have colossal energy, at times an equally great indolence.279 
277 Ibid, 192. 
278 Ibid, 194. 
279 Ibid. 
117 
The reflective aesthete, in assessment of its own life-view and in recognition of the 
“nothingness” of its living for the sake of enjoyment, despairs over itself.  This despair is 
not tied to any worldly possession or condition; this aesthete may possess various worldly 
goods, but having “seen through the vanity of everything,” these possessions appear 
worthless and the aesthete cannot find satisfaction in them.  In this despair over itself, life 
appears meaningless to the aesthete, who lives a life that it does not value but also does not 
know how to escape.  This despair is caused by the aesthete’s being continually beyond 
itself, in that it has undermined confidence in its own life-view without being able to 
replace it with another view of life. 
The reflective aesthete is aware that “all is vanity” – that the purported value of the 
goals and objects of enjoyment that characterize aestheticism is illusory – but does not 
know how to overcome to this disillusionment.  The aesthetic pseudonym comments: “I 
have lost all illusions.  In vain do I seek to abandon myself in joy’s infinitude; it cannot lift 
me, or, rather, I cannot lift myself.”280  This loss of direction and purpose constitutes one 
of the fundamental characteristics of aestheticism: nihilism.  The aesthetic pseudonym 
reflects: 
My life is utterly meaningless.  When I consider its various epochs, my life is like 
the word Schnur in the dictionary, which first of all means a string, and second a 
daughter-in-law.  All that is lacking is that in the third place the word Schnur means 
a camel, in the fourth a whisk broom.281 
The aesthete has lived life in pursuit of various pleasures, but, now, perceiving such pursuit 
as vain, the aesthete cannot attribute any meaning or value to its life, such that “life has lost 
reality […].”282 
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Furthermore, this nihilism of aestheticism is not merely theoretical but has serious 
practical consequences.  Up to this stage of aestheticism, the aesthete oriented its activity 
around the pursuit of various sources of enjoyment, such as health, wealth, status, and the 
like.  Having seen such pursuits as lacking any justification and as thereby being 
unfulfilling, the aesthete can no longer derive enjoyment from them.  The aesthete 
recognizes no other maxim than to enjoy life but now has no clear object toward which to 
direct its will.  This nihilism is practically paralyzing, as indicated by the aesthetic 
pseudonym’s own self-reflections: 
I don’t feel like doing anything.  I don’t feel like riding – the motion is too powerful; 
I don’t feel like walking – it is too tiring; I don’t feel like lying down, for either I 
would have to stay down, and I don’t feel like doing that, or I would have to get up 
again, and I don’t feel like doing that, either.  Summa Summarum: I don’t feel like 
doing anything.283 
The most ludicrous of all ludicrous things, it seems to me, is to be busy in the world, 
to be a man who is brisk at his meals and brisk at his work.284 
It takes a lot of naïveté to believe that it helps to shout and scream in the world. 
[…] Now I never shout anymore.285 
I feel as a chessman must feel when the opponent says of it: That piece cannot be 
moved.286 
This perception of the pointlessness of activity is what effects the “great indolence” of 
aesthetic despair.  The aesthete struggles to act, due to the difficulty in finding reasons to 
justify particular actions: “Ordinarily I have so many and most often such mutually 
contradictory reasons.  It also seems to me that with cause and effect the relation does not 
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hold together properly.”287  Lacking clear and definite reasons to act, the aesthete becomes 
resigned to a state of indolence. 
Despite having no reason to act in any particular manner, however, the aesthete 
must nonetheless act, since it is impossible to live without acting in some manner.  In 
consequence of its need to act coupled with its nihilistic perception of activity, the aesthete 
adopts an understanding of choice that emphasizes the triviality of action and an 
indifference toward the same.  Illustratively, the aesthetic pseudonym writes: 
Marry, and you will regret it.  Do not marry and you will also regret it.  Marry or 
do not marry, you will regret it either way.  Whether you marry or you do not marry, 
you will regret it either way.  Laugh at the stupidities of the world, and you will 
regret it; weep over them, and you will also regret it.  Laugh at the stupidities of the 
world or weep over them, you will regret it either way.  Whether you laugh at the 
stupidities of the world or weep over them, you will regret it either way.  Trust a 
girl, and you will regret it.  Do not trust her, and you will also regret it.  Trust a girl 
or do not trust her, you will regret it either way.  Whether you trust a girl or do not 
trust her, you will regret it either way.  Hang yourself, and you will regret it.  Do 
not hang yourself, and you will also regret it.  Hang yourself or do not hang 
yourself, you will regret it either way.  Whether you hang yourself or do not hang 
yourself, you will regret it either way.  This, gentlemen, is the quintessence of all 
the wisdom of life.288 
 
Since particular acts are not perceived as contributing to the realization of any justified life-
view, every possible action appears trivial, and the aesthete is indifferent toward both its 
actions and the consequences of the same.  Since life cannot be lived without acting, the 
aesthete necessarily acts, but it does so arbitrarily, since no action is perceived as being 
ultimately justified.  Accordingly, in response to the perceived vanity of all activity, the 
aesthete simply lives “with as little teleology as possible.”289  There is no ultimate purpose 
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toward which the aesthete strives: “My life achievement amounts to nothing at all, a mood, 
a single color.”290 
The nihilism of aestheticism and the consequent disinterest in activity founds one 
of the most paradigmatic experiences of the aesthetic life: boredom.  Because action is 
perceived as pointless, such that it does not matter what one does, the aesthete is incapable 
of finding fulfillment in life.  The pursuits that originally evoked pleasure for the aesthete 
have become mere reminders of the triviality of existence, and the aesthete no longer knows 
how to enjoy its life.  In the absence of activities that would produce enjoyment and thereby 
make the aesthetic life fulfilling, the aesthete suffers boredom: 
How dreadful boredom is – how dreadfully boring; I know no stronger expression, 
no truer one, for like is recognized only by like. […] I lie prostrate, inert; the only 
thing I see is emptiness, the only thing I live on is emptiness, the only thing I move 
in is emptiness.  […] I am dying death.  And what could divert me?  Well, if I 
managed to see a faithfulness that withstood every ordeal, an enthusiasm that 
endured everything, a faith that moved mountains; if I were to become aware of an 
idea that joined the finite and the infinite.  But my soul’s poisonous doubt consumes 
everything.291 
The aesthete acts with indifference and goes through the motions of living, but this lifestyle 
is unfulfilling, such that the passage of time seems to drag and living becomes tedious: 
“Time passes, life is a stream, etc., so people say.  That is not what I find: time stands still, 
and so do I.”292  The course of life itself is condemned by the aesthete, to the extent that it 
consists in the tedious repetition of all things, devoid of all interest: 
Wretched fate!  In vain do you prink up your wrinkled face like an old prostitute, 
in vain do you jingle your fool’s bells.  You bore me, it is still the same, an idem 
per idem.  No variation, always a rehash.  Come, sleep and death; you promise 
nothing, you hold everything.293 
290 Kierkegaard, Either/Or I, 28. 
291 Ibid, 37. 
292 Kierkegaard, Either/Or II, 26. 
293 Kierkegaard, Either/Or I, 29-30. 
121 
The aesthete seeks enjoyment but, having seen through the vanity of everything, cannot 
find any object toward which to direct its attention and effort, such that the aesthete is 
resigned to a state of indefinite yearning: “I lack the patience to live. […]  It is said that our 
Lord satisfies the stomach before the eyes.  That is not what I find: my eyes are surfeited 
and bored with everything, and yet I hunger.”294  In this state, life simply continues in an 
aimless and tedious manner: “Life has become a bitter drink, and yet it must be taken in 
drops, slowly, counting.”295 
Within the aesthetic life, boredom is coextensive with and expressive of the 
nihilistic perception that devalues all possible actions, leaving the aesthete in a state of 
perpetual unfulfillment, in which it does not know how to direct its attention and its will.  
The aesthete not only cognizes the vanity of life, it also experiences this vanity as boredom.  
Boredom is the mood that makes manifest to aesthete that it is alienated from its situation; 
boredom reveals the aesthetic personality in its disengagement from its world.  As bored, 
the aesthete does not know how to direct its will, since no activities appear meaningful to 
it; boredom expresses the aesthete’s disinterest both in living and in ordinary sources of 
enjoyment.  Accordingly, boredom evinces a frustration of willing, but this is a frustration 
of second-order volition: when bored, the aesthete does not desire the attainment of some 
particular object, as much as the aesthete desires for there to be some object worth pursuing 
at all.  The aesthete futilely desires for there to be some source of enjoyment in its life, and 
this futility becomes manifest as boredom. 
Moreover, this mood of boredom not only makes manifest the aesthetic self in its 
nihilism and alienation, but also determines how the aesthete perceives its environing 
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situation.  Boredom is described by the aesthete as a sensation of “emptiness.”  As bored, 
the world seems devoid of meaning and importance, such that the aesthete is inclined to 
disregard it.  As Calvin Schrag explains, a mood like boredom not only reveals features of 
the self but should “also be thought of as a situational determinant,” in the sense that 
boredom reflects how the self is attuned to its given situation.296  In its boredom, the 
aesthete finds its world to be dull, providing nothing that arouses the interest of the aesthete; 
the world places no hold upon the aesthete, who perceives its world as providing a manifold 
of pointless and worthless activities. 
Ordinarily, boredom is considered to be an emotion that one occasionally and 
briefly experiences in response to uninteresting circumstances.  One might feel bored, for 
example, during a ten-minute wait for a bus, when one has nothing to do but sit on the 
bench by the side of the road.  As indicated by the foregoing analyses, however, this 
ordinary conception of boredom is not what is described by Kierkegaard in Either/Or, to 
the extent that boredom is not accidental to the aesthetic life, nor is boredom an occasional 
or brief experience for the aesthete.  Boredom is an essential feature of the aesthetic life-
view, grounded in the aesthete’s nihilism and indicative thereof.  Rather than being 
occasional or fleeting, boredom is the default condition of the aesthetic life; having seen 
through the vanity of everything, the aesthete experiences life as essentially tedious and 
empty, and it is only during interludes of distraction that this fundamental boredom is 
obscured.  However, even when the aesthete does overcome boredom through distractions, 
its boredom is always lurking under the surface, recurring whenever the distraction fails or 
subsides.  Similar to the account provided in The Concept of Irony, the boredom described 
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by the aesthetic pseudonym in Either/Or is existential in nature, to the extent that boredom 
is described in this text as grounded in the individual’s fundamental view of life, rather 
than in particular circumstances in which there is momentarily nothing that interests the 
individual.  As Schrag notes, the aesthete suffers a boredom, “in which there is no particular 
object or person with which one is bored, but simply one’s self and one’s being in the 
world.”297 
The reflective aesthete cannot find satisfaction in the kind of pleasures that 
concerned the lower stages of aestheticism, having seen through the vanity of such 
lifestyles.  Concurrently, the nihilistic view of the reflective aesthete, which perceives all 
activity as vain and thereby unfulfilling, results in an unbearable boredom, but this 
boredom incentivizes the aesthete to find distraction from its own unfulfilled and frustrated 
state of existence.  This shift in the aesthetic life from the pursuit of particular pleasures 
toward distraction is highlighted by Kierkegaard in his commentary on Goethe’s Faust, the 
titular character of which epitomizes the reflective aesthete’s disillusionment with 
mundane pleasure.  Throughout Either/Or, Kierkegaard often references literary characters 
in depiction of particular forms of aestheticism.  Most predominantly, he presents Mozart’s 
Don Giovanni as a fairly unreflective aesthete and Goethe’s Faust as an exemplar of 
reflective aestheticism.   Whereas an aesthete like Don Giovanni may be content with the 
perpetual expansion of his catalogue through the endless pursuit of mundane pleasure, 
Faust expresses a more complex relation to pleasure.  Kierkegaard presents Faust’s relation 
to pleasure in the following manner: 
Faust is a demonic figure just like Don Juan, but a superior one.  Sensuousness does 
not acquire importance for him until he has lost a whole previous world, but the 
consciousness of this loss is not blotted out; it is always present, and therefore he 
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seeks in the sensuous not so much pleasure as distraction.  His doubting soul finds 
nothing in which it can rest, and now he grasps at erotic love, not because he 
believes in it but because it has an element of presentness in which there is a 
momentary rest and a striving that diverts and that draws attention away from the 
nothingness of doubt.298 
As Harries notes, Faust pursues enjoyment precisely in order to “forget his despair.”299  
Faust does not seduce Gretchen because he believes that such a pursuit is itself valuable, 
but because he hopes through this pursuit to divert his attention away from the despair and 
boredom that had inclined him toward suicidal ideation at the beginning of the play.  More 
than anything else, the reflective aesthete desires distraction from its nihilism.  This desire 
for distraction emerges from having “lost a whole previous world,” which, as David Stern 
explains, is precisely the world of immediate pleasure – the world found to be the source 
of enjoyment by unreflective aesthetes like Don Giovanni.300  The reflective aesthete, 
having lost the ability to find enjoyment in this world, due to having seen through the vanity 
thereof, no longer seeks pleasure in this world, but instead desires distraction from its own 
nihilistic perception (“the nothingness of doubt”) and corresponding state of dissatisfaction 
and boredom.  With the aesthete’s loss of the world of immediate pleasures, the need to 
recover pleasure in a more sophisticated manner emerges. 
This disillusionment with immediate pleasure and corresponding tendency toward 
distraction introduces an important distinction between what Ryan Kemp designates as 
first- and second-order enjoyment, the latter of which is unique to the reflective form of 
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aestheticism.301  Between the stages of aestheticism, Kierkegaard distinguishes sensuous 
pleasure, which is derived from particular mundane objects, from reflective pleasure, 
which is derived from the poeticized representation of some situation or experience.  
Kierkegaard’s following description of the reflective aesthete outlines this distinction 
between types of enjoyment: 
The poetic was the plus that he himself brought along. This plus was the poetic he 
enjoyed in the poetic situation of actuality; this he recaptured in the form of poetic 
reflection.  This was the second enjoyment, and his whole life was intended for 
enjoyment.  In the first case, he personally enjoyed the esthetic; in the second case, 
he esthetically enjoyed his personality.  The point of the first case was that he 
egotistically enjoyed personally that which in part actuality has given to him and 
which in part he himself had used to fertilize actuality; in the second case, his 
personality was volatized, and he then enjoyed the situation and himself in the 
situation.  In the first case, he continually needed actuality as the occasion, as an 
element; in the second case, actuality was drowned in the poetic.302 
First-order enjoyment is aesthetic in the sense that is it sensual and immediate – it is the 
pleasure that is produced by an actual experience.  As Kemp illustrates, a first-order 
enjoyment would be “the feeling one gets when tasting something sweet as opposed, say, 
to the feeling one gets when recollecting (or imagining) the experience of tasting something 
sweet.”303  Kemp explains that first-order enjoyment is characterized by a twofold 
immediacy.  First, as the preceding example indicates, it is immediate to the extent that “it 
is directly grounded in sense experience.”304  A first-order enjoyment is the pleasure that 
arises from the experience of some actual object.  Second, first-order enjoyment is 
immediate to the extent that it is “non-self-referential,” in the sense that this enjoyment is 
perceived as coming from the object itself, rather than the representation of some object; 
301 Ryan Kemp, “‘A’ the Aesthete: Aestheticism and the Limits of Philosophy,” from: Kierkegaard’s
Pseudonyms, ed. Katalin Nun and Jon Stewart (London: Routledge, 2015), 4. 
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such enjoyment is conditioned by actuality, which serves as the source of the pleasure.305  
Kemp illustrates this distinction in the following: 
I can, on the one hand, simply and immediately enjoy all the idiosyncrasies of the 
beloved – the way the beloved’s face looks under the light of the moon, the 
beloved’s charming wit, and so on.  On the other hand, I can enjoy the idea of being 
in love.  The object of this second, more reflective, pleasure is the thought that I 
find myself in such-and-such a situation.306 
In the enjoyment experienced at the sight of the face of the beloved, it is the face itself that 
is pleasing, and this face is sensibly given and is itself taken to be the source of the pleasure.  
Whereas first-order enjoyment is an immediate and sensuous pleasure, second-order 
enjoyment is reflective, such that it has a more mediated relation to experience.  The former 
is the satisfaction one experiences from something actual, like the taste of sweet food or 
the sight of a beautiful face.  Second-order enjoyment, in contrast, is the satisfaction one 
experiences reflectively, such that the source of the pleasure is not actuality but the 
representation of actuality.  Second-order enjoyment is unique to this highest stage of 
aestheticism, because it requires highly developed reflective capacities combined with the 
disinterest in sensual pleasures that arises therewith. 
Having become disillusioned of the value of first-order enjoyment, what the 
reflective aesthete desires is to make life interesting, so as to distract itself from its nihilistic 
perception and consequent boredom.  What the reflective aesthete desires is not so much a 
sensuous pleasure, but to be able to view life as interesting.  Kierkegaard understands 
interest to be self-referential and artificial.  Interest is self-referential, in the sense that a 




situation: “the interesting always involves a reflecting on oneself.”307  Harries adds: “The 
interesting depends on a movement of reflection that enables the individual to detach 
himself from his engaged being in the world in order to enjoy it […].”308  Kierkegaard 
illustrates this detachment in the following way: “How beautiful it is to be in love; how 
interesting it is to know that one is in love.”309  Interest is not a quality that objectively 
inheres in a given situation; rather, interest is produced in the representation of a situation.  
Relatedly, Kierkegaard understands interest to be artificial, albeit not in the sense of being 
unreal or ineffectual, but simply in the sense of being something created.  Interest is 
something with which consciousness imbues the situation through its representation 
thereof; it is not an objective and given quality of a situation, but is something created by 
the perception of oneself in that situation. 
The disillusionment with mundane pleasure compels the aesthete to the pursuit of 
second-order enjoyment in the interesting, and precisely herein lies the second aspect of 
aesthetic despair – its “colossal energy.”  As previously noted, in its form of personal 
despair, the aesthetic life oscillates between the two extremes of “great indolence” and 
“colossal energy.”  The aesthete is resigned to indolence when overtaken by the nihilistic 
perception of the vanity of existence, wherewith the aesthete is totally disinterested in 
activity and suffers boredom.  This indolence is momentarily interrupted, however, in 
moments of colossal energy, whereby the aesthete, unable to bear its boredom and 
frustration, is compelled to distract itself from the consciousness of its own existential 
condition. 
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3.5 The Rotation of Crops – A Theory of Boredom and Its Solution 
In the reflective form of aestheticism, boredom becomes the most pressing issue for 
the aesthete, which is indicated textually by the fact that the most explicit ethical system 
presented in the first volume of Either/Or revolves around the commitment to avoiding 
boredom.  This system is presented in the penultimate essay of the first volume of 
Either/Or, tiled “The Rotation of Crops: A Venture in a Theory of Social Prudence,” which 
is a manual explanatory of the best method through which to avoid boredom and thereby 
maintain an interest in life.  While the composition of such a manual certainly appears 
satirical and facetious – and there are such elements in the essay – of all the essays 
constitutive of the first volume of Either/Or, this one best exposes the essence of 
aestheticism, which it does by revealing both the primary goal of reflective aestheticism 
and the corresponding ethics to which the aesthete adheres in pursuit of this goal. 
Before considering different strategies for avoiding boredom, this essay begins with 
an analysis of boredom, presenting it as both a pervasive and motivating experience, both 
of which indicate how serious the issue of boredom is from the aesthetic perspective.  The 
aesthetic pseudonym highlights both qualities in the following hyperbolic representation 
of the biblical narrative concerning the creation of the world: 
The gods were bored; therefore they created human beings.  Adam was bored 
because he was alone; therefore Eve was created.  Since that moment, boredom 
entered the world and grew in quantity in exact proportion to the growth of 
population.  Adam was bored alone; then Adam and Eve were bored together; then 
Adam and Eve and Cain and Abel were bored en famille.  After that, the population 
of the world increased and the nations were bored en masse.  To amuse themselves, 
they hit upon the notion of building a tower so high that it would reach the sky.  
This notion is just as boring as the tower was high and is a terrible demonstration 
of how boredom had gained the upper hand.  Then they were dispersed around the 
world, just as people now travel abroad, but they continued to be bored.  And what 
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consequences this boredom had: humankind stood tall and fell far, first through 
Eve, then from the Babylonian tower.310 
First, boredom is presented in this passage as an essential feature of existence, recurring 
with and imposing upon each generation.  From the aesthetic perspective, boredom is a 
ubiquitous phenomenon.  The aesthetic pseudonym stresses this point with the following 
statement: “Boredom is the demonic pantheism.”311  This vague expression is explained in 
the following way: 
Pantheism ordinarily implies the qualification of fullness; with boredom it is the 
reverse: it is built upon emptiness, but for this very reason it is a pantheistic 
qualification.  Boredom rests upon the nothing that interlaces existence; its 
dizziness is infinite, like that which comes from looking down into a bottomless 
abyss.312 
Boredom is not only ubiquitous; it is also expressive of the emptiness of existence.  Harries 
explains this juxtaposition of fullness and emptiness as pantheistic qualities: 
While the pantheist senses the presence of God in everything, and thus finds 
everything infinitely significant, the bored person because he senses the 
nothingness pervading everything, finds nothing worthwhile.313 
Boredom is the experience of an all-pervading emptiness that evinces the perceived 
worthlessness of all activity.  The nihilism of aestheticism is manifest here; from the 
aesthetic perspective, boredom is pervasive, because existence and the activities of living 
appear meaningless, such that the aesthete is disinterested in them.  Second, and more 
importantly for the practical aspects of this theory, in this retelling of the story of creation, 
boredom is presented as a source of motivation, to the extent that boredom is cited in 
explanation of the generation of humanity and the erection of the Tower of Babel.  The 
310 Ibid, 286. 
311 Ibid, 290. 
312 Ibid, 291. 
313 Harries, 91. 
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aesthete stresses this motivational aspect of boredom in the following claim: “Boredom is 
the root of all evil; it is that which must be held off.”314  This holding-off evinces the 
primary effect that boredom has in life: boredom is “not merely repelling but infinitely 
repulsive” and constitutes an “infinite momentum for making discoveries.”315  While 
bored, one is precisely not in a state of contentment but feels the constant urge to dispel 
one’s boredom; boredom is understood to be a source of motion to the extent that boredom 
impels one to cease to be bored, or, positively expressed, the experience of boredom impels 
one to seek amusement and to make “discoveries” in this sense. 
The identification of boredom and evil is certainly presented in a hyperbolic 
manner, but, from the aesthetic perspective, there is truth to the identification.  In the 
aesthetic life, there is a subordination of all pursuits to that of enjoyment, such that, as 
Harries notes, “The polarity [of] good and evil has here been replaced with that of the 
interesting and the boring.”316  To a life that is primarily dedicated to the pursuit of the 
interesting, boredom, as the state in which interest is absent and living becomes 
burdensome, is the greatest evil, in the sense that it is to be avoided above all else.  Boredom 
is precisely the state in which life is not being enjoyed, which is the foremost concern of 
the aesthetic personality. 
These two observations – that boredom is ubiquitous and a source of motivation – 
ground the practical dimensions of the essay on crop rotation; this essay is primarily 
concerned with an exploration of strategies through which boredom can be avoided, and 
the aesthetic pseudonym presents an ethical system revolving around this avoidance.  The 
314 Kierkegaard, Either/Or I, 289. 
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guiding maxim in this aesthetic ethics is that one ought to “conquer” or “escape” 
boredom.317  Positively expressed, this means that “one ought to amuse oneself.”318  This 
ethics is more complicated than a straightforward pursuit of amusement, however.  As 
Kemp notes, the maxim that one ought to amuse oneself “develops out of crisis: pleasure 
depends on novelty, and novelty is a finite resource.”319  Given the finitude of novelty – 
that there are limited novel experiences that one can pursue and that the novelty of 
experiences diminishes – the aesthete adopts an economic view of the pursuit of 
amusement.  The guiding practical question of the reflectively aesthetic life is: what is the 
most successful means through which a being with limited resources can amuse itself 
throughout its entire life?  Employing an agrarian metaphor, the aesthete suggests that what 
is needed to overcome the evil of boredom is the “rotation of crops.”320  Just as the farmer 
must use certain techniques in order to maximize the yield of crops, so too must aesthete 
carefully pursue enjoyment, so as to maximize its pleasure. 
Based on an ambiguity in the metaphor itself, the aesthete presents two possible 
methods of crop rotation to avoid boredom.  The first method, which the aesthete suggests 
is the one based on “popular opinion,” is the more obvious but also the weaker of the two 
strategies.321  This method “consists in continually changing the soil.”322  One way in which 
the farmer could try to maximize the yield of crops is by planting crops in a new field every 
season.  The aesthete understands this cure for boredom to consist of a ‘change in scenery,’ 
by which one seeks amusement in ever-novel experiences.  This strategy is supposed to be 
317 Kierkegaard, Either/Or I, 291. 
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effective under the presupposition that the source of boredom lies in surfeit or repetition – 
that what makes a given situation boring is that the particular experiences therein have been 
enjoyed overindulgently or have been repeated to the point that they have either 
temporarily or permanently lost their appeal.323  The obvious method to avoid such 
boredom of surfeit or repetition is to find novel experiences – ones that have precisely not 
been excessively or repetitiously experienced.  When, for instance, one has already spent 
an entire afternoon shopping at the mall, visiting yet another store becomes tedious, but 
this tedium dissipates simply with one’s leaving the mall and doing something else.  Of 
this strategy, the aesthete provides the following two sets of examples: 
One is weary of living in the country and moves to the city; one is weary of one’s 
native land and goes abroad; one is europamüde and goes to America etc.; one 
indulges in the fanatical hope of an endless journey from star to star.  Or there is 
another direction but sill extensive.  One is weary of eating on porcelain and eats 
on silver; wearying of that, one eats on gold; one burns down half of Rome in order 
to visualize the Trojan conflagration.324 
With this method of crop rotation, one attempts to overcome boredom by constantly 
seeking what is new, either by finding completely novel experiences or by modifying usual 
experiences to make them novel.  Accordingly, this is identified as the “extensive” strategy 
of crop rotation, since it “depends upon the boundless infinity of change, its extensive 
dimension.”325  Regarding this infinity, the aesthete says, referencing a Hegelian concept: 
“This method cancels itself and is the spurious infinity.”326 This strategy represents a 
“spurious infinity,” in the sense that it consists of an endless progression that perpetually 
postpones the final moment; to avoid boredom through this method, one constantly changes 
323 For further elaboration on this form of boredom, cf. Cheshire Calhoun, Living with Boredom (SOPHIA, 
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one’s situation by either going to new places or modifying usual experiences so as to 
continually delay the tedium otherwise introduced through surfeit and repetition.   
The foregoing proposed means to avoid boredom and attain amusement is based on 
the belief that the novelty of an experience is what overcomes boredom.  While the 
aesthetic pseudonym affirms this belief, he is nonetheless wary of the extensive method’s 
ability to maintain novelty, concluding: “This rotation of crops is the vulgar, inartistic 
rotation and is based on an illusion.”327  The illusory base of this strategy is the belief that 
the process of finding ever-new experiences is actually productive of amusement.  
Certainly, one can easily dispel momentary boredom by changing one’s situation in some 
manner, but, as a life-long project requiring endless variation to one’s situation, this 
strategy of overcoming boredom is criticized by the aesthetic pseudonym due to its 
unsustainability.  Projects of amusement that consist merely of finding new experiences 
are dismissed as impractical, insofar as both one is limited in one’s means to be able to fill 
a lifetime with ever-new activities and – more importantly – the activity itself of finding 
new and amusing activities will inevitably become boring and, thereby, self-defeating.  On 
the one hand, the extensive method fails because, as Kemp says, “its returns quickly 
diminish.”328  One can, for example, travel to America when one tires of Europe, and then 
move on to another continent when one loses interest in America, but, with each trip, the 
novelty of travelling to a new land itself wears off, such that travel decreasingly mitigates 
against boredom.  On the other hand, the activity of finding novel experiences itself would 
inevitably become tedious and make life boring.  Even if one could always find novel 
experiences, the work of this finding becomes increasingly tedious. 
327 Ibid, 291. 
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Given the self-defeating nature of the extensive method, the aesthete recommends 
that this method be supplanted by an alternative and more effective method of crop rotation, 
which “seeks relief not through extensity but through intensity.”329  Rather than seeking to 
maintain amusement merely through an endless procession of novel experiences, this 
intensive method is founded on the understanding that one is best amused though the 
reflective cultivation of the quality of experience.  This intensive solution is presented as 
analogous to the method of crop rotation actually employed by farmers, who do not try to 
maximize the yield of crops by simply continually finding new fields for farming: "The 
method I propose does not consist in changing the soil but, like proper crop rotation, 
consists in changing the method of cultivation and the kinds of crops.”330  One can best 
amuse oneself not by pursuing ever-new experiences, which becomes an increasingly 
tedious and self-defeating process, but by cultivating the manner in which one reflects on 
one’s experiences.  The extensive strategy problematically presupposes that one could 
indefinitely postpone boredom through the perpetual pursuit of novelty, ignoring the fact 
that the pursuit itself loses novelty and its returns diminish.  The intensive strategy attempts 
to avoid this limitation, to the extent that it recognizes that boredom does not arise so much 
from a particular situation, as if boredom were an objective property, such that certain 
situations would be universally and necessarily boring, but is instead conditioned by one’s 
own perception of a given situation.  Shifting focus from the quantity of experiences to the 
subject’s perception of experience effects what John Hale appropriately calls “a kind of 
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Copernican revolution” in strategies intended to avoid boredom.331  This intensive 
approach is meant to solve the problem of boredom, insofar as overindulged or often 
repeated experiences can be made amusing depending on how one views them.  As Kemp 
notes: “Instead of casting one’s lot with the external world, the aesthete must learn to use 
actuality as a ‘sounding board’ (Resonansbund) for the rich and boundless world of inner 
experience.”332   
Whereas the extensive strategy involves as change in one’s situation, the intensive 
strategy involves a change in oneself.  To this end, the aesthete advises: “The eye with 
which one sees actuality must be changed continually.”333  Congruent with the Romantic 
praxis, this continual change is supposed to be accomplished through a project of “living 
artistically,” whereby one views one’s own life as an artistic project.334  Louis Mackey 
describes the aesthetic task as follows: 
The aesthete wants enjoyment, but enjoyment cannot simply be had, it must be 
arranged.  Life must be made an art, but the art of living requires a total detachment 
from everything merely given and possibly unpleasant, as well as a disinterested 
arbitrariness in the concoction of actual pleasures.335 
In order to accomplish this project of living artistically, what is essential is not that one 
seek new experiences; rather, it is essential that one find ways to view everyday 
experiences as interesting.  One makes experiences as interesting as possible by recasting 
them poetically.  The aesthete’s recommended solution to boredom is a self-directed 
poiesis; as Mackey explains: “His medium is not words, but himself: he is the living poiesis 
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[…].”336  One lives artistically by orienting one’s decisions, beliefs, and activities around 
the fulfillment of a poeticized narrative of one’s existence. 
Congruent with the romantic prescription that life should be lived poetically, the 
proposed method of crop rotation is founded upon the distinction between one’s actual life 
and the narrative that one constructs to make sense of that life; the aesthete’s intensive 
solution to boredom exploits this distinction so that one’s actual experiences, which tend 
to be boring, can be imaginatively recast as interesting, such that the aesthete can achieve 
pleasure without the self-defeating work of constantly finding new experiences.  This 
poetic narrative is a way of representing one’s actual life, albeit in a highly idealized 
manner, such that it becomes interesting.  The aesthete’s recommendation is that one 
assume a poetic stance toward oneself by imaginatively constructing a narrative for one’s 
life that is only partially informed by one’s everyday experiences.  Following the 
prescriptions of the Romantics, the aesthete suggests that one romanticize one’s existence 
or make one’s existence novel – that one quite literally model one’s life after a novel, the 
content of which is whatever one finds amusing.  For the sake of avoiding boredom, it is 
recommended both that one view oneself as if one were a character in a novel and that one 
view one’s life-development as the achievement of some apparently profound goal, such 
that one’s otherwise mundane experiences assume new meaning, depending on how they 
are viewed as contributing to this development.  This poetically composed narrative is not 
simply an impotent story that one tells oneself about one’s life; rather, this narrative is the 
representation of life in accordance with which the aesthete organizes its goals and 
336 Ibid, 15. 
137 
activities; the aesthete views life as the unfolding of this narrative, such that the latter has 
practical import. 
In order to make life interesting, this poetic re-conception of one’s life must strike 
a balance between ideal and real elements, insofar as the extremes of pure fantasy and pure 
realism are equally boring.  Pure fantasy is boring, firstly, because, due to the severe 
disparity between one’s actual life and the poetic narrative of the same, one’s everyday 
experiences would be constant reminders of the illusory nature of the narrative, and one 
would thereby be constantly reminded of the tedium of one’s actual life, which would 
defeat the purpose of the narrative.  Secondly, since the imagination is essentially 
reproductive rather than productive, the material from which one imaginatively constructs 
can only come from actuality, such that a pure fantasy that ignores that which is given in 
one’s actual situation would have limited resources for poiesis, and such limitation would 
create repetitive and eventually boring narratives.  On the other hand, pure realism is 
boring, because life itself is tedious from the aesthetic perspective, and, if the narrative that 
one creates is simply an accurate representation of that tedium, then the narrative would 
not provide any distraction from the boredom that permeates life but would instead leave 
one wholly susceptible to the same.  In order to avoid the issues with such extremes, the 
recommended solution is precisely a balance of reality and ideality; the narrative that one 
imaginatively constructs must be grounded in one’s actual life, albeit only loosely; one 
should assume one’s actual experiences but reimagine those experiences into some 
idealized narrative. 
This balance between actuality and ideality is supposed to be achieved through the 
manipulation of what the aesthetic pseudonym designates as “the relation between 
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recollecting and forgetting.”337  This artistically lived life involves the imaginative 
construction of experiences by mixing the recollection of an experience with a forgetting 
of the same.  It is important to note that the aesthetic pseudonym uses neither of these terms 
in the ordinary sense.  Both recollection and forgetting are presented as “arts” and, as such, 
are deliberately employed faculties and capable of cultivation.338  In the context of 
Kierkegaard’s theories, recollection is not understood to be the same as memory.339  
Whereas the faculty of memory is intended to produce representations of past experiences, 
the accuracy of which may be compromised unintentionally, recollection is deliberately 
selective and involves a “mixture of fiction and truth.”340  Recollection is understood to be 
a faculty through which one creatively reimagines past experiences.  Recollection is not 
simply identical to memory, but it could be thought of as a poetic memory.  The aesthetic 
pseudonym says: “Recollection is a means not only of conserving but also of augmenting; 
something that is permeated by recollection has a double effect.”341  On the one hand, 
recollection does preserve some past experience by recalling it to consciousness.  On the 
other hand, recollection modifies that memory by reimagining it in some fashion.  Within 
the theory of crop rotation, this capacity of recollection is complemented by the “art of 
forgetting,” which is also understood idiosyncratically by the aesthetic pseudonym.  
Forgetting is neither an inability to recall nor an unconscious suppression of certain 
experiences, rather it is the capacity to deliberately annul or ignore aspects of one’s 
experience, so as to be able to poetically reimagine the same.  Whereas recollection 
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conserves and augments, forgetting eliminates and obscures.  In the construction of the 
poetic narrative for one’s life, “forgetting is the scissors with which one snips way what 
cannot be used, but, please note, under the maximal supervision of recollection.”342  This 
forgetting is co-constitutive of the selectivity operative in the poetic representation of one’s 
life; through recollecting and forgetting, the aesthete selects only certain features from 
actual life – those features that are able to be recast into an interesting narrative – and 
ignores the rest. 
In the ordinary understanding of these faculties, recollecting and forgetting are 
associated solely with the past – one either recollects or forgets a past experience.  In the 
theory of crop rotation, however, these faculties are employed not simply to create 
representations of past experiences; rather, they have both retrospective and prospective 
intentions and are used to ideate one’s own life across all temporal modes.  For instance, 
the aesthete says: “But to forget is an art that must be practiced in advance.  To be able to 
forget always depends upon how one remembers, but how one remembers depends on how 
one experiences actuality.”343  David Stern summarizes this point well: “This cultivation 
and creation of possibility can be seen as a constant writing or fictionalizing of experience 
for present enjoyment and a rewriting or editing of it for future use and remembrance.”344  
Recollection and forgetting are used to create a narrative of one’s whole life and thereby 
need to produce an explanation of the past experiences that shape one’s present identity 
and that will determine how future experiences will be processed and adapted to fit this 
narrative.  This poetic narrative accounts for who one has been, but it must be constructed 
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in such a way that new experiences can be seamlessly assimilated into this fabricated 
identity. 
These two capacities are requisite for being able to freely poeticize a narrative of 
one’s life that only partially reflects actuality; recollection and forgetting together effect a 
conscious refining of one’s experiences, such that certain aspects are filtered out and others 
are preserved.  Such a poetic reconstruction involves the simultaneous preservation of an 
experience through recollection – the actuality of some experience must be posited, so as 
to provide the content of the reconstruction – and annihilation of that experience through 
forgetting – the actuality of the experience must be negated, so that it can be poetically 
reconstructed.  Both of these elements are necessary for the poetic construction: 
recollection provides the poet with the content of the poetic construction, and forgetting 
liberates the poet from the mere representation of its actual experiences. 
This novelization of life only overcomes boredom with the proper balance of 
recollecting and forgetting.  The creative interplay of recollecting-forgetting works to 
produce an "inexhaustible variation" within one’s experiences, such that boredom does not 
set in.345  Through this interplay, one is able to maximally cultivate amusement and interest 
in one’s various experiences; analogous to the farmer, one becomes increasingly 
resourceful with one’s experiences with this interplay.  This rotation method culminates in 
the following: “When an individual has perfected himself in the art of forgetting and 
recollection in this way, he is then able to play shuttlecock with all existence.”346  Through 
this poeticizing, existence is made interesting – one reimagines even the most boring 
situations so as to be amused by the same.  Every experience can be made interesting 
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through this poetic recollecting-forgetting, and boredom can be avoided through this 
project of romanticizing existence. 
When properly enacted, this twofold art of recollecting and forgetting maintains the 
balance between pure fantasy and pure realism, but thereby evinces a particular perception 
of and relationship to actuality.  A disproportionate employment of either art would 
compromise this balance: excessive forgetting in the absence of recollecting would tend 
toward fantasy, while recollecting without a concurrent forgetting would produce an overly 
realistic representation.  In the balance of these arts, actuality assumes a particular position; 
the aesthete does not feel bound to view its life and its experiences as they actually are, 
such that the intensive form of crop rotation requires a disengagement and disregard for 
actuality.  Recollecting and forgetting are precisely means of distancing oneself from 
actuality, so as to be able to freely recreate it.  Successful crop rotation, accordingly, 
involves a depreciation of actuality, such that the aesthete feels no respect toward the same: 
Thus nil admirari [marvel at nothing] is the proper wisdom of life.  No part of life 
ought to have so much meaning for a person that he cannot forget it any moment 
he wants to; on the other hand, every single part of life ought to have so much 
meaning for a person that he can remember it at any moment.347 
Actuality is invalidated within this strategy of crop rotation, to the extent that the former is 
viewed only as providing the material for the aesthete’s poiesis.  The aesthete feels no 
obligation to represent life as it actually is; instead, one’s actual experiences are only raw 
material to be freely recast or ignored in the imaginary construction, and such experiences 
represent “inexhaustible material for amusement.”348  Here, the worldlessness 
characteristic of romanticism is present; the aesthetic method of crop rotation involves an 
347 Ibid, 293. 
348 Kierkegaard, Either/Or II, 159. 
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ironic relation to actuality, such that one’s concrete situation is acknowledged only on the 
condition that it is interesting.  Harries notes: 
Implicit in the search for the interesting is thus a rejection of the place we have been 
assigned by the situation in which we find ourselves.  The search for the interesting 
is essentially a flight from reality.  Reality furnishes only the point of departure, 
only the occasion.349 
The disparity between the poetic construction and the actual world is not a concern for the 
aesthete, to the extent that the latter is dedicated solely to amusement. 
For the aesthete, the metric that determines the successful application of these 
faculties of forgetting and recollecting is not the accuracy of the narrative, for one’s actual 
life tends to be boring and an accurate representation of such a life would be just as boring; 
rather, since the purpose of the intensive method of crop rotation is to avoid boredom, the 
successful application of the arts of recollection and forgetting is indicated by the amusing 
nature of the narrative.  Successful crop rotation produces a narrative of one’s own life that 
makes living interesting.  Moreover, it is not simply life as a whole that becomes interesting 
through this method; particular experiences and activities become interesting 
corresponding to the way that they are perceived as contributing to this total narrative. 
While the purpose of the narrative is to make life enjoyable, this enjoyment is not 
achieved simply through forgetting unpleasant experiences and recollecting pleasant ones.  
Regarding this point, the aesthetic pseudonym is careful to note that such an approach 
would be both an inartistic application of these capacities and one that would actually 
compromise enjoyment.  While forgetting the unpleasant and recollecting the pleasant 
seems appropriate, the aesthetic pseudonym notes that, when retrospectively apprehended, 
even pleasant experiences become unpleasant: “the pleasant as a bygone, specifically as a 
349 Harries, 97. 
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bygone, has an intrinsic unpleasantness with which it can awaken a sense of loss […].”350  
Accordingly, the aesthete suggests that forgetting “ought to be related to the pleasant just 
as much as to the unpleasant.”351  More to the point, though, the aesthetic pseudonym does 
not intend for these capacities to produce enjoyment simply by recalling pleasant 
experiences and ignoring unpleasant ones; instead, forgetting is supposed to purify 
experiences of all qualities.  David Stern explains: 
Experience must be carefully controlled and manipulated so that it is relieved of 
any intrinsic meaning or significance it might have and becomes wholly the product 
of our cultivating activity.352 
Forgetting is supposed to provide the poetic consciousness with unqualified material, 
which it can recollectively shape into whatever form is amusing.  Actual experiences are 
only supposed to be the raw materials used to construct the amusing narrative of one’s life.  
Forgetting involves a purification of actuality, stripping away any significance from actual 
experiences (including their original pleasantness), so that they can be poetically imbued 
with a new meaning; “forgetting is the right expression for the proper assimilation that 
reduces experience to a sounding board.”353 
Given its reflective nature, the intensive method of crop rotation is conditioned by 
the distinction between first- and second-order enjoyment.  That the aesthetic “eye must be 
changed out” suggests that boredom is best avoided not through the endless pursuit of first-
order enjoyments, which would eventually become boring, but through the cultivation of 
one’s reflective and poetic capacities, which constitute the organ for second-order 
enjoyment.  As Harries notes, the intensive method of crop rotation is founded on the belief 
350 Kierkegaard, Either/Or I, 294. 
351 Ibid. 
352 Stern, “Ties,” 261. 
353 Kierkegaard, Either/Or I, 294. 
144 
that interest is not an objective property of a given experience, but rather “interest is 
something with which the individual endows the situation.”354  Moreover: “The situation 
furnishes only the occasion.  The interesting is thus a meaning discovered in what is in 
itself meaningless.”355  The intensive method seeks to achieve enjoyment by endowing the 
situation with interest through the creation of a poeticized story of one’s life.  What the 
intensive method of crop rotation recommends is not the pursuit of first-order enjoyment, 
which would be tied to changes in place or in activity, but a second-order enjoyment 
achieved through the self-referential and reflective project of composing oneself poetically. 
That the intensive method is designed for the achievement of second-order 
enjoyment indicates that it has utility and importance only for the reflective aesthete, since, 
prior to reflective aestheticism, there is no consciousness of the meaninglessness of 
existence, of the boredom that arises therefrom, and of the concurrent desire for more 
reflective pleasure.  Moreover, this strategy of poetically reimagining experience is viewed 
as necessary for the reflective aesthete’s commitment to enjoying life, to the extent that 
ordinary experience is incapable of providing enjoyment.  Kierkegaard says the following 
of the aesthete: 
And there is nothing to divert you; all the worldly pleasures are meaningless to you, 
and even if  you envy the simple their foolish joy in life, you do not go in pursuit 
of it.  Pleasure tempts you not.356 
The aesthetic pseudonym confirms a preference for second-order enjoyment, saying: “Real 
enjoyment consists not in what one enjoys but in the idea.”357  He adds: 
My soul has lost possibility.  If I were to wish for something, I would wish not for 
wealth or power but for the passion of possibility, for the eye, eternally young, 
354 Harries, 96. 
355 Ibid. 
356 Kierkegaard, Either/Or II, 205. 
357 Kierkegaard, Either/Or I, 31. 
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eternally ardent, that sees possibility everywhere.  Pleasure disappoints; possibility 
does not.  And what wine is so sparkling, so fragrant, so intoxicating!358 
The intensive method stems from the need to recover an interest in the world that has been 
lost, as previously intimated in relation to Kierkegaard’s comments on Faust.  Having 
become disillusioned by the life of immediacy, the aesthete cannot be satisfied by the 
pursuit of first-order pleasures.  The necessity and urgency of the intensive method stems 
from both the aesthete’s inability to experience pleasure through first-order enjoyment and 
the correlative desire for some higher form of pleasure; the experienced insufficiency of 
immediate enjoyment, which stems from the nihilism of aesthetic consciousness, 
necessitates the rotation method for the production of more reflective enjoyment.  It is with 
the disillusionment of first-order pleasure that the need to recover pleasure in a more 
sophisticated and artificial manner emerges.  David Stern explains this transition as 
follows: 
The “whole previous world” lost to the aesthete is, of course, the naive and innocent 
enjoyment of what the world affords us, in the absence of which poiesis – the 
reflective pursuit of activity devised by the will or ego as a means of creating a 
second immediacy – comes more and more into the foreground.359 
The intensive method of crop rotation is a strategy of recovery.  In accordance with this 
method, one does not seek pleasure through immediate experiences; rather, one seeks 
pleasure in the poetic reconstruction of experience.  This shift to reflective enjoyment 
evinces the Faustian need for distraction; the poiesis through which the world is reimagined 
precisely distracts one away from one’s nihilistic perception of the world as empty.  The 
358 Ibid, 41.  The aesthetic pseudonym also laments the paltriness of ordinary pleasures at ibid, 22, 27-28, 
29. 
359 Stern, “Ties,” 260-261. 
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sensuous world in its immediacy is insufficiently satisfying, but the fantastic world that the 
aesthete poetically constructs from it is not. 
This calculating pursuit of secondary enjoyment distinguishes reflective 
aestheticism from more immediate forms of the same.  Adherence to this rotation method 
makes it clear that the reflective aesthete, despite living for enjoyment, does not recklessly 
or unselfconsciously pursue the satisfaction of  immediate desire; rather, as Mackey notes, 
this sophisticated aestheticism requires strict self-discipline: “The art of living is neither an 
impossible self-denial nor a prodigal self-squandering, but the most fastidious self-
discipline.”360  The achievement of balance between recollecting and forgetting in the 
novelization of existence requires the careful application of what the aesthete calls the 
“principle of limitation.”361  Living artistically is only successful if one limits the quantity 
of recollection and forgetting involved in the construction of the narrative for one’s life.  
Just as the farmer must limit agrarian activities so as to only cultivate certain crops at 
certain times, the aesthete must also limit what is recollected and what is forgotten in its 
experiences, in order to best overcome boredom.  This is why recollection and forgetting 
are presented not simply as mental faculties but as arts – recollection and forgetting require 
technique.  The decisions regarding what is recollected or forgotten require that one 
become a “meticulous observer” of one’s own life, carefully weighing the poetic potential 
of each experience.362 
While this method involves strict self-discipline, it does not require complete 
control over one’s circumstances.  To the contrary, the aesthetic pseudonym encourages 
360 Mackey, 10. 




openness to the accidental occurrences in life.  What makes the accidental so appealing to 
the aesthete is the unpredictable nature of the same.  One’s concrete situation provides the 
raw material of the poetic construction.  Accordingly, the more diversity in this situation, 
the more content for creation.  The aesthete strives to be open to any situation: “By seizing 
the occasion – any occasion – and turning it to capricious ends, he makes and unmakes his 
situation as it pleases him.”363 
Furthermore, both this self-discipline and openness to accidental occurrences 
requires a guardedness against all interpersonal relationships, which further explains the 
aesthetic distancing from actuality; not only must one distance oneself from actuality 
through recollecting and forgetting, one must also distance oneself from others and avoid 
ethical commitments in order to avoid boredom.  Specifically, the aesthetic pseudonym 
recommends against forming friendships, getting married, or assuming an official post.364  
The issue with such committed social relationships is twofold.  First, commitment to other 
persons obliges one to act in certain ways, thereby limiting one’s freedom and 
independence, which, in turn, compromises one’s ability to spontaneously and arbitrarily 
“play shuttlecock with all existence.”  The aesthetic pseudonym explains: 
One must always guard against contracting a life relationship by which one can 
become many. […] If an individual is many, he has lost his freedom and cannot 
order his riding boots when he wishes, cannot knock about according to whim.365 
 
Second, through such relationships, one often “falls into a very deadly continuity with 
custom.”366  Interpersonal relationships tend to be structured around predictable and 
 
363 Mackey, 11. 
364 Kierkegaard, Either/Or I, 295, 296, 298. 
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repetitious activities, which quickly become boring.  For these reasons, avoiding social 
commitments is recommended for the facilitation of crop rotation. 
To be clear, it is not the case that the aesthete recommends the complete and lasting 
avoidance of interpersonal relationships, especially since the latter are obviously often 
sources of enjoyment and amusement.  The aesthetic pseudonym explains: 
But just because one stays clear of friendship, one will not for that reason live 
without contact with people.  On the contrary, these relationships can take a deeper 
turn now and then, provided that one always – even though keeping the same pace 
for a time – has enough reserve speed to run away from them.367 
If one is to be able to use interpersonal relationships as a source of amusement while 
avoiding the boredom that tends to arise therefrom, one must maintain such relationships 
in such a way that one could always flee from them: “The experienced farmer lets his land 
lie fallow now and then; the theory of social prudence recommends the same thing.”368  To 
minimize boredom, one must be able to preserve one’s freedom and independence, so as 
to avoid the obligating and customary consequences of interpersonal relationships.  The 
goal of such preservation is to avoid “foundering in any particular relationship in life 
[…].”369    The aesthete views the ethical life precisely as one of boredom: 
The ethical is just as boring in scholarship as in life. […] Under the esthetic sky, 
everything is buoyant, beautiful, transient; when ethics arrives on the scene, 
everything becomes harsh, angular, infinitely langweiligt.370 
Avoiding such relationships allows one to live arbitrarily, which is key for avoiding 
boredom.  Explaining the aesthetic dismissal of ethical relations, Harries says: 
[T]he bored individual is essentially amoral, not immoral.  To be moral or immoral
we have to recognize certain claims.  We have to have a sense that certain actions
ought to, or ought not to be done.  To the bored individual the world does not
367 Ibid, 295-6. 
368 Ibid, 296. 
369 Ibid, 295. 
370 Ibid, 367. 
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present such oughts.  It is silent.  That is why he is an amoralist.  Everything is 
allowed and nothing is worth doing.371 
To the aesthete, the world seems devoid of all meaning, and the aesthete does not feel 
obligated to act in any particular way in the world, taking itself to be instead licensed to 
pursue amusement however it pleases. 
While Kierkegaard’s essay on crop rotation does not include detailed illustrations 
of the intensive strategy, such illustration is provided by the final essay of Either/Or: Part 
I, “The Seducer’s Diary.”372  This diary is preceded by a brief introduction by the 
pseudonymous author of the first volume of Either/Or, in which the author denounces 
having written the diary, claiming instead to have simply found it and transcribed its 
content.373  The diary itself, titled “Commentarius perpetuus no. 4,” is written by a man 
named “Johannes” (no doubt an allusion to Don Giovanni/Juan), who is a reflective 
aesthete that has clearly mastered the art of crop rotation: “his life has been an attempt to 
accomplish this task of living poetically.”374  In this diary, Johannes outlines his carefully 
constructed project of amusing himself through the seduction of a girl named “Cordelia 
Wahl,” combining narrative of and commentary on the events contributing to the seduction. 
Because Johannes’ aestheticism is reflective, his commitment to seduction is far 
from ordinary.  Whereas a less reflective aesthete like Don Giovanni would view the goal 
of seduction as sexual conquest, Johannes is disillusioned by such immediate pleasure and 
371 Harries, 93. 
372 Regarding this connection between the two essays, cf. Kemp, 6; Stern, “Ties,” 263. 
373 The pseudonymous editor of Either/Or, Victor Eremita, says the following regarding the authorship of 
the diary: “The last of A’s papers is a narrative titled ‘The Seducer’s Diary.’  Here we meet new difficulties, 
inasmuch as A does not declare himself the author but only the editor.  This is an old literary device to which 
I would not have much to object if it did not further complicate my own position, since one author becomes 
enclosed within the other like the boxes in a Chinese puzzle” (Kierkegaard, Either/Or I, 8-9). 
374 Ibid, 303, 304. 
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instead seduces for the twofold goal of avoiding boredom and achieving amusement; he 
says: “I fear neither comic nor tragic predicaments; the only ones I fear are the lanweilige 
ones.”375  Correlatively, Johannes is committed to the seduction of Cordelia, because such 
seduction furnishes him with interesting content that can accommodate his primary project 
of living poetically.  Highlighting his difference from a Don Giovanni, Johannes explains: 
“I do not care at all to possess the girl in the external sense but wish to enjoy her 
artistically.”376 
At no point is Johannes concerned with his relationship with Cordelia, rather, as 
Taylor notes, Johannes “seeks to bring about interesting situations that he can observe 
[…],” and it is for the sake of such observation that this aesthete strives at all.377  Prior to 
even becoming involved with Cordelia, Johannes has already projected some idea what it 
would take to make the relationship interesting for him.  He is not interested simply in 
seduction or in sexual conquest.  Instead, he devises a complicated plan for his relationship 
with Cordelia.   First, he wants to become engaged to Cordelia without himself proposing 
to her.  He accomplishes this by befriending Cordelia’s guardian (i.e., her aunt) and 
explaining to her his difficulty in finding a suitable partner, in response to which the 
guardian suggests that Johannes marry Cordelia and arranges their engagement.  Second, 
once they are engaged, Johannes wants Cordelia to freely decide to break off the 
engagement, while at the same time fully devoting herself to him.  He accomplishes this 
by leaving books of poetry at her house that emphasize the erotic dimensions of love, 
knowing that she will peruse these books in his absence, by taking her to parties for 
375 Ibid, 328. 
376 Ibid, 372. 
377 Taylor, 168. 
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engaged couples, knowing that such parties showcase the paltriness of the institution of 
marriage, and by even arguing with her about the importance of marriage, albeit designing 
his arguments to fall flat and thereby serve to convince Cordelia of the unimportance of 
the institution.  Johannes does all of this in an attempt to subtly influence Cordelia to come 
to the belief that “love does not need an external bond, which is only a hindrance,” at which 
point he hopes that she will break off the engagement out of her unhindered love for him.378  
Johannes works to bring all of this about for no other reason than that he happens to find 
this series of events interesting for reflection. 
Johannes is not committed to the seduction of Cordelia because he finds the 
activities and results of seduction themselves to be interesting; rather what is interesting is 
the narrative of his own life that he composes for himself from out of the elements of his 
actual relationship, and it is for the sake of acquiring material for this narrative that he is 
committed to the project of seduction.  Westphal explains: “But the diarist is so highly 
reflective that most if not all of his delight in seducing Cordelia comes from watching 
himself do it and writing himself up.”379  Accordingly, Johannes does not view seduction 
simply as a way to attract a woman; rather, as Mackey explains, seduction for Johannes “is 
a kind of poiesis worked in the medium of woman’s sexuality.”380    For this reason, 
Johannes denounces being called a seducer, saying instead: “I am an esthete, an eroticist 
[…].”381  Kierkegaard explains: “he was much too endowed intellectually to be a seducer 
in the ordinary sense.”382 
378 Kierkegaard, Either/Or I, 425. 
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That Johannes’ account of his seduction is presented in the form of a diary is not 
incidental but is paramount to the kind of enjoyment he seeks.  Peder Jothen notes: “The 
form of the text is crucial: it is a diary, meaning its aesthetic genre is itself an imaginative 
retelling of the seductive acts […].”383  Johannes pursues a reflective enjoyment in the 
poetic perception of the relationship, and the diary itself is the manifestation of this 
enjoyment.  The first-order enjoyments of the seduction are the particular conversations, 
exchanged love-letters, encounters, caresses, and so on.  The second-order enjoyment, with 
which Johannes is primarily concerned, is the self-observation maintained during the 
seduction – it is Johannes’ poetic reflection upon himself in the act of seduction.  It is for 
the sake of this second-order enjoyment that Johannes seduces Cordelia; the seduction 
facilitates a project of living poetically, through which the seducer makes his life 
interesting for himself and thereby avoids boredom.  It is precisely his perception of the 
relationship – informed just as must by his imagination as by actual events – that is pleasing 
to Johannes. 
To the extent that the diary is a manifestation of Johannes’ poetic imagination, it is 
by no means an accurate representation of the relationship: the “diary is not historically 
accurate or strictly narrative; it is not indicative but subjunctive.”384  The diary is not simply 
a retelling of events that constitute the seduction of Cordelia; instead, the diary represents 
Johannes’ poetic consciousness over the course of the seduction.  Johannes possesses a 
“poetic nature, which is not abundant enough or, if you please, not deficient enough to 
separate poetry and actuality from each other.”385  Moreover: “With a sharply developed 
383 Peder Jothen, Kierkegaard, Aesthetics, and Selfhood: The Art of Subjectivity (Burlingon: Ashgate, 2014), 
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organ for discovering the interesting in life, he has known how to find it and after having 
found it has continually reproduced his experiences half poetically.”386 
Appropriate for the intensive method of crop rotation, there is no ethical concern 
for Cordelia.  David Stern explains her role within Johannes’ project: 
At this extreme development of aesthetic reflection, Cordelia the individual seems 
no longer needed, no longer even genuinely present.  For Johannes, the radically 
active ego, it is not Cordelia as such, not the actual person encountered in lived 
experience, who is of interest.  Rather it is the activities – Johannes’ plans, schemes, 
tactics, campaigns, etc. – that are crucial […].387 
 
Johannes exhibits no ethical concern for anyone described in the diary, but instead he is 
wholly concerned with creating interesting situations; the primary question guiding his life 
is the following: “Has the interesting been preserved at all times?”388  Johannes maintains 
a poetic distance from actuality, viewing it merely as the source of material for his poetic 
invention; in this way: “He did not belong to the world of actuality, and yet he had very 
much to do with it.”389 
Johannes is a reflective aesthete who employs the intensive method of crop rotation 
to avoid boredom through numerous amorous drifts; his life is lived artistically through a 
narrative of love.  Amorous relationships never become boring for this seducer, because 
every affair fulfills a different poetically constructed narrative.  The goals of the Johannes’ 
various affairs are not uniform; rather, each affair has a unique goal based on the kind of 
fulfillment that Johannes is inclined to pursue at a given moment.  Johannes writes in his 
diary: 
The art is to be as receptive as possible to impressions, to know what impression 
one is making and what impression one has of each girl.  In that way, one can be in 
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love with many girls at the same time, because one is in love in a different way with 
each one.  To love one girl is too little; to love all is superficiality; to know oneself 
and to love as many as possible, to let one’s soul conceal all the powers of love 
inside itself so that each receives its specific nourishment while the consciousness 
nevertheless embraces the whole – that is enjoyment, that is living.390 
The task of this seducer is to maximize amusement by carefully constructing romantic 
narratives for each potential affair.  In this way, each additional affair continues to be 
interesting.  The main story of seduction in the diary does not culminate so much in the 
sexual consummation of the relationship between Johannes and Cordelia, but in the fact 
that Cordelia maintains her love for Johannes despite having broken their engagement 
herself.  The reflection upon the structure of the relationship is what Johannes finds 
pleasing. 
390 Ibid, 361. This is probably an allusion to Don Giovanni, Lucinde, or both.  In Don Giovanni, the titular 
character says: “It’s all love; whoever is faithful only to one is cruel to others; I, who feel such ample 
sentiment in myself, love all of them; and since women don’t comprehend things, they call my natural 
goodness deceit” (Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, Mozart’s Don Giovanni, trans. Ellen H. Bleiler (New York: 
Dover, 1964), 67).  In Lucinde, Julius (one of the novel’s protagonists) says: “Actually, one ought to play at 
loving all women. […] Now, listen carefully to what I’m saying; not actually all of them, but only those who 
are lovable and whom one happens to run across” (Friedrich Schlegel, Lucinde and the Fragments, trans. 
Peter Firchow (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), 73). 
CHAPTER 4. THE ETHICAL LIFE-VIEW AND THE OVERCOMING
OF AESTHETICISM AND ITS BORDOM 
4.1 Overview of the Aesthetic and Ethical Views of Life 
The reflectively aesthetic life, with its pervasive boredom and desperate 
compulsion to seek distraction through a form of poetically living that involves total 
subordination of ethical concerns to amusement, is sharply contrasted by the life-view 
presented by Kierkegaard in the second volume of Either/Or.  This volume is written from 
the perspective of an ethicist – identified in the text as “[Judge] William” – and expresses 
Kierkegaard’s ethical life-view.391  The second volume of Either/Or consists of letters 
written specifically to the aesthetic pseudonymous writer of the first volume; through his 
pseudonymous character of Judge William, Kierkegaard attempts to explain to this aesthete 
how the aesthetic life involves an inadequate form of self-consciousness and how the 
ethical life-view constitutes an alternative lifestyle to that of aestheticism.  In addition to 
critically analyzing aestheticism, the Judge advances his own ethical view of life in his 
letters.  This life-view revolves around a conception of self-determination that accentuates 
personal freedom and responsibility and ultimately constitutes an alternative cure to 
boredom – one that requires a fundamental shift in self-perception, rather than a mere 
masking of the experience through distracting fantastic representations of one’s life.  The 
ethical volume of Either/Or has a twofold goal of providing a description of the aesthetic 
life-view that in part diagnoses the source of aesthetic despair, depression, and boredom 
and of showing how the ethical life-view overcomes the limitations of aestheticism.  
Indirectly, this presentation of the ethical life-view also clarifies the sense in which irony 
391 Following the general trend in Kierkegaard scholarship, the term ethicist refers to both one who prescribes 
the adoption of an ethical life-view and one who instantiates such a life-view – Judge William is both. 
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is to be mastered, insofar as it outlines the proper relation to actuality that the individual 
person is supposed to maintain in order to overcome nihilism and alienation. 
In explication of the ethical life-view, Kierkegaard presentatively juxtaposes the 
ethical view of life to that of aestheticism, advancing the ethical view with a simultaneous 
critical analysis of reflective aestheticism.   Incorporating elements from his dissertative 
critique of Romanticism, Kierkegaard suggests that aestheticism represents an inadequate 
view of selfhood, which, more determinately, includes an inadequate view of freedom, 
possibility, action, and responsibility.  To the extent that the aesthete misunderstands these 
essential features of selfhood, the aesthetic person lives a life characterized by despair, 
depression, and boredom.  In Kierkegaard’s account, the aesthetic life-view stems from a 
hyperbolic conception of agency – one that overemphasizes the negative moment of 
freedom, wherewith the person is liberated from acting merely in accord with its natural 
and social order.  The aesthetic individual has achieved an awareness of itself as free, such 
that it recognizes itself as possessing the capacity to act contrary to natural tendencies or 
socially determined norms, but the aesthete has not found any positive justification for 
acting in any particular way and is left in a state of emptiness.  The aesthetic personality 
revolves around a nihilistic perception that all activity is ultimately pointless, such that it 
does not matter how one acts, and this nihilism evinces a specific conception of freedom: 
the aesthetic person perceives itself as free from any source of obligation, such that action 
becomes pointless.  The aesthete conceives of freedom purely negatively, attributing to 
itself a freedom from all compulsion but failing to recognize any positive reasons for 
acting.  As Kierkegaard notes, this conception of freedom has consequences for how the 
aesthetic personality orients itself in its world.  Since the aesthete views itself as free from 
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all sources of obligation, it does not recognize itself as bound to its actual situation in any 
decisive way.  Furthermore, it does not even perceive itself as responsible for its own 
actions, since it considers itself free from that as well.  The aesthete does not admit any 
responsibility for its life or for its deeds. 
The ethical pseudonym argues that this aesthetic life-view results in despair, 
depression, and boredom, insofar as the aesthetic life has no integrity and consistency.  In 
the ethicist’s view, a life has integrity and consistency only when it is positively oriented 
around particular projects, but having such projects requires commitment, which the 
aesthete avoids.  There is no integrity and consistency in the aesthetic life, because the 
aesthetic individual does not accept any responsibility for how it shapes itself and its world 
through its actions, preferring instead to maintain a distance from all forms of 
commitments, so as to be able to freely pursue amusement.  Since the aesthete submits to 
no sense of obligation or responsibility, all actions are viewed as trivial, and, consequently, 
the aesthete is bored with existence.  Because life is boring, the aesthete yearns for another 
way of living but cannot see a reason to commit to anything, the result of which is 
depression.  Kierkegaard understands depression as precisely the feeling of being 
constrained or trapped by one’s own life-view.392  Finally, the aesthete despairs; given the 
pervasive experience of boredom and depression, the aesthete no longer wishes to be 
itself.393 
392 Kierkegaard, Either/Or II, 188-189. 
393 Ibid, 218-219 
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4.2 Self-Choice and Ethical Personality 
Kierkegaard presents the ethical views of life and of action explicitly in contrast to 
the views advanced in the first volume of Either/Or.  The aesthete views actions as 
pointless and inconsequential, claiming that “the quintessence of all the wisdom of life” is 
the recognition that it does not matter what one does, insofar as every course of action is 
equally pointless and terminates in a regret for having chosen at all.394  In Kierkegaard’s 
assessment, this view stems from a misunderstanding of the nature of selfhood – a 
misunderstanding that is corrected in the ethical view of life, such that the latter represents 
a more advanced stage of personal development by expressing a more adequate conception 
of what it is to be a self.  The aesthetic understanding of action as trivial renders choosing 
or not choosing to be a matter of indifference, culminating the following belief, which 
highlights the indifference of action and the consequent boredom: “I can either do this or 
do that, but whichever I do is equally absurd – ergo, I do nothing at all.”395 
In contradistinction to the aesthetic belief in the triviality of action, the ethical 
pseudonym emphasizes the importance of action for projects of self-development.  The 
ethicist’s theory of agency revolves around the concept of “self-choice,” which is presented 
both to critique aestheticism and to found the ethical life-view.  In the ethical theory of 
action, there is, as Taylor notes, a distinction between two “levels” of choice that constitute 
the agency of personality.396  At one level, there is what is ordinarily understood as a 
choice: “the deliberate resolution to attempt to realize one’s possibilities, or to strive to 
achieve some goal.”397  At this level, one might choose to travel to Berlin or stay at home, 
394 Kierkegaard, Either/Or I, 39. 
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for instance.  Kierkegaard views such particular and concrete decisions as grounded in a 
more fundamental kind of choice – one in which one is said “to choose oneself.”  This self-
choice is not a choice of one particular self from out of a manifold of possible selves; at 
this level, it is not that one chooses this self or that self, but instead it is a decision to be 
the self that one is – it is a choosing to be oneself.   Taylor explains this conception of self-
choice in the following: 
This is the permeation of the self’s concrete actuality through self-reflection and 
the acceptance of that self as one’s own.  It involves the self’s recognition of one’s 
strengths, weaknesses, evil, and one’s close connection with the surrounding 
world.398 
While the reflective or recognitive aspect that Taylor highlights makes self-choice appear 
similar to mere self-knowledge, Kierkegaard considers self-choice to be more than an act 
of contemplation.  He explains the difference between self-knowledge and self-choice in 
the following manner: 
The ethical individual knows himself, but this knowing is not simply 
contemplation, for then the individual comes to be defined according to his 
necessity.  It is a collecting of oneself, which itself is an action, and this is why I 
have with aforethought used the expression “to choose oneself” instead of “to know 
oneself.”399 
The choice of self involves not only a knowledge of the various properties that constitute 
one’s identity, but also a conscious and freely enacted acceptance or affirmation of oneself 
as having those properties, such that self-choice has a decisional dimension that is absent 
is mere self-knowledge.  Kierkegaard understands this self-choice to ground the ordinary 
type of choice, to the extent one that can deliberately strive to realize one’s possibilities if 
398 Ibid, 195. 
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one knows and accepts who one is generally: “The original choice is forever present in 
every succeeding choice.”400 
For Kierkegaard, self-choice is the decisive and preeminent condition for 
personhood, such that one becomes a person only by recognizing that one is free and by 
correlatively assuming responsibility for oneself.  He explains: 
Just as an heir, even if he were heir to the treasures of the whole world, does not 
possess them before he comes of age, so the richest personality is nothing before 
he has chosen himself; and on the other hand even what might be called the poorest 
personality is everything when he has chosen himself, for the greatness is not to be 
this or that but to be oneself, and every human being can be this if he so wills it.401 
 
The choice is crucial for the content of the personality; through the choice the 
personality submerges itself in that which is being chosen, and when it does not 
choose, it withers away in atrophy.402 
 
For Kierkegaard, one can never passively or immediately be a person, but rather one must 
freely and deliberately choose to be a person and thereby assume responsibility for oneself.  
For this reason, he implies that the aesthete is not a person in the strict sense but possesses 
latent personality.  Kierkegaard understands self-choice as a recognition and acceptance of 
oneself as being both a free agent and responsible for one’s agency: “If you consider [a 
person] ethically, you consider him according to his freedom.”403  Personality is achieved 
when one assumes responsibility for oneself, and this assumption entails the free 
recognition and acceptance of one’s self, which is why Kierkegaard calls it a “self-choice.” 
This self-choice is the origin of a properly ethical life-view, which, for Kierkegaard, 
is not achieved through adherence to certain maxims, but rather it is achieved by 
maintaining a certain perception of and relation to oneself.  In advancing his conception of 
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an ethical way of life, Kierkegaard is not at all interested in recommending or prohibiting 
particular actions; instead, his emphasis is on viewing oneself as the sole author of one’s 
actions; in explanation of the self-choice, he says that “it is not so much a matter of 
choosing between willing good or willing evil as of choosing to will […].”404  Kierkegaard 
thinks that the achievement of the ethical life-view depends upon how one considers one’s 
actions, rather than on what one does.  As George Connell explains: “One does not become 
virtuous by and through particular virtuous actions; rather, one chooses to be ethical and 
only then is one able to carry out particular ethical actions.”405  Consequently, considered 
in terms of their particular actions, the ethically qualified person may not appear any 
different from the aesthetic person: “the person who lives ethically may do exactly the 
same as one who lives esthetically […].”406  The only difference between ethical and 
aesthetic individuals is how they view themselves as agents, not what they do.  For 
Kierkegaard, the ethical is not a lifestyle dedicated to adherence to particular maxims or to 
making objective judgments concerning the moral quality of actions.  Rather, the essence 
of the ethical life-view is the assumption of responsibility for who one is.  Mackey explains: 
“Ethics, for Judge Wilhelm, is not a matter of values but of being.  It is not in the first place 
a question of following a certain set of moral rules; it is the determination to become a 
certain kind of person.”407  Connell adds, the ethical life-view is concerned more with 
character formation, and it views “character formation as a basic action […].”408 
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The self-choice, then, is primarily an appropriative act, whereby the person assumes 
authority over itself and its actions.  Accordingly, the ethicist’s theory of personality 
involves a strong conception of autonomy.  While, in moments of deliberation, the ethical 
person may be influenced by various external forces, such as natural inclination or social 
pressure, this person nonetheless takes itself to be responsible for its submission to the 
influence of any external force.  Borrowing Kantian terminology, through the self-choice, 
an individual adopts the view of its will as being pathologically affected, but not 
pathologically necessitated: while the person may be influenced by natural or social forces, 
the person is nonetheless free to act in accordance with these external incentives or not.409  
In Kierkegaard’s theory, the person who has chosen itself consciously and freely takes 
possession of itself and thereby views itself as tasked with determinately shaping itself by 
negotiating the various influences upon its will; the person is aware of its influences and 
must decide how to act in relation thereto.  Regarding the person who assumes this self-
relation, Kierkegaard says: 
He then possesses himself as an individual who has these capacities, these passions, 
these inclinations, these habits, who is subject to these external influences, who is 
influenced in one direction thus and in another thus.  Here he then possesses himself 
as a task in such a way that it is chiefly to order, shape, temper, inflame, control – 
in short, to produce an evenness in the soul, a harmony, which is the fruit of the 
personal virtues.410 
Once personality takes responsibility for itself, it cannot excuse its behavior by appealing 
to the influence of external forces, since it is responsible for choosing to let itself succumb 
to any such force.  The ethical personality views all of its actions as unambiguously 
belonging to it by virtue of its recognition of freedom: “when the passion of freedom is 
409 Regarding this distinction, cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood 
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awakened, it is jealous of itself and by no means allows what belongs to a person and what 
does not to remain unspecified and confused.”411  The ethical personality views itself as 
the sole author of its life, such that it alone is responsible for its activity and inactivity. 
Furthermore, in this appropriative self-choice, one does not choose oneself in a 
finite manner, in the sense that one chooses oneself under certain qualifications or that one 
affirms certain properties at the exclusion of others.  Rather, as Connell notes, the ethical 
personality emerges through an unconditional and total affirmation of oneself: 
[I]n choosing oneself, it is not the particular characteristics that one has that
motivate the choice, it is the simple fact that one has them.  It is not the “content”
of the choice – that one is rich or poor, clever or slow – that matter in the first
instance, it is that those features stand in a certain formal relation to the self: that
the self can say of them: “mine.”  To choose oneself is to take up a stance of
responsible attention toward oneself as one finds oneself.412
One does not choose oneself because one is rich or healthy or the like; rather, in the self-
choice, one takes responsibility for oneself as such, irrespective of the particular qualities 
that are possessed by that self.  All of one’s properties – for better or worse – are 
appropriated in the self-choice, such that the ethical personality assumes responsibility for 
them all. 
4.3 The Ethical Conception of Selfhood – The Natural and Spiritual 
Selves 
The enactment of the appropriative self-choice involves a significant shift in the 
person’s conception of itself and of its actions.  Prior to the self-choice, one perceives one’s 
identity as being dictated by circumstance, by the various life-events that befall oneself, 
and by external forces over which one has no control.  The ethically accentuated 
411 Ibid, 223. 
412 Connell, 60. 
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personality, however, takes responsibility for these accidental features; the adoption of an 
ethical attitude toward oneself involves taking ownership of one’s life, such that one 
considers oneself as solely responsible for one’s existence, even though one did not create 
oneself.  Peter Mehl summarizes this point in the following: “Shaping one’s self self-
consciously…is the core of the ethical.”413  Kierkegaard stresses this by explaining that the 
distinction between accidental and essential properties assumes a new significance for the 
ethical personality.  Of the ethical person, he says: 
Everything that is posited in his freedom belongs to him essentially, however 
accidental it may seem to be; everything that is not posited in his freedom is 
accidental, however essential it may seem to be.414 
The individual becomes ethical “not by brushing off his accidental qualities, but by 
remaining in them and ennobling them.  But he ennobles them by choosing them.”415  The 
ethical person views its identity as self-determined: its essence is not simply dictated by 
nature but determined through one’s freedom.  The ethical identity is determined by what 
it freely and deliberately posits as its own. 
In explanation of this shift in self-perception, Kierkegaard outlines two different 
conceptions of selfhood – the natural and the spiritual.  Prior to the ethical choice, one 
perceives one’s self merely as a product of nature, whereby one’s identity is necessarily 
determined.  This natural self is determined by one’s body, one’s physical and temporal 
location in the world, one’s innate capacities and talents, and so on – whatever properties 
one has naturally.  In this view, one’s identity is considered simply to be a “specific product 
413 Peter J. Mehl, Thinking Through Kierkegaard: Existential Identity in a Pluralistic World (Urbana: 
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of a specific environment.”416  Corresponding to this perception of oneself merely as a 
natural product is a mundane form of living, wherewith “a person is bound up with all the 
earthly life […].”417  To the extent that the self is viewed purely naturally, being a self 
entails simply taking care of one’s natural needs and desires.  Kierkegaard says that, for 
such a personality, “spirit,” that is, the state of selfhood wherein one posits oneself as free 
and responsible, “is not qualified as spirit but is immediately qualified.”418  When spirit is 
immediately qualified, the ethical personality is only latently present in the individual; this 
individual has the capacity to choose itself, but this appropriation has not yet been enacted.  
In this state of immediacy, being oneself is considered to be a purely natural occurrence, 
rather than as something that one achieves through an assumption of responsibility, such 
that, in this immediacy, “spirit is still not qualified as spirit but as a gift.”419  From the 
natural perspective, being a self is seen as gift from nature, which entails that one’s identity 
is viewed as something already produced, rather than as something that one is to produce. 
 To this natural conception of selfhood, Kierkegaard juxtaposes a spiritual one, 
wherewith one freely and deliberately chooses to be the self that one is.  As spirit, one takes 
responsibility for the self that one naturally is, which entails that the self is precisely no 
longer viewed as a mere product of nature, but as something over which one has authority 
and for which one is thereby responsible: “As a product [a person] is squeezed into the 
forms of actuality; in the choice he makes himself elastic, transforms everything exterior 
into interiority.”420  When the individual engages in this self-appropriation, “he possesses 
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himself as posited by himself – that is, as chosen by himself, as free […].”421  Through this 
act of self-positing, whereby one takes responsibility for oneself, spirit emerges.  
Kierkegaard describes this self-positing in the following manner: “whereas nature is 
created from nothing, whereas I myself as immediate personality am created from nothing, 
I as free spirit […] am born through my choosing myself.”422  In self-choice, one does not 
create oneself from nothing but posits oneself, in the sense that one accepts authority over 
a self that one did not oneself create.  In the state of immediacy, one’s identity is a dispersed 
set of empirical determinations that belong to one naturally.  To achieve spiritual unity, the 
person has “to gather itself together out of this dispersion, so to speak, and to transfigure 
itself in itself […].”423  This gathering and transfiguration is achieved when the self chooses 
to view itself as something that it freely determines and for which it is responsible for 
determining. 
Whereas the natural self views its identity as being necessarily determined by 
nature, the spiritual self recognizes that it determines its own identity through its choices, 
such that self-determination is the defining feature of ethical personality.  Kierkegaard uses 
this distinction to highlight the difference between aesthetic and ethical conceptions of self.  
Whereas the aesthetic forms of life maintain a natural view of the self, to the extent that 
they view the meaning and purpose of their lives as determined by natural circumstance, 
the ethical form of life is achieved through the self-positing of spirit, whereby one takes 
responsibility for one’s own self-determination.  In the ethical life, it is precisely through 
one’s deliberate activity and inactivity that one develops oneself: “Here his task is not to 
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form himself but to act, and yet he forms himself at the same time […].”424  By assuming 
responsibility for itself, the ethical person views “the process of actualizing himself” to be 
its preeminent task or duty, to which all others are ancillary: “he possesses himself as a 
task that has been assigned to him, even though it became this by his own choosing.”425  
The primary goal of the ethical life is self-determination, and this task determines all 
subordinate goals, in the sense that the latter are viewed as particular ways in which one 
determines oneself.  For example, an individual’s particular choice to travel to Berlin in 
order to study philosophy is a manifestation of who that individual is as a person; this 
choice to travel is self-determining. 
Despite the shift from the natural conception of selfhood to the spiritual one that is 
effected by the appropriative self-choice, Kierkegaard paradoxically says that the self 
changes but is the same: the ethical person “does not become someone other than he was 
before, but he becomes himself.  The consciousness integrates, and he is himself.”426  In 
the self-choice, it is precisely the self that one already is that is chosen, yet this self assumes 
new significance: 
This self that he chooses in this way is infinitely concrete, for it is he himself, and 
yet it is absolutely different from his former self, for he has chosen it absolutely.  
This self has not existed before, because it came into existence through the choice, 
and yet it has existed, for it was indeed “himself.”427 
One becomes a “free spirit” when one consciously and responsibly accepts the natural self 
that one already is.  In this way, the self must already exist before the choice, but, in another 
sense, it is also brought into existence through the choice: 
424 Ibid, 263. 
425 Ibid, 259, 262.  Regarding this notion of being oneself as a task, cf. ibid, 251, 260. 
426 Ibid, 177. 
427 Ibid, 215. 
168 
What I choose, I do not posit, for if it were not posited I could not choose it, and 
yet if I did not posit it by choosing it then I would not choose it.  It is, for if it were 
not I could not choose it; it is not, for it first comes into existence through my 
choosing it, and otherwise my choice would be an illusion.428 
Because this self-choice involves an affirmation of one’s self, albeit in a way that imbues 
that self with a new significance without thereby changing its qualities, Kierkegaard speaks 
of self-choice as a “transfiguration.”429  Of the ethical person, he explains: “He remains 
himself, exactly the same that he was before, down to the most insignificant feature, and 
yet he becomes another, for the choice penetrates everything and changes it.”  A person 
may be, for example, a brother or a Danish citizen, and these properties are determined by 
one’s birth.  When such a person chooses himself, he does not thereby cease being a brother 
or a Dane, but he does view these properties in a new way – not as merely accidental 
features of his identity that have been determined by some external force, but as properties 
that he freely affirms and for which he takes responsibility.  He may or may not be a loving 
brother or upstanding citizen, but, either way, through the self-choice, he makes himself 
responsible for those social relationships.  Through self-choice, these properties are no 
longer viewed as determined by nature, but as being posited by oneself.  Before and after 
the self-choice, one has the same properties, but the significance of those properties has 
changed.  In this sense, the self-choice involves a transfiguration of oneself. 
Kierkegaard uses this notion of a freely chosen appropriation of oneself primarily 
to distinguish the aesthetic and the ethical stages of life.  The ethical life-view involves a 
self-choice, through which one takes responsibility for the self that one is.  This entails that 
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the ethical personality views self-development as a deliberate and imputable process, 
which is precisely rejected by the reflective aesthete.  Kierkegaard explains: 
What is the esthetic in a person, and what is the ethical?  To that I would respond: 
the esthetic in a person is that by which he spontaneously and immediately is what 
he is; the ethical is that by which he becomes what he becomes.430 
Even though the reflective aesthete recognizes itself as negatively free, it does not view 
self-determination as its task.  Without having taken responsibility for personal 
development, the aesthetic individual does not think that it determines its identity through 
its action, but instead views itself as liberated from everything, including its actions and 
the consequences of the same.  Only by assuming responsibility for self-development does 
one advance beyond an aesthetic life-view and attain an ethical existence.  With the self-
choice, the ethicist recognizes that one’s actions determine oneself, such that activities have 
significance for the ethicist that they do not possess for the aesthete.  While the aesthete 
does compose itself poetically, it does so for amusement and not for the purpose of self-
development; the aesthete maintains distance between itself and its activity, and, since it 
does not view itself as committed to its own actions in any decisive way, it does not engage 
in genuine self-determination. 
Stressing the significance of activity for the ethical life, Kierkegaard says that it is 
only through the self-choice that one’s life takes on ethical qualifications, such that one 
views one’s own actions as good or evil.  The ethical pseudonym explains: 
Rather than designating the choice between good and evil, my Either/Or431 
designates the choice by which one chooses good and evil or rules them out.  Here 
the question is under what qualifications one will view all existence and personally 
live.432 
430 Ibid, 178. 
431 Kierkegaard’s Judge often speaks of the self-choice as an “Either/Or,” in the sense that one can either 
choose oneself or not. 
432 Ibid, 169.  Cf. ibid, 178. 
170 
When the individual chooses itself ethically, it takes responsibility for itself, “so that every 
movement he makes is accompanied by a consciousness of responsibility for himself 
[…].”433  Accordingly, as Connell says, “the original choice is the choice to exist in a moral 
universe.  All individual moral actions are in essence reaffirmations and applications of 
that fundamental choice.”434  Lower levels of aestheticism view life through the categories 
of pleasure and pain, while reflective aestheticism views life through those of interest and 
boredom.435  In general, the aesthete lives in “the realm of pre-ethical norms,” according 
to Wesphal; for the aesthete, “Ethical categories are simply inoperative.”436  The categories 
of good and evil only become decisive qualifications of life for a personality that has made 
the self-choice, since only this personality takes responsibility for itself and thereby for 
how it chooses to act.  Actions are imbued with moral significance through the self-choice; 
“the ethical […] nevertheless is essentially that which makes the choice a choice.”437  
Accordingly, the ethical theory presented by Kierkegaard is not concerned with 
determining which actions are good or evil, but rather it is concerned with explaining how 
personality develops so as to become ethically significant.438  He says: “Therefore, it is not 
so much a matter of choosing between willing good or willing evil as of choosing to will, 
but that in turn posits good and evil.”439  Moreover: “Therefore, the point is still not that of 
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choosing something; the point is not the reality of that which is chosen but the reality of 
choosing.”440 
4.4 Absolute Choice and the Eternal Validity of the Self 
Kierkegaard further explicates this theory of self-choice by stating that the choice 
is “an absolute choice, for only by choosing absolutely can one choose the ethical.”441  
Despite whatever philosophical and religious connotations are associated with notions of 
absoluteness, Kierkegaard understands the absolute choice merely to be the affirmation of 
one’s person as an unconditioned value, to which all else is subordinated.  Kierkegaard’s 
position is that an absolute choice is central for ethical existence, since it is in this choice 
that one recognizes and affirms one’s inherent dignity as a person.  Kierkegaard 
understands the self-choice to be absolute in a twofold manner, which he explains in the 
following manner: 
But what is it, then, that I choose – is it this or that?  No, for I choose absolutely, 
and I choose absolutely precisely by having chosen not to choose this or that.  I 
choose the absolute, and what is the absolute?  It is myself in my eternal validity.442 
First, the choice of self is absolute in the sense that one is not choosing oneself in a 
determinate manner, but rather, on a more fundamental level, one is choosing to be a freely 
and responsibly acting self; the self-choice is absolute because it is not limited to choosing 
the particularity of the self, but involves the person choosing simply to affirm its validity 
as an agent, whereby particular choices become significant for that person.  The ethical 
pseudonym explains: “The Either/Or I have advanced is, therefore, in a certain sense 
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absolute, for it is between choosing and not choosing.”443  Second, the choice is described 
as absolute because its object is absolute.  In this context, Kierkegaard explicitly and 
repeatedly identifies the self that one chooses as the absolute: “I myself am the absolute; I 
posit the absolute, and I myself am the absolute.”444  What is chosen in the choice is the 
self, albeit in a specific sense – as absolute.  John Elrod summarizes this notion of an 
absolute choice well in the following: 
One merely chooses to choose.  That is to say, the individual does not choose 
himself as something in particular, e.g., a teacher, husband, politician, musician, 
revolutionary, or whatever, but he chooses himself in the much more abstract sense 
of being a finite being who is faced by an absolute and infinite ethical requirement. 
[…] It is the acceptance of oneself as radically free and responsible for oneself 
[…].445 
In the self-choice, personality does not choose itself in a purely finite way, but instead 
chooses itself as absolute. 
This notion of an absolute self as the object of an absolute choice is clarified by 
Kierkegaard’s connecting absoluteness with his conception of inner teleology: “The 
personality appears as the absolute that has its teleology in itself.”446  In explanation of this 
latter concept, Kierkegaard says the following: 
Now, when I say that the individual has his teleology within himself, this may not 
be misinterpreted to mean that the individual is central or that the individual in the 
abstract sense is supposed to be sufficient unto himself […].  The individual has his 
teleology within himself, has inner teleology, is himself his teleology; his self is 
then the goal toward which he strives.447 
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One has inner teleology and is thereby absolute when being oneself is one’s ultimate goal 
– when being oneself is taken as the unconditional task of one’s existence.  Personality is
absolute when it “is its own objective.”448  This “autotelic” self, as Harries calls it, is 
described as being absolute because striving to be oneself is a value that is not determined 
relative to anything beyond itself.449  Kierkegaard’s designation of the self as absolute in 
this context just means that it is viewed as an end-in-itself.  While a person can be used as 
a means for particular ends, from the ethical standpoint, it nonetheless retains an intrinsic 
and inexhaustible dignity. 
Being such an end-in-itself imbues the self with what Kierkegaard variously calls 
the “absolute” or “eternal validity of the personality.”450  This validity is absolute, because 
it is not conditioned by anything.  It is eternal, because one strives to be oneself perpetually, 
which is to say that this validity is not limited by or to any temporal condition; when one 
chooses oneself, “he then has himself as his task under an eternal responsibility.”451  While 
the use of this terminology may sound as if this self-choice has religious significance, in 
this context, Kierkegaard speaks of this eternality in a non-religious manner.  The ethical 
personality views itself as having eternal validity, in the sense that one’s identity has a 
worth that is not limited or determined by one’s temporal existence (either in whole or in 
part). 
Accordingly, this conception of eternal validity is introduced as another way to 
distinguish the ethical and aesthetic evaluations of life.  Edward Mooney explains the 
concept in the following way: 
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This validity does not vary with time and place and so is deemed ‘eternal.’  The 
moral values animating everyday practices, and the moral self that they underwrite, 
will have a depth and duration greater than the instant to instant transitoriness or 
whimsy of ‘merely’ immediate, aesthetic experience.452 
With his conception of an absolute self possessing an inner teleology, Kierkegaard is 
distinguishing two ways of orienting one’s life toward its fundamental goals.  In the case 
of ethical personality, one takes oneself as having absolute value, such that one’s worth is 
not determined by anything that is accidental or transient: “there is something within him 
that in relation to everything else is absolute […].”453  The aesthetic life-view serves as the 
foil to the foregoing conception of the intrinsic dignity of personality.  The aesthetic person 
has an external teleology or is heterotelic, to the extent that its ultimate value and goal 
reside in something other than the self; the self for the aesthete is only extrinsically 
dignified, and the aesthete does not perceive or affirm its personal worth as absolute, 
instead viewing its life as only being conditional valued.  In general, personality is not 
posited as absolute when anything other than being oneself is taken as the fundamental 
goal or as determining the value of one’s being.  Such is the case of all aesthetic ways of 
life, and, in his analysis of various forms of living aesthetically, Kierkegaard presents a 
variety of ends to which the value of personality tends to be subordinated, including health, 
physical beauty, wealth, honors, nobility, the development of a given talent, the satisfaction 
of desire, contentment, and amusement.  In each of these cases, wherein something other 
than the self to taken to have absolute value, one wills to be oneself only on the condition 
that one of these other goals can be realized, such that personality is valued relative to 
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something else.  For instance, in one of the lower forms of aestheticism, one wills to be 
oneself so long as one is wealthy, and when that wealth is lost, so too is the person’s 
perception of self-worth and willingness to be oneself; this aesthetic individual does not 
choose to be itself, but instead chooses only to be a wealthy self.  In the aesthetic form of 
personality, the self has dignity conditionally – only to the extent that the self possesses 
certain qualities, such as wealth.  When the aesthete no longer has these qualities, it no 
longer considers itself to have dignity, and it despairs.  In such instances, the aesthete treats 
its own self as a mere means for some external goal; it exists, for example, only to be 
wealthy.  The aesthete does not recognize itself as having eternal validity, precisely because 
it determines its value in relation to something transient – in relation to “something whose 
nature is that it can pass away.”454  In contrast, that the personality is taken to be absolute 
in the ethical choice entails that personality is not conditioned by anything; for the ethical 
personality, being a person is an end in itself and not an end for anything else.  Should the 
ethical person lose its wealth or anything else, it nonetheless wills to be itself.  The ethical 
person has an identity that transcends empirical determinations, and it perceives itself as 
valuable, even if it is not healthy, beautiful, wealthy, talented, contented, or amused.  Even 
if the ethicist is dissatisfied by a loss of wealth, for instance, and wishes to rectify this loss, 
it does not thereby devalue itself.  The ethical personality views itself as eternally valid – 
as having a value uncorrelated to any temporal status or possession. 
454 Ibid, 236. 
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4.5 Continuity in the Ethical Life – Repentance and Duty 
With its emphasis on absolute choice and eternal validity, Kierkegaard’s theory of 
ethical life appears extremely abstract.  However, Kierkegaard intends the self-choice to 
be one of concretion.  To this end, he describes the self-choice as consisting of a twofold 
movement, wherethrough one affirms not only one’s freedom, but also one’s concrete 
situation as a condition for acting freely.  Kierkegaard presents the two moments of the 
choice as those of isolation and continuity.  The first moment of the absolute choice is that 
by which the individual gains an apprehension of itself apart from its naturally and socially 
determined identity.  This moment is identified as one of isolation, since, through it, one 
recognizes one’s personality in isolation from empirical determinations – as being more 
than just a product of nature and society.  Kierkegaard explains this in the following: 
The first form the choice takes is complete isolation.  That is, in choosing myself, 
I separate myself from my relations to the whole world, until in this separation I 
end in an abstract identity.  Since the individual has chosen himself according to 
his freedom, he is eo ipso acting.  Yet his action has no relation to anything in the 
surrounding world, for the individual has completely exterminated this and is only 
for himself.  The life-view that appears here is, however, an ethical view.455 
This first movement terminates in the affirmation of an identity that is abstract, in the sense 
that the individual is affirming one’s dignity and freedom, irrespective of any empirical 
determination.  This movement of isolation involves “the maturing of one’s personality,” 
since, through it, one achieves an understanding of one’s freedom for self-determination 
and value as a person as being irreducible to empirical conditions.456  It involves the 
recognition of the self as “a power in a human being that can defy the whole world.”457  
Through this movement of isolation from one’s empirically determined situation, one 




discovers one’s negative freedom, such that this movement involves finding one’s will not 
to be pathologically necessitated.  What Kierkegaard describes here as the movement of 
isolation is precisely what is described in his dissertation as the infinite, absolute negativity 
of irony; it is the consciousness of the person’s irreducibility to its empirical situation. 
The abstraction of this first moment of the absolute choice, wherewith the self is 
drawn away from its concrete situation, however, is conditioned by the concurrent second 
moment, wherethrough one affirms continuity with one’s situation.  This movement 
corresponds to the mastery of irony, and Kierkegaard’s account of the former helps 
elucidate the nature of the latter. This second moment of self-choice involves the 
integration of one’s personality with its empirical determinants, thereby overcoming the 
abstractness of the moment of isolation.  Kierkegaard says: 
The true concrete choice is the one by which I choose myself back into the world 
the very same moment I choose myself out of the world.  That is […] I collect 
myself in all my finite concretion, and when I have thus chosen myself out of the 
finite in this way, I am in the most absolute continuity with it.458 
While, in the first moment, the individual recognizes itself as negatively free, the individual 
also recognizes that it can only manifest its freedom and thereby develop its personality 
within a concrete situation.  The ethical personality recognizes that it is responsible to its 
specific situation, since this situation provides the only means for self-development and 
self-expression: “The ethical does not want to wipe out this concretion but sees in it its 
task, sees the material with which it is to build and that which it is to build.”459  To the 
extent that the ethical person is dedicated to self-determination, it must also be dedicated 
to the specific situation in which it finds itself, since the latter dictates the particular ways 
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in which the ethicist can actually determine itself.  Genuine self-determination does not 
occur in contemplation or in imagination but through action, and possible actions, through 
the realization of which one determines oneself, are available only in the concrete situation 
in which one finds oneself.  The movement of continuity involves the recognition of one’s 
positive freedom – the recognition that the expression of freedom is conditioned by one’s 
own given situation.  In this moment of the self-choice, the person affirms itself as 
pathologically affected – as having a freedom for self-determination that is conditioned by 
its given situation.  Accordingly, Kierkegaard states that “when you choose yourself 
absolutely, you will easily discover that this self is not an abstraction or a tautology.”460  
Instead, the self that one chooses is one’s empirical self in all of its concreteness; “This self 
contains in itself a rich concretion, a multiplicity of qualities, of characteristics.”461 
For the ethicist, these two movements belong essentially together in the choice of 
self: “the absolute isolation here is identical with the most profound continuity.”462  
Kierkegaard explains this identity in the following manner: 
In the moment of choice, [the ethical person] is in complete isolation, for he 
withdraws from his social milieu, and yet at the same moment he is in absolute 
continuity, for he chooses himself as a product.  And this choice is freedom’s choice 
in such a way that in choosing himself as a product he can just as well be said to 
produce himself.463 
The absolute choice is the twofold affirmation of oneself as pathologically affected but not 
necessitated; that is, it is the affirmation that, while one is not compelled to act on any 
particular empirical incentive, one is nonetheless necessitated to choose which empirical 
incentives to endorse or neglect.  The choice that initiates the ethical personality is one that 
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posits the self as conditionally free – as free to act within a certain situation.  Through the 
self-choice, the ethicist posits both its freedom and its connection with the situation in 
which it finds itself: “The person who has ethically chosen and found himself possesses 
himself defined in his entire concretion.”464 
Kierkegaard further characterizes the concretizing aspect of the absolute choice by 
saying that the person “gains a history” in the choice of self.  Naturally, this is not intended 
to suggest that, prior to the self-choice, the person had maintained an ahistorical existence; 
rather, the absolute choice initiates a change in the person’s perception of and relation to 
its own historical existence.  Rather than viewing history as an external series of events 
that determine one’s identity to various degrees, the ethicist views history as a condition 
for selfhood and as something that must be affirmed in the self-choice.  Stressing the 
importance of such a perception of history, Kierkegaard says the following: 
A human being’s eternal dignity lies precisely in this, that he can gain a history.  
The divine in him lies in this, that he himself, if he so chooses, can give this history 
a continuity, because it gains that, not when it is a summary of what has taken place 
or has happened to me, but only when it is my personal deed in such a way that 
even that which has happened to me is transformed and transferred from necessity 
to freedom.465 
In the affirmation of one’s own historical existence, there is a shift in the perception of 
one’s historicality, since this deliberate affirmation makes history one’s own deed, rather 
than a series of events that necessarily determines the individual.  The ethical personality 
views history as the process of one’s deliberate self-development. 
This acceptance of the historical dimensions of the self is essential for the self 
choice, to the extent that these dimensions give the self its determinant content; the 
464 Ibid, 262. 
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historical situatedness of the self provides the manifold of material for self-development.  
Kierkegaard explains the ethicist’s apprehension of this manifold in the following: 
Now he discovers that the self he chooses has a boundless multiplicity within itself 
inasmuch as it has a history, a history in which he acknowledges identity with 
himself.  This history is a different kind, for in this history he stands in relation to 
other individuals in the race and to the whole race, and this history contains painful 
things, and yet he is the person he is only though this history.466 
Contrary to the aesthetic self, which finds itself irrevocably alienated from its concrete and 
historical situation, the self that is affirmed in the ethical choice “is not an abstract self that 
fits everywhere and therefore nowhere but is a concrete self in living interaction with these 
specific surroundings, these life conditions, this order of things.”467  It is not possible for 
the ethical individual “to discard his actuality, for if he wants to be the absolute in that way, 
he is a nonentity, an abstraction.”468  The only way that one can posit self-development as 
an unconditional goal is if one affirms the materials with which one develops oneself, and 
these materials are provided by one’s historical situation and must be appropriated 
therefrom.  Ethical self-affirmation is the choice of the specific self that one is, which 
entails that it is an acceptance of the historical situatedness of that self.  The ethicist gains 
a history in the sense that it deliberately accepts its historical situatedness as a condition 
for being able to realize its possibilities through action, rather than in its imagination.  Self-
choice requires that one deliberately assimilate one’s concrete existence: “It is not, as said 
before, a matter of exterminating the concrete in an abstract and contentless assault but of 
assimilating it.”469 
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As indicated by this notion of gaining a history, temporality becomes decisive for 
the ethical personality in a way that it is not for the aesthete.  The aesthetic project “to play 
shuttlecock with all existence” through the intensive method of crop rotation involves a 
disregard for the temporal structure of one’s life; for the sake of generating interest and 
thereby making life amusing, the aesthete recommends an interplay of recollection and 
forgetting, such that one’s past and future are distorted within the atemporality of the poetic 
imagination, which freely and arbitrarily recreates one’s past and projects a future informed 
not by one’s actual situation but by whatever fantasy one finds to be amusing.  The aesthete 
maintains a loose relation to its historical situation, since it views being bound to its 
situation as contributing to its boredom.  However, since one’s situatedness is temporally 
determined, in the assumption of responsibility for its concrete situation, the ethical 
personality thereby takes responsibility for its past and its future.  Mackey connects the 
temporal aspects of the self-choice with the notions of repentance and duty that 
Kierkegaard develops throughout the second volume of Either/Or: “a man chooses himself 
absolutely when in repentance he takes his whole past and in duty his whole future under 
the lordship of his freedom.”470  Moreover: “In the present resolution of self-choice a man 
takes all of his past into his freedom (repentance) and freely programs his entire future 
(duty).”471 
Despite its usual religious connotations, in this context, Kierkegaard understands 
repentance in a primarily ethical manner.472  He explicitly connects the concept of 
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repentance directly to that of self-choice, saying that “to choose oneself is to repent 
oneself.”473  He adds: 
But a person can choose himself according to his freedom only when he chooses 
himself ethically, but he can choose himself ethically only by repenting himself, 
and only by repenting himself does he become concrete, and only as a concrete 
individual is he a free individual.474 
Repentance is an act through which one takes responsibility for one’s past, and, since one’s 
identity is determined by one’s past, one cannot take responsibility for oneself without 
thereby precisely repenting.  Through repentance, the ethical person receives concretion: 
But the person who chooses himself ethically chooses himself concretely as this 
specific individual, and he achieves this concretion because this choice is identical 
with repentance, which ratifies the choice.  The individual, then, becomes conscious 
as this specific individual with these capacities, these inclinations, these drives, 
these passions, influenced by this specific environment.  But as he becomes aware 
of all this, he takes upon himself responsibility for it all.475 
Repentance is an acceptance of responsibility for the entire historical situation that 
determines one’s concrete identity.  The history for which one assumes responsibility in 
Kierkegaard’s account consists of both one’s personal past but also anything else that has 
contributed to the constitution of the identity of the individual.  In the self-choice, one takes 
responsible for one’s past actions, one’s natural inclination toward evil, one’s family and 
race (i.e., humanity), and the total series of events that contributed to one’s coming into 
existence.476  Furthermore, Kierkegaard connects repentance directly with the two 
moments of self-choice – isolation and continuity: 
Here repentance appears in all its profound meaning, for while in one way it isolates 
me, in another way it binds me indissolubly to the whole human race, because my 
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life does not begin now and with nothing, and if I cannot repent of the past, then 
freedom is a dream.477 
Repentance requires a distancing of oneself from one’s situation, such that one can affirm 
one’s freedom in relation to that situation, but it also involves the establishment of 
continuity with that situation, insofar as one views oneself as responsible for it, since one’s 
situation is constitutive of one’s self. 
Corresponding to this appropriation of one’s past through repentance, the ethical 
person also takes responsibility for its future by considering the way that its actions shape 
the self that it is becoming therethrough.  In the moment of deliberation, in which the person 
must decide how it will act, the ethical person surveys what possibilities are available to it 
within its concrete situation and views these possibilities as particular ways that it can 
determine the person that it will become.  For the ethical personality, these possible courses 
of action are viewed as tasks that one has the duty to realize for the sake of self-
determination: 
In other words, the person who lives esthetically sees only possibilities everywhere; 
for him these make up the content of future time, whereas the person who lives 
ethically sees task everywhere.  Then the individual sees this, his actual concretion, 
as task, as goal, as objective.  But in seeing his possibility as his task, the individual 
expresses precisely his sovereignty over himself.478 
The primary duty of the ethical person is to become itself, but Kierkegaard makes it clear 
that, while the ethical life revolves around duty, it is not what is usually understood as “a 
life of duty” or a “living for the performance of one’s duties.”479  In explication of his view 
of duty, Kierkegaard distinguishes two conceptions of the same: the external and the 
internal.  There is a mistaken view of the ethical life, wherein the “ethical is defined as 
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duty, and duty in turn as a multiplicity of particular rules, but the individual and duty stand 
outside each other.”480  In this view, duty is understood as external – as something that is 
simply imposed upon the agent from some external source.  Kierkegaard clarifies the other 
conception of duty in the following: 
It is curious that the word “duty” can prompt one to think of an external relation, 
since the very derivation of the word suggests an internal one; for that which is 
incumbent upon me, not as this individual with accidental characteristics but in 
accordance with my true being, certainly has the most intimate relation with myself.  
That is, duty is not something laid upon but something that lies upon.  When duty 
is regarded in this way, it is a sign that the individual is oriented within himself.  
Then duty will not split up for him into a multiplicity of particular stipulations, for 
this always indicates that he has only an external relation to duty.  He has put on 
duty; for him it is the expression of his innermost being.  When he is thus oriented 
within himself, he has immersed himself in the ethical, and he will not run himself 
ragged performing his duties.  Therefore, the truly ethical person has an inner 
serenity and sense of security, for he does not have duty outside himself but within 
himself.481 
 
For the ethical personality, duty is not viewed as an external imposition, but as something 
that the agent freely imposes upon itself, such that “it is the expression of his innermost 
being.”  This internal sense of duty is grounded in self-choice, since only one who has 
assumed responsibility for oneself will view duty as self-imposed: when the individual “has 
chosen himself absolutely, has repented of himself, he then has himself as his task under 
an eternal responsibility, and in this way duty is posited in its absoluteness.”482 
Self-determination is the primary duty of the ethical personality, and every other 
duty is conditioned by this one.  Because Kierkegaard views duty as internally related to 
personality, he suggests that particular duties are not universal but unique to each 
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individual; he says: “I never say of a man: he is doing duty or duties; but I say: He is doing 
his duty; I say: I am doing my duty, do your duty.”483  Mackey explains: 
The principle duty can be stated in a form applicable to every man without 
exception: Thou shalt become thyself.  But particular duties cannot be defined in 
theory, they can only be discovered in situation.  Particular duties arise, for each 
person, out of the exigencies of his particular nature and the particular 
circumstances in which he finds himself.484 
Universally, ethical persons have the duty of self-determination, but the particular actions 
through which this duty is satisfied is unique to the concrete situation of a given ethical 
person.  Connell summarizes this twofold point in the following manner: 
It is out of this formal relationship of the self to itself that particular duties arise.  
Although all ethical selves are formally identical (they relate in the same way to 
their given characteristics and situations), they are materially diverse (their given 
characteristics and situations vary).  In taking responsibility for its given aspects, 
each self find itself faced with a unique set of duties.485 
For the ethical person, “it is not a matter of the multiplicity of duty but of its intensity.”486  
Moreover: “When a person has felt the intensity of duty with all his energy, then he is 
ethically matured, and then duty will break forth within him.”487  Because the ethical 
personality feels the intensity of duty, it views its possible courses of action not simply as 
possibilities but as tasks.  Through the acceptance of its own duty to be itself, the ethical 
personality assumes a relationship to its future possibility; it views itself as tasked with 
becoming itself. 
As Michelle Kosch persuasively argues, this conception of duty is largely inspired 
by the ethical theory of J.G. Fichte, rather than by the theories of Kant or Hegel, such that 
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“Fichte was in fact the main historical model for Kierkegaard’s ethicist […]”488  In matters 
of practical deliberation, Kierkegaard’s ethicist does not, like Kant, evaluate the validity of 
maxims by testing their categorical nature, nor does this ethicist emphasize adherence to 
social norms, as does Hegel.  Rather, Kierkegaard’s conception of practical deliberation is 
in line with that of Fichte; Kosch explains this connection by identifying two key claims, 
on which Kierkegaard and Fichte agree: 
They are: 1) the claim that duty is always situation specific, and that one’s concrete 
situation has priority over abstract principles in the determination of one’s duty; 
and 2) the claim that, although duty should be discussable and ultimately an object 
of inter-subjective agreement, subjective conviction (rather than social consensus 
or any other sort of external authority) is the final arbiter of duty.489 
In Fichte’s moral theory, an agent’s fundamental project of self-determination is 
conditioned by the situation in which it finds itself.  This entails that, in moments of moral 
deliberation, an agent must survey its specific situation, so as to develop an awareness of 
what actions are possible for it; this survey produces a “manifold of what is possible” for 
the agent, but this manifold of possibilities itself is determined by “the initial standpoint 
occupied by each person.”490  After surveying this manifold of possible actions, the agent 
acts on whichever possibility is confirmed by its own conscience.491  Kosch summarizes 
this theory in the following: 
So for Fichte moral decision-making is not in the first instance a matter of applying 
a universal rule to a set of maxims generated by desires (whatever they happen to 
be) together with background beliefs and circumstances, but instead a matter of 
extracting from the conjunction of the moral end, background beliefs and 
circumstances a concrete imperative with a universal character.  One knows one 
has reached the correct determination of what to do in a given circumstance by the 
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presence of a feeling of certainty, a subjective conviction about one’s duty.  This is 
the voice of conscience, which is in each case determinate and specific to our 
situation […].492 
Accordingly, Westphal explains that we should not think of Kierkegaard’s ethical life-view 
“in Platonic or Kantian terms as involving the apprehension of an abstract, formal principle 
by an intellect that has somehow become pure reason.”493  Duty for Kierkegaard is not 
produced through a categorical imperative or through social convention, but rather is 
produced through a personal conviction regarding how to determine oneself within one’s 
own concrete situation.   
Through the self-choice, with its moments of repentance, which grounds the self in 
its historically determined existence, and duty, which projects the self toward its future 
goal of becoming itself in a determinate way, the ethical person assumes a temporal 
orientation in its world, such that it achieves what Kierkegaard identifies as continuity with 
its concrete situation; the latter says: 
Not until a person in his choice has taken himself upon himself, has put on himself, 
has totally interpenetrated himself so that every movement he makes is 
accompanied by a consciousness of responsibility for himself – not until then has a 
person chosen himself ethically, not until then has he repented himself, not until 
then is he concrete, not until then is he in his total isolation in absolute continuity 
with the actuality to which he belongs.494 
The ethical person takes itself to be bound to its particular situation, such that it is 
responsible for and responsible to this situation; the ethicist views its situation as the sole 
context within which it can realize its primary task of self-determination, and, 
consequently, in the realization of this task, the ethicist cannot distance itself from its 
situation through imagination and poiesis, but must instead cultivate a knowledge of its 
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specific situation, and it must ultimately affirm its situatedness in its activity.  Kierkegaard 
describes the ethicist in the following manner: “He is well aware that every human being 
develops in freedom, but he is also aware that a person does not create himself out of 
nothing; that he has himself in his concretion as his task […].”495   Moreover, in contrast 
to aesthetic alienation, this awareness entails that the ethical personality is “reconciled with 
existence […].”496  The ethicist views itself as necessarily bound to its situation, the result 
of which is described by Kierkegaard in the following: “only when life is considered 
ethically does it take on beauty, truth, meaning, continuance […].”497 
4.6 The Critique of Reflective Aestheticism – Self-Choice and Self-
Creation 
The ethical personality establishes continuity with its world by accepting its project 
of self-determination as conditioned by the particular historical situation in which it finds 
itself.  Kierkegaard uses this sense of continuity as a way of critiquing the reflectively 
aesthetic life-view.  In his assessment, this aesthetic life precisely lacks continuity with its 
concrete situation due to its nihilism, and this lack is reinforced by the aesthete’s 
subordination of its determinate actuality to the content of its poetic imagination.  The 
aesthetic poiesis maintains distance between personality and its situation, such that the 
aesthete is “a stranger and alien in the world.”498  For the sake of avoiding boring situations, 
the aesthetic personality distances itself from its concrete situation and is always willing to 
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ignore both its actual past and the way in which this past determines its future in favor of 
its atemporal imaginings.  The ethical pseudonym says to the aesthete: 
[T]he capacity of soul that is actually wanting in you is memory, that is, not of this
or of that, not of ideas, witticisms, or dialectical intricacies – far be it for me to
make that claim – but memory of your own life, of what you have experienced in
it.499
The person who lives ethically has a memory of his life (to recall an earlier 
expression); the person who lives esthetically does not have it at all.500 
It is not simply that the aesthetic life lacks continuity, but that it actively works to enforce 
this discontinuity through its application of the arts of recollection and forgetting that 
constitute the intensive method of crop rotation.  Mackey describes the aesthete’s view of 
its concrete situation in the following: 
To reproduce one’s experience in the medium of poetry may, in the hands of a 
master, be the way to create works of excellence.  But if a man’s life consists of 
this reproduction, then he betrays experience by reducing it to the occasion of his 
creativity, prefers his own appetite for pleasure to the demand for responsible 
action, and inverts the order of reality by confounding the essential (ethical) with 
its accidental adornment (aesthetic).501 
Kierkegaard notes that there is a kind of continuity achieved through the aesthetic poiesis 
but that this continuity is achieved in thought, not actuality: 
As far as poetry and art are concerned, may I remind you of what I mentioned 
earlier, that they provide only an imperfect reconciliation with life, also that when 
you fix your eye upon poetry and art you are not looking at actuality, and that is 
what we really should be speaking about.502 
Because the aesthete does not maintain the genuine – that is, the ethical – view of its 
situation, whereby one establishes continuity with one’s situation for the sake of self-
determination through action rather than imagination, the aesthete remains discontinuous 
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with its situation: “To say it in other words, the individual has not chosen himself ethically.  
He therefore has no connection with actuality […].”503  The ethical pseudonym says to the 
aesthete: “if there is to be meaning in it life must have continuity, and this your life does 
not have.”504  The aesthete, however, not only lacks continuity, but also deliberately tries 
to avoid continuity in its attempt to negate boredom, insofar as continuity is viewed as 
contrary to the aesthetic project of avoiding commitment and embracing arbitrariness, such 
that continuity with life is thereby perceived as a source of boredom. 
Kierkegaard stresses this distinction between the ethical and the aesthetic relations 
to actuality through a distinction he makes between two similar concepts: self-choice and 
self-creation.  The consistent refrain throughout Kierkegaard’s explication of the ethical 
life-view is that the self-choice that establishes this life-view requires the acceptance of 
one’s concrete identity.  That this self-choice is supposed to be one of appropriation 
culminates in the insight that the ethical personality emerges through the free and deliberate 
acceptance the self that one is with all of its historical determination.  Kierkegaard 
thematizes this point through a distinction that he introduces between self-choice and self-
creation, maintaining that ethical existence is initiated through a choice of self, rather than 
a creation of self.  Kierkegaard explains that, in the acceptance of one’s situatedness, the 
ethical person “does not assume that the world begins with him or that he creates 
himself.”505  Moreover, he describes the ethicist in the following way: “He is well aware 
that every human being develops in freedom, but he is also aware that a person does not 
create himself from nothing […].”506  Connecting this distinction with his conception of 
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freedom as conditioned by a concrete situation, Kierkegaard says the following of the 
ethical person: “But since he has not created himself but has chosen himself, duty is the 
expression of his absolute dependence and his absolute freedom in their identity with each 
other.”507  This distinction between self-creation and self-choice relates to Kierkegaard’s 
distinction between the natural self and the spiritual self; the attainment of spirit requires 
an acceptance of one’s natural self, which already exists prior to the self-choice; while 
spirit emerges through this choice, the self that one chooses is not thereby created from 
nothing, but instead must already exist in some manner so that it can be chosen. 
Whereas self-choice entails a proper conception of one’s freedom as situationally 
conditioned, Kierkegaard understands self-creation as entailing an inadequate and 
exaggerated conception of freedom.  In the self-creational model of identity, Kierkegaard 
understands freedom not simply as the capacity of the person to choose which courses of 
action to enact from the available manifold of actions that belong to that person’s specific 
situation; rather, self-creation entails that one is not at all bound by one’s historical 
situatedness.  This notion of self-creation, which Kierkegaard uses as a foil to his ethical 
theory of identity, involves a conception of personality as freely created, irrespective of its 
situation.  The consequence of this conception of freedom, as well as how it is expressed 
by a person, is that there is no real sense of responsibility either for one’s situation or to 
persons (oneself and others).  This is why the ethical pseudonym accuses the aesthete of 
maintaining this inadequate conception of freedom, which founds the former’s criticisms 
of the irresponsibility of the latter.  Regarding the choices made by the aesthete, 
Kierkegaard says that the aesthete has “not actually chosen at all” or has only “chosen in a 
 
507 Ibid, 270. 
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figurative sense.”508  This is because what is lacking in the actions of the aesthete is any 
commitment to the action and relatedly any assumption of responsibility for the same.  
Stressing its negative freedom, the aesthete perceives itself as independent from 
everything, including its own actions, such that it does not take responsibility for what it 
does, nor does it conceive itself as being determined by its choices, since such a notion of 
self-determination would require that one’s identity be conceived as bound to one’s 
choices.  The ethical pseudonym says that “if one does not choose absolutely, one chooses 
only for the moment and for that reason can choose something else the next moment.”509  
From the ethical standpoint, the aesthetic choice is not a choice in a rigorous sense, 
“because the self-determining aspect of the choice has not been ethically stressed […].”510  
The aesthetic personality overestimates its freedom, emphasizing the abstract and negative 
moment of freedom divorced from the concrete and positive moment, the result of which 
is that the aesthete conceives itself as radically liberated from its situation and from its own 
actions. 
It is for this reason that Kierkegaard views the ethical stage of life as an 
advancement upon the aesthetic one.  With its purely abstract or negative conception of 
freedom, the aesthete maintains an inadequate conception of itself as free.  Kierkegaard 
finds the conception of freedom underlying the theory of self-creation to be inadequate for 
two reason.  First, persons simply do not find themselves with a capacity to create 
themselves absolutely from nothing.  As indicated in his analysis of history and choice, 
Kierkegaard thinks that individuals find themselves as having come into existence within 
508 Ibid, 166. 
509 Ibid, 167. 
510 Ibid. 
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a particular natural and social situation, and they have no control over which situation they 
come to be in or how that situation conditions their identity.  While individuals find 
themselves capable of shaping their situation and their identity, at no moment do they find 
themselves responsible for having created that situation or one’s concrete self ex nihilo.  
One’s “life does not begin now and with nothing,” even though it assumes an original 
significance through self-choice.511  What the aesthete has confused is a freedom of 
imagination or thought, which is precisely not situationally bound, with a freedom of 
action, which is determined by the agent’s actual situation.  Second, Kierkegaard thinks 
that a purely negative conception of freedom is self-defeating; in its attempt to maintain a 
purely negative freedom, Kierkegaard thinks that the aesthetic person has thereby precisely 
compromised its freedom: 
If one believes that at some moment a person can keep his personality completely 
blank and bare or that in the strictest sense one can halt and discontinue personal 
life, one certainly is mistaken.  Already prior to one’s choosing, the personality is 
interested in the choice, and if one puts off the choice, the personality or the obscure 
forces within it unconsciously chooses.512 
The aesthete wants to maintain its freedom by assuming a “state of indifference,” wherein 
there is no commitment to its activity.  However, it is impossible for a person not to act 
and not to thereby determine itself through its action; even the refusal to act is itself an act 
for which an agent is responsible.  If the aesthete does not actively and consciously define 
itself, then it will be passively determined by whatever unconscious impulses impel its 
activity.  Kierkegaard finds the purely negative conception of freedom to be inadequate, 
since it results in a kind of unfreedom; in the refusal to commit to its own project of 
511 Ibid, 239. 
512 Ibid, 164. 
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autonomous self-development, the identity of the aesthete is ultimately determined 
heteronomously. 
The conception of freedom that founds the theory of self-choice differs significantly 
from the conception that founds the theory of self-creation.  Whereas the latter entails a 
wholly original creation of one’s own person not informed by its situatedness, Kierkegaard 
understands self-choice more modestly as an appropriation of something already existent 
– namely, oneself.  Something original does come into existence through the self-choice,
but not from nothing – the self as spirit is grounded by the natural self.  As previously 
noted, the concrete self already naturally exists, but, through the appropriative choice of 
this self, spirit emerges.  Kierkegaard carefully maintains that, in the affirmation of one’s 
person and freedom, “the individual comes to stand higher than every relationship, but 
from this it in no way follows that he is not in that relationship […].”513  The choice of self 
brings one into continuity with one’s given situation.  When one makes the self-choice, it 
is not any self that is chosen; instead, one chooses precisely the self that one already is – 
namely, a self with certain features and embedded within a certain situation. 
The ethical personality emerges through an acceptance of one’s freedom and 
possibilities as limited to a particular situation, to which the person is responsible for the 
sake of its project of self-development.  Kierkegaard rejects the notion of choosing oneself 
in isolation or abstractly; instead, the ethical choice is always determined by a specific 
situation.514  Accordingly, Mackey describes the ethicist as dependently free and 
contingently absolute: 
He does not create himself as a natural and historical being: in this sense he is not 
absolute but relative, not independent but contingent.  But he is free with a 
513 Ibid, 275. 
514 Ibid, 251. 
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dependent freedom and he becomes a contingent absolute just insofar as he is able 
to get hold of himself as a whole.515 
The ethical personality acknowledges a limited freedom: even though it can choose to take 
responsibility for itself, it cannot choose itself in the sense of creating itself absolutely. The 
ethical personality does not, for instance, choose its epoch, its parentage, its capacities or 
talents, its social milieu, its body, and so on.  The ethicist recognizes that it is created with 
certain features and within a certain situation, over which it has no control.  The ethical 
choice is simply the choice that takes responsibility for this situatedness and affirms these 
concrete features of one’s identity as the basis for freely acting in the world.  Kierkegaard 
explains this conditional freedom through a useful metaphor: the ethical personality is the 
“editor” of its identity, not the creator of the same.516  This highlights the sense in which 
the ethical person is merely shaping already existent materials, rather than creating 
something unqualifiedly original. 
Corresponding to this view of freedom as limited, Elrod explains that the ethical 
personality views its possibility as grounded in its concrete situation, whereas the aesthete 
views possibility in terms of whatever it can imagine.  According to Elrod, possibilities for 
the ethical personality are “existential possibilities” because they are “rooted in 
existence.”517  He explains: 
Now ethical ideality is the ideality of the self’s existential reality.  The ideality of 
ethics does not soar beyond man as a formal absolute abstractly conceived and 
formulated.  On the contrary, ethical ideality proceeds from the ideality inherent in 
the self’s given reality.518 
Elrod further explains the source of ethical ideality in the following manner: 
515 Mackey, 54. 
516 Kierkegaard, Either/Or II, 260. 
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The relation between reality and ideality is not one in which reality is confronted 
by a formal, abstract ideality to which it is morally subject.  Ethical ideality emerges 
not through abstract thinking, contemplation, or intuition but through the 
unconditional requirement upon the individual to be himself.  If ideality were 
derived in this former manner, reality would be directed toward an ideal alien to it, 
whereas, for Kierkegaard, the ideal is discovered in the real.519 
Ideality is precisely ideated by the ethical personality through a survey of its concrete 
situation – one that examines both the capacities of the agent and the possible courses of 
action that are realizable to that agent given its specific situation.  Mehl explains how the 
ethical person becomes aware of its possibilities in the following manner: 
If one is sincere about strong autonomy one will inevitably pursue and practice 
some set of ethical considerations as best one can construe them given one’s full 
life conditions.  What these conditions are will depend on who one is, on what 
configured one in the past, on what one self-consciously pursues subsequent to the 
choice of oneself, in short, on how the process of self-definition unfolds.  But 
whatever the content turns out to be, it is not as crucial as the universal possibility 
of autonomous engagement, for the essential thing about a person is the capacity 
for maintaining distance from our ends and interests, and hence binding ourselves 
into a coherent and constant whole.520 
In order to develop itself through action, in moments of deliberation, the ethicist only 
considers those possibilities that it can actually enact; the ethicist is always concerned with 
how it should act in a particular circumstance. 
In contrast to the ethical view that possible paths for self-determination are dictated 
by the personality’s concrete situation, the aesthete’s possibilities are precisely divorced 
from its situation; the aesthete views its possibilities as whatever it can imagine, 
irrespective of its particular situation.  Since its possibilities are not existentially grounded, 
Harries notes that aesthetic ideals are false, in the following sense: “The ideal of poetic life 
519 Ibid, 116. 
520 Peter J. Mehl, “Moral Virtue, Mental Health, and Happiness: The Moral Psychology of Kierkegaard’s 
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is false because it fails to do justice to what the human being is, i.e. a finite individual, tied 
to a particular situation […].”521  In the aesthetic view, the person takes itself to have more 
possibilities than the person would in the ethical view.  Obviously, though, not all of these 
aesthetic possibilities can be realized through action, such that they cannot be viewed as 
genuine tasks for the individual, as Elrod says: “It is true that aesthetic and intellectual 
possibilities can confront the individual as tasks, but they are not genuine tasks because 
they are not genuinely possible.”522  Because the aesthetic possibilities are not grounded in 
the aesthete’s actual situation, not all of them are enactable by the aesthete, and some 
remain fantasies for which the aesthete can wish but not truly will.  Kierkegaard comments 
on these imaginarily constructed possibilities in the following way: 
There is only one thing I do not want to fail to stress, that as soon as the ethical 
person’s gymnastics become an imaginary constructing he has ceased to live 
ethically.  All such imaginary gymnastic constructing is equivalent to sophistry in 
the realm of knowledge.523 
Furthermore, this difference between imaginary and actualizable possibilities explains why 
Kierkegaard thinks that decisions and actions are more significant for the ethical 
personality than for the aesthetic one; he says: 
Therefore, the ethical choice is in a certain sense much easier, much simpler, but in 
another sense it is infinitely more difficult.  The person who wants to decide his life 
task ethically does not ordinarily have such a wide range; the act of choosing, 
however, is much more meaningful to him.524 
Choice is more significant for the ethical personality, because the ethicist only chooses 
what it is capable of enacting and it chooses with the understanding that what it enacts 
determines its actual identity. 
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One of the primary ways that Kierkegaard explains his views on freedom and 
ideality in the distinction between self-choice and self-creation is by invoking the concept 
of God, albeit in a fairly restricted manner compared to his theories pertaining to the 
religious life-view.  The ethical view of life is achieved through an acceptance of the 
limitations of one’s freedom and possibilities; one attains an ethical life-view to the extent 
that one perceives oneself as merely appropriating and shaping an already existent identity, 
both the features and possibilities of which are determined by the situation in which one 
merely finds oneself.  This means that the ethical choice requires the acknowledgement 
that one is not self-creating but has instead come into existence through the work of 
another, and this other is identified by Kierkegaard as God; the ethical choice requires that 
one acknowledge that one is not self-created, and Kierkegaard frames this as a recognition 
of God as the creator of what is appropriated in the absolute choice.  God creates the natural 
self, which later achieves spiritual significance through the choice of itself.  In the self-
choice, one is not “supposed to reject the existence, the actuality, in which God has placed 
him.”525  When God is identified as the creator, the ethical person acknowledges that it has 
not created itself from nothing and is admitting that the empirical features of its self are 
established by some external force, such that the only thing that a person can do is accept 
those features or deny them.  Whereas the aesthete thinks of its given situation as trivial 
and inessential, the ethical person is supposed to view it as a gift from God: 
Therefore, temporality does not exist, if I dare speak this way, for the sake of God, 
in order that he, to put it in mystical terms, can test and try the one who loves, but 
it exists for the sake of humankind and is the greatest of all the gifts of grace.526 
525 Ibid, 244. 
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The ethical person needs God to be able to choose its self, “because he chooses it absolutely 
from the hand of the eternal God.”527  Moreover, only on the condition that “he finds 
himself in God” can one choose oneself absolutely.528  God is important for the ethical life-
view, because a person becomes ethical only by taking ownership of something that it did 
not create – its self in all of its natural and social situatedness.  The ethical person takes 
responsibility for what God has created.  The recognition of God, then, is part of the 
recognition of oneself as self-choosing, not self-creating.  This is why the 
acknowledgement of God is so important for the ethical project – if the individual 
recognizes God as responsible for creation, then the individual can only view itself as 
capable of appropriating itself, thereby transcending the aesthetic life-view. 
While Kierkegaard explicitly identifies the recognition of God as a condition for 
self-choice, given the features and purpose of this theory, what is necessary here is that the 
ethicist recognizes and accepts its unfreedom in relation to its situatedness.  While the 
ethical pseudonym articulates this recognition in religious terms, the religious dimension 
is ultimately inessential to the denial of self-creation.  In order to maintain the distinction 
between self-creation and self-choice, the person must recognize that its freedom is 
conditioned by its being situated in a place that it does not create but that it must 
nonetheless affirm as the condition for its own project of self-development.  Kierkegaard 
says the following of the ethical person: 
He has his place in the world; in freedom he himself chooses his place – that is, he 
chooses this place.  He is a specific individual; in the choice he makes himself into 
a specific individual: namely, into the same one, because he chooses himself.  An 
individual thus chooses himself as a complex specific concretion and therefore 
chooses himself in his continuity.529 
527 Ibid, 217. 
528 Ibid, 216. 
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Additionally, referencing the two moments of the absolute choice, Kierkegaard says of the 
ethical person that “at the same time as he seems to be isolating himself most radically he 
is most radically sinking himself into the root by which he is bound up with the whole.”530  
For one to overcome the issues of aestheticism by achieving a proper self-conception, what 
is essential is that one accept one’s preestablished place in the world – that one accepts 
being rooted in this place.  Only on the condition of this acceptance can one properly 
choose oneself.  By accepting the particular place in which one finds oneself, one 
acknowledges that one is not free to be anyone but can only be the self that one is.  In order 
to overcome aestheticism and affirm oneself, there only needs to be the choice to take 
responsibility for a self and a corresponding situation, neither of which have been created 
by the one who is choosing.  The role that God serves in this account is that God is the one 
who puts one in one’s place; God is the one who binds the individual to a particular 
situation by creating the individual therein.  While the ethical pseudonym maintains a fairly 
robust account of autonomy, personal freedom does not extend to one’s belonging to a 
concrete situation.  Instead, one’s given situation is given precisely by a force outside of 
the individual’s control.  The person is not free to create its place; it is only free to accept 
its particular place as a condition for its projects of self-development. 
4.7 The Issue of Continuity – Boredom and Earnestness 
What is clear from the foregoing analysis of the aesthetic and ethical stages of life 
is that the notion of continuity is primary in Kierkegaard’s account of boredom.  The 
relation between personality and actuality – the continuity or discontinuity of these relata 
530 Ibid, 216. 
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– is what is decisive for the kind of boredom that Kierkegaard describes in his theory of
stages on life’s way.  On the one hand, the lack of continuity within the aesthetic life 
accounts for its pervasive boredom, which the aesthete can temporally mask but cannot 
altogether avoid.  On the other hand, the ethicist’s commitment to its given situation 
establishes continuity between ethical personality and its actual situation, such that the 
boredom that characterizes the aesthetic life is thereby precluded in the ethical life. 
As previously explained, the foundation of the boredom that pervades the aesthetic 
life is the aesthete’s nihilistic stance toward its existence; as Harries summarizes the point: 
“The foundation of boredom then is nihilism.”531  The aesthete is bored because it finds all 
possible courses of action and ways of life available within its situation to be pointless and 
vain.  The aesthetic experience of boredom evinces the aesthete’s alienation from its actual 
situation; having seen through the vanity of its earlier pursuits of enjoyment, the reflective 
aesthete perceives its world as meaningless and incapable of providing fulfillment, such 
that the aesthete is bored with existing.  Such boredom is precisely what drives the aesthete 
to distract itself from its life through projects of fantasy and amusement.  Because such 
boredom is founded in the aesthete’s life-view itself, this boredom is existential, rather 
circumstantial, in the sense that the boredom that the aesthete identifies as “evil itself” 
stems from the structure of the aesthetic self and not from a particular set of circumstances 
in which the aesthete happens to find itself at a given moment.532  Aesthetic boredom is 
determined not by given circumstances, but by the life-view that perpetually divests the 
world of its significance. 
531 Harries, 93. 
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To some extent, the aesthetic pseudonym does recognize the existential nature of 
his boredom.  In the critique of the extensive method of crop rotation and correlative 
prescription of the intensive method of the same, the aesthete recognizes that the source of 
boredom lies not in particular circumstances, but in himself.  It is from this understanding 
of boredom that the aesthete recommends not variation in one’s experiences, so as to make 
them novel, but instead recommends that one “continually vary oneself.”533  The aesthetic 
pseudonym does intimate the genuine resolution of his boredom by recommending that 
individuals turn attention away from external circumstance and toward themselves, but his 
emphasis on continually changing oneself compromises the success of his strategy.  The 
aesthete is not bored because it fails to represent its experiences to itself in a sufficiently 
poetic manner; instead, the source of aesthetic boredom is the disparity between self and 
world, which the aesthete freely perpetuates through its poiesis.  The recommended method 
of crop rotation not only does not resolve the alienation of the self from its actual situation, 
but instead precisely reinforces this alienation by shifting attention away from one’s 
situation and encouraging one to lose oneself in fantastic novelizations of life, in 
accordance with which one is to live in a non-committal manner, such that the aesthete’s 
“life will amount to nothing but tentative efforts at living.”534  Accordingly, the application 
of this method of crop rotation continually reproduces the conditions for boredom.  While 
the aesthete may momentarily distract itself from its nihilism and alienation through its 
self-directed poiesis, it thereby merely masks its fundamental boredom.  Because the 
aesthete misunderstands the nature of its own boredom, its recommended cure for the same 
results in the perpetuation precisely of the conditions for its boredom.  Even though its 
533 Ibid, 298. 
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intensive method improves upon the extensive one by shifting focus from external 
circumstance to the individual person, the aesthete nonetheless considers the nature of 
personality in an inadequate way.  The aesthetic pseudonym fails to understand the nature 
of his boredom, to the extent that he thinks that he can overcome boredom through 
novelization, rather than through a reevaluation of his basic relation to his actual situation. 
From the ethical perspective, there is truth to the aesthete’s criticism of the 
extensive method of crop rotation, and the correlative position of the intensive strategy 
does come close to the genuine resolution of boredom, to the extent that the aesthete views 
boredom not as stemming from particular situations but as induced by the manner in which 
one perceives one’s existence.  The reflective aesthete properly recognizes that its boredom 
is not merely circumstantial, to the extent that it understands that simple changes in 
circumstance do not thereby bring an end to its boredom.  Despite this insight, however, 
the aesthete fails to understand how essentially grounded its experience of boredom is in 
its own life-view.  In order to truly overcome boredom, what is needed is a change in how 
one more fundamentally orients oneself in one’s world – there needs to be a change in how 
one understands one’s freedom, possibilities, and responsibility as situationally 
conditioned, rather than a change in how one poetically represents one’s particular 
experiences.  Because the aesthete does not possess an adequate enough conception of itself 
to understand that its boredom stems from its own life-view, the aesthetic response to its 
boredom is one of flight.  The aesthete tries to avoid boredom by shifting its perception of 
actuality, not by effecting a more fundamental shift in its self-conception.  This solution is 
merely a distraction from boredom, not a resolution of it; the aesthete does not address its 
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perception of life as meaningless, but instead tries to obscure its nihilistic outlook by 
fantastically reconstructing how it views its life. 
In contrast, the ethical life is one in which the boredom that perpetually and 
ubiquitously dominates the aesthetic life is surmounted, to the extent that, within the ethical 
life-view, the person establishes continuity with its actual situation.  Boredom arises from 
the aesthete’s inadequate self-conception, such that both the extensive strategy of pursuing 
ever novel experiences and the intensive strategy of producing imaginary constructions 
that only momentarily distract from boredom are equally flawed, insofar as neither strategy 
addresses the source of boredom, which is the aesthetic life-view itself.  If boredom is to 
be overcome, then the individual “cannot relate himself negatively to the world around him 
[…].”535  As Kemp, explains, the aesthete maintains a negative relation to the world by 
shunning all commitments to both its situation and anything therewithin.  He clarifies this 
point in the following: 
While there is certainly a sense in which [the aesthete] is committed to avoiding 
boredom, there is nothing in particular (no object or person or choice) that he takes 
to be valuable independent of its ability to provide pleasure.536 
The aesthetic life is characterized by a rejection of the situation in which the aesthete finds 
itself.  Harries says: 
Implicit in the search for the interesting is thus a rejection of the place we have been 
assigned by the situation in which we find ourselves.  The search for the interesting 
is essentially a flight from reality.537 
The aesthetic pursuit of amusement and avoidance of boredom involves a discontinuity 
with its given situation.  Boredom is overcome by the ethical personality, insofar as the 
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latter establishes continuity with its specific situation.  This continuity is established when 
the person commits itself to a project of self-determination and, recognizing that 
situatedness is a condition for such a project, concurrently commits itself to the particular 
situation in which it finds itself. 
In order to transcend the negative relation to the world and thereby advance beyond 
the stage of aestheticism, the person needs to achieve a certain receptivity to its world in 
its self-choice.  In explanation of this receptivity, Mooney notes that, contrary to popular 
but mistaken interpretations that inappropriately attribute common existentialist ideas to 
Kierkegaard’s work, the ethical self-choice that Kierkegaard presents in Either/Or “is not 
radical Sartrean choice.”538  Mooney adds that, contrary to existentialist theories of self-
development, which tend to presuppose a “choice model of volition,” Kierkegaard presents 
a “receptivity model of volition.”539   By this, Mooney means that Kierkegaard’s theory of 
self-choice emphasizes the sense in which one must consciously accept the givenness of 
one’s situation in order to define oneself at all.  It is this receptive dimension of self-
development that ultimately distinguishes the ethical from the aesthetic stages of existence.  
Mooney says: 
Assuming responsibility for self presupposes that I can be more or less transparent 
to myself, responsive to my deepest inner promptings, and morally attentive to my 
context and historical location.540 
Far from being an arbitrary matter of radical self-creation, the ethical self-choice involves 
taking responsibility for the self that one already is, which entails that one take 
538 Mooney, 13. 
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responsibility for the context within which one’s self emerges and continues to develop.541  
This is exactly Kierkegaard’s point when he describes the following effect of the self-
choice: 
The individual, then, becomes conscious as this specific individual with these 
capacities, these inclinations, these drives, these passions, influenced by this 
specific social milieu, as this specific product of a specific environment.  But as he 
becomes aware of all this, he takes upon himself responsibility for it all.542 
Contrary to the acosmism of aestheticism, the ethical personality is aware of the way in 
which its existence is necessarily shaped and conditioned by its environing situation, from 
which it cannot completely sever itself and over which it has no absolute control.  
Regardless of the particular manner in which one wishes to develop oneself, the available 
possibilities that one may neglect or enact in any process of self-development are dictated 
by one’s concrete situation, not whatever situation is poetically constructed through the 
romantic imagination.  As Mooney puts the matter: “Resources for self-acquisition are 
conferred by tradition, by community, even by a deeper Source.”543 
Ultimately, in order to overcome aestheticism and its boredom, Kierkegaard’s 
ethicist is not advocating that one have a particular set of values or that one act in certain 
ways that are supposed to be objectively good; rather, it is recommended that one live with 
some awareness of the way in which personal identity is unavoidably shaped by one’s 
situation.  The existential boredom of reflective aestheticism arises from the established 
disparity between self and world, which the aesthete actively perpetuates by employing the 
intensive strategy of crop rotation.  While the aesthete may momentarily obscure this 
disparity through its projects of amusement, boredom is a perpetual problem for its way of 
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life, and it is an experience that will recur every time the aesthete’s projects inevitably 
cease to be amusing.  The person overcomes boredom not through distraction, but through 
a more fundamental reorientation of its life-view.  Ethical personality adopts a life-view in 
which the disparity between self and world, which is the condition for aesthetic boredom, 
is resolved through a reevaluation of the sense in which the ethical self is unfreely 
embedded within its given situation.  The ethical person’s situation is not viewed as 
meaningless or as providing content for the imagination merely for the sake of the 
production of amusing representations of life, but instead it is understood as the concrete 
context within which one necessarily determines oneself through one’s deliberate choices. 
When one’s situation is understood as the sole and necessary context in which one 
has possibilities and within which one can determinately shape one’s existence, one is not 
disinterested in and disengaged from one’s situation, but instead approaches it with what 
Kierkegaard calls “the earnestness of spirit.”  Requisite for the shift from the aesthetic to 
the ethical life-view is that the person becomes earnest about its existence.  Kierkegaard 
says: “Only the ethical individual gives himself an account of himself in earnest and is 
therefore honest with himself […].”544  For the ethical personality, actuality does not 
represent something to be ignored, forgotten, or reimagined, but is instead that determinate 
space within which the self can pursue is project of self-determination; in the ethical view 
of life, the situation in which one finds oneself is not perceived as meaningless, but as a 
necessary condition for its primary task of self-determination.  In order to overcome its 
boredom, what the aesthete needs is not a more amusing perception of its life, but “to 
become awakened to the earnestness of the spirit.”545  It is for this reason that Kierkegaard 
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says that the ethicist is the one who “is truly living poetically […]”546  Such truly poetic 
living involves the understanding that “we are not to read about or listen to or look at what 
is the highest and the most beautiful in life, but are, if you please, to live it.”547 
546 Ibid, 138. 
547 Ibid, 139. 
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing analysis of the way in which Kierkegaard describes boredom 
and contextualizes this mood within his theory of personal development through stages of 
self-awareness, it is clear that the type of boredom that Kierkegaard examines is far from 
the ordinary one.  As it is ordinarily understood, boredom is a common and fairly minor 
occurrence in one’s life, experienced whenever one finds oneself in a particular situation 
in which the various activities that are available therewithin do not interest one, such that 
one is for some duration of time prevented from doing what one finds interesting.  The kind 
of boredom whose description concerns Kierkegaard, however, is not an ordinary 
experience, but is instead uniquely characteristic of a highly reflective stage of personality, 
one in which the person actively struggles with the meaning of its life.  Between The 
Concept of Irony and Either/Or, Kierkegaard is not at all concerned with an explication of 
what could be designated as “ordinary” or “simple” boredom; instead, he is committed to 
a description of existential boredom – the rarer experience that does not stem from a 
momentary disinterest in one’s current circumstances, but instead evinces a more 
fundamental struggle to find oneself meaningfully oriented within one’s world at all. 
In Kierkegaard’s account, not every individual is capable of experiencing this type 
of boredom; the experience of boredom is conditioned by one’s having become critical of 
the meaning of one’s life, such that the ability to experience the kind of boredom that 
Kierkegaard describes is indicative of an achievement of a heightened consciousness of 
one’s existential condition.  The way that Kierkegaard situates the experience of boredom 
within his theory of personal development significantly indicates how he understands this 
particular mood.  On the one hand, to be capable of such boredom entails that one has 
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transcended the life of immediacy, such that one no longer merely dogmatically 
presupposes that there is some objective and obvious meaning and purpose for one’s life.  
In the life of immediacy, which is represented by Kierkegaard as the pre-ironic life or as 
the six pre-reflective substages of aestheticism, the individual does not experience 
existential boredom, because the individual does not reflect on its understanding of life, 
but instead takes the meaning and purpose of life to be obvious, such that the individual is 
only ever concerned with how best to live in accordance with this dogmatically accepted 
understanding.  The experience of boredom is an expression of one’s having become 
liberated from the presumptuous metaphysical and ethical understandings of existence that 
belong to the unreflective stages of life, such that one has correlatively assumed a critical 
stance toward such understandings.  The ironic and reflective aesthete liberates itself from 
the dogmatic and unconscious commitment to an understanding of the meaning and 
purpose of life, but, in this state of liberation, it finds itself in a world that has lost all 
meaning and value, such that the aesthete finds itself alienated from its world.  Given how 
Kierkegaard understands the condition for the possibility of becoming existentially bored, 
the reflectively aesthetic stage of personal development is the only one in which such 
boredom is experienced, since it is only in this stage that the person finds itself alienated 
from its world through the assumption of a nihilistic stance toward its existence.  In the 
less reflective stages of existence, the individual person does not at all question the meaning 
of its existence, such that whatever boredom it does experience cannot be a manifestation 
of its struggle to find itself meaningfully oriented within its world.  If one is to experience 
what Kierkegaard describes as boredom, then a more sophisticated stage of consciousness 
is necessary – one in which one recognizes that one’s previous understanding of existence 
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has no discernable justification and that one had only dogmatically accepted such an 
understanding.  On the other hand, in the higher stage of ethical existence, one has precisely 
reconciled oneself to one’s world through a shift in self-conception, whereby one achieves 
a more adequate understanding of what it means to be a person, such that the possibility of 
the boredom that characterizes reflective aestheticism is thereby precluded.  Accordingly, 
Kierkegaard understands boredom to be an experience that is unique to persons at a 
particular stage of development – a stage at which the person finds itself alienated from its 
world through a nihilistic perception that the world is devoid of all significance. 
Within the aesthetic stage of life, boredom is a dominant and illuminating 
experience; boredom evinces the essential features of aestheticism.  It is not simply the 
case that the aesthete is bored, but instead this boredom figures into the aesthetic life in a 
decisive manner.  Boredom is the manifestation of the aesthete’s acosmic discontinuity 
with its concrete situation, its escapist commitment to distraction that reinforces this 
acosmism, and its negative unity of life. 
First, boredom is a manifestation of the nihilism that essentially characterizes the 
aesthetic stage of life.  Having achieved a recognition of the vanity of the various 
understandings of the meaning and purpose of life that pertain to substantial existence, the 
aesthete adopts a nihilistic stance toward its life.  It finds all possible actions and ways of 
living to be pointless and unfulfilling, such that the aesthete becomes bored with existence.  
The world is viewed by the aesthete as divested of value, such that the former appears 
empty, and boredom is the experience of such emptiness. 
Second, boredom is not just an expression of the aesthete’s struggle to engage 
meaningfully with its world; boredom also determines the aesthetic praxis.  As explicated 
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in the theory of crop rotation, through which the aesthetic individual attempts to 
accomplish its task of enjoying life, boredom in effect functions as the fundamental source 
of motivation for the aesthete.  The aesthete is indifferent to all possible actions, viewing 
them as equally pointless and unfulfilling.  Such nihilism makes the aesthete indolent and 
ultimately bored with living.  This boredom, however, is precisely what motivates the 
aesthete to activity.  The experience of boredom is “infinitely repulsive,” driving the 
aesthete out of its indolence and into pursuits of amusement, where such amusement is 
intended to distract the individual from its own experience of the meaninglessness of 
existence.  Because the aesthete is no longer satisfied with the pursuit of ordinary pleasures, 
having seen through the vanity of the same, it must develop more sophisticated means 
through which to make its life interesting and thereby enjoyable.  Such is the purpose of 
the theory of crop rotation, in which the aesthete experiments with various ways of 
poetically composing its life, albeit without substantial commitment to or any assumption 
of responsibility for such composition.  
Finally, because the aesthetic project of distraction maintains the aesthete’s 
discontinuity with its world, its life loses positive unity, devolving into a disjointed and 
disparate series of projects.  Rather than being positively unified around the enactment of 
possible ways of living that it deems to be valuable for its general project of self-
development, the aesthete unifies its life only negatively through the constant negation of 
boredom in the pursuit of any course of action that it finds amusing enough to distract it 
from the state of its own existence.  The aesthete is not committed to any course of action 
but is instead just concerned with avoiding boredom, such that boredom provides the only 
sense of unity within the aesthetic life.   
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In Kierkegaard’s account, such boredom is unique to reflective aestheticism, and 
the higher stage of ethical personality precisely overcomes such boredom when it 
transcends the aesthetic life-view.  Consequently, between the stages of reflective 
aestheticism and ethicality, Kierkegaard in effect outlines two possible responses to the 
boredom that becomes manifest when consciousness assumes a critical stance toward its 
life by questioning the validity of the meaning of the same.  There is, on the one hand, the 
momentary resolution of boredom through distraction, when the aesthete employs its 
method of crop rotation so as to create amusing representations of its life.  On the other 
hand, there is a more radical resolution of boredom – one that undermines the very 
condition for its possibility and involves a shift in one’s basic view of life.  To overcome 
boredom in this way, what is necessary is that one attain a more adequate conception of 
oneself as conditionally free.  While the reflective aesthete achieves an understanding of 
itself as negatively free, it is only in the ethical stage that the person recognizes the way in 
which its freedom is conditioned by its determinate situation, and this recognition is 
expressed by the ethicist in its acceptance of responsibility to and for its situation.  
Summarily, Kierkegaard’s account of how boredom is situated in relation to these 
particular stages of life indicates the conditions under which boredom is experienced but 
can also be surmounted; boredom can be inadequately surmounted through distraction, 
which ultimately perpetuates the condition for boredom, or the possibility of boredom can 
be altogether precluded through a reevaluation of one’s life-view. 
The aesthetic response to boredom is one of obscuration; rather than getting to the 
root of the problem, which is the aesthetic life-view itself, the aesthete works merely to 
divert its attention away from the issue.  The aesthete finds its boredom to be unbearable, 
214 
such that it is motivated to escape from it through its method of crop rotation.  In such an 
attempt to avoid boredom, the aesthete may temporarily mask its boredom, but it 
concurrently perpetuates the condition for its boredom – namely, its discontinuity with its 
world.  In its attempt to overcome boredom and as a result of its unresolved nihilism, the 
aesthete views its world merely as a source of amusement.  The aesthete does not feel 
bound to its concrete situation in any particular way but takes itself as free to act within its 
world in whatever way that it pleases.  It is in this sense that Kierkegaard says that the 
aesthete “has no connection with actuality.”548 
The ethical response, in contrast, involves eliminating the condition for the 
possibility of boredom.  The existential kind of boredom that Kierkegaard describes is 
conditioned by the discontinuity of personality with its world.  Unlike the aesthete, who 
maintains such discontinuity, the ethicist achieves “absolute continuity with the actuality 
to which he belongs.”549  This continuity is established precisely through the self-choice, 
wherewith the ethicist chooses to take responsibility for the free and deliberate shaping of 
the self that it concretely is.  This self-choice involves a receptivity to one’s world, which, 
along with one’s agency, is co-constitutive of one’s project of self-determination, since it 
is precisely the determinate situation in which one finds oneself that furnishes one with the 
possible means for self-determination.  With this receptivity, the person becomes earnest 
about its situation, and this earnestness can be seen as the opposite of boredom; as bored, 
the person experiences its world as devoid of value, but, as earnest, the person experiences 
its world as essential for its project of self-determination.  The ethical personality expresses 
this earnestness when, rather than distancing itself from its situation through fantasy and 
548 Kierkegaard, Either/Or II, 250 
549 Ibid, 248. 
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arbitrary activity, it chooses itself, where such choice involves commitment to the concrete 
situation in which the personality has been and will continue to be defined.  Here, the 
emphasis is not on living a particular life-style or enacting certain possibilities, but on 
viewing oneself as integrated with one’s situation, such that one is responsible to that 
situation, in the sense that one can only determine oneself through the particular materials 
provided therewithin.  The emphasis, here, is not on what one does, but on how one does 
it.  Since, as Kierkegaard says, “the person who lives ethically may do exactly the same as 
one who lives esthetically,” boredom is not overcome by engaging in particular actions 
which are supposed to be objectively meaningful and fulfilling.550  Instead, the person 
surmounts its boredom by reevaluating its basic view of life, where such reevaluation 
involves recognizing not only that one is free to determine oneself, but also that such free 
self-determination is situationally conditioned. 
Boredom is a central concept of Kierkegaard’s theory of stages on life’s way, 
precisely because of the way that the experience elucidates the aesthetic and ethical stages 
of existence.  On the one hand, the experience of boredom exposes the threefold 
constitution of the reflectively aesthetic life.  First, boredom evinces the essential nihilism 
that is achieved in reflective aestheticism, whereby the aesthete is alienated from its world.  
Second, boredom founds the aesthetic praxis, to the extent that the unbearability of 
boredom is what motivates the aesthetic project of poetic self-composition.  Third, 
boredom constitutes the only unity maintained by the aesthetic life, insofar as the aesthete 
rejects committing itself to anything except the continual avoidance of boredom.  
Summarily, boredom characterizes the nature of this aesthetic life-view, in which there is 
 
550 Ibid, 257. 
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no continuity with the world.  On the other hand, Kierkegaard’s conception of boredom 
sets into relief the features of the ethical stage of existence, emphasizing the differences 
between the latter and the aesthetic stage.  That boredom is an essential feature of 
aestheticism and is founded by the latter’s nihilistic discontinuity between self and world 
indicates the importance of the notion of continuity in Kierkegaard’s understanding of the 
development of personality.  In the ethical stage of life, the person surmounts boredom by 
establishing continuity with its concrete situation by viewing that latter as essentially co-
constitutive of the person’s project of self-determination.  Accordingly, Kierkegaard’s 
conception of boredom crucially defines the aesthetic and ethical stages of personal 
development, setting into relief the essential constitution of both stages. 
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